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1 Preface
This thesis consists of four papers that combined constitute my PhD. In the following I wish
to extend my gratitude to all the people who helped me make this thesis possible. First and
foremost I would like to thank my Adviser Professor Anders Sørensen who also coauthors
chapter 3. This thesis has beneted much from your continued guidance and inspiration. I
especially want to thank you for always taking an interest in me, as my friend and mentor, when
working together and when discussing subjects outside your own research areas. And referring
to the latter, I would also like to thank you for your continued support and encouragement
to write about the things I found most interesting, even though they were not all part of my
original intends for this PhD
The next group of people that deserves a special appreciation is my fellow students at CBS,
CEBR and Princeton. Without you, these years would have been so much less inspiring and
enjoyable. A very special thanks goes to Daniel le Maire my coauthor to chapter 1 and 2. I
have enjoyed and beneted enormously from working with you, not only in this PhD, but in
all the years since we started our studies together at KU in 1998. I cherish your continued
friendship, and your dedicated and curious nature has always been an aspiration to me. There
are a number of people here in Denmark and in the US that deserves mentioning, but since I
am sure you all know how much I have enjoyed my time with you I will conne this thanks to
the two people that I spent the most time with in the past three years Esben and Frederik-
Thank you for great discussions and for making CBS such a welcoming place.
I am grateful that I was given the opportunity to write this PhD being part of the faculty at
CBS and the research community at CEBR. To all of my colleagues there - thank you for making
these years enjoyable and for your engagement and willingness for discussion. Specially, I would
like to thank my co-adviser Professor HC Kongsted for many great advices and also thanks to
the coauthors to chapter 3 Mikael Andersen and Professor Michael Rosholm. I would also like
to extend a special thanks to Professor Peter Mølgaard and Professor Svend-Erik Hougaard for
your continued commitment to creating an outstanding working environment and for always
taking interest and being helpful.
A very rewarding part of my PhD was the year at Princeton University and I am grateful
for this rewarding opportunity. So many people inspired me and helped make my time there
utmost enjoyable. Of all things I probably benetted the most from Professor Orley Ashenfelter
and Professor Alan Krugers labor economics course, and from discussing my work with them.
Also, thanks to Professor Bo Honore for welcoming me in Princeton and for all the valuable
and much appreciated comments you have given me. Moreover, my Princeton experience would
not have been possible without the generous contributions I received from Danmark-Amerika
Fondet, Augustinus Fonden, DAs Jubilæums Fond, GTN Fonden, Hedorf Fond, Købmand
Svend Hansen og Hustru Ina Hansen Fond, Oticon Fonden, Otto Mønsteds Fond and Rudolph
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Als Fondet.
Next I feel very fortunate for the chance of following courses with a number of the worlds
leading economist made possible by the DGPE program. Especially the people of CAM at
Copenhagen University have been very welcoming and I have benetted much from presenting
my research there and from participating in numerous seminars, courses and conferences.
Also thanks to all my former colleagues in the Rockwool Foundation Research Unit and the
Danish Welfare commission for their help in shaping me as economist.
Last by certainly not least, I would like thank my friends and family for their continued
support and my girlfriend Nynne for inspiring me to always do my best, for your unconditional
support even when worlds apart, and for keeping my head above water whenever times were
tough.
Christian Scheuer,
Copenhagen, June 2009
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2 Introduction
"Leaping into the future of labor economics: the research potential of linking employer and
employee data" is the title of a paper by Daniel S Hammermesh published in Labour Economics
in 1999. I quote it here, since it captures much of my motivation for the work included in this
thesis. Considering applied micro econometrics and labor economics my main elds of interest,
the development of linked employer-employee data that took place in Denmark around the time
of the new millennium, marked new and exciting possibilities.
For some years Danish researchers have had access to very detailed information on all people
living in Denmark, but at the beginning of this century also data on all companies linked to these
persons was being made available for research. Combined with modern computer technology
this meant access to a linked database following all employers and all employees in Denmark
over time.
I had no doubt that this should be the centerpiece of my Ph.D. The result has been two
lines of research, one studying the e¤ect of globalization on labor demand in Denmark, and one
studying sorting, that is, how and why employers meet employees in the labor market. In the
summary I treat each line of research independently although I would like to emphasize, that
studying a labor market where rms and workers reacts to one another is the corner stone in
both.
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3 Summary
Chapter 2, 3 and 4 are the main chapters of this thesis, while chapter 1 on the determinants
of labor force participation for recipients of social assistance (coauthored by Daniel le Maire)
is included and important as well. This rst chapter is the earliest of the 4 papers included
and was conducted for the Danish Welfare Commission, and as such it is not closely related
to the rest of the thesis. The main objective of this rst paper is to quantify the importance
of economic incentives for persons receiving social assistance in Denmark. The paper includes
two empirical strategies for determining to what degree economic incentives are important for
persons receiving social assistance. Firstly, we use within-individual variation in the recipients
spouse income, and secondly we compute and use own potential net gain of working compared
to receiving social assistance. From the recipients spouse income we nd no employment e¤ects,
a result consistent with workers receiving social assistance benets being marginalized in the
labor market. This nding is supported by the groups compressed wage distribution and
the strong state dependence in their labor market status. Using own potential net gain of
working compared to receiving social assistance we nd participation elasticities in the range
of 0.28-0.44 for men and 0.62-0.68 for women. However, in the paper we argue that unobserved
heterogeneity likely implies these estimates to be upward biased.
Chapter 2 (coauthored with Daniel le Maire) is about positive assortative matching in the
labor market, or more specically we seek to address the questions if and how above average
productive workers ends up in above average productive rms. The paper includes both a
theoretical and empirical part and is probably the most comprehensive of the four chapters in
this thesis. This paper was impelled by what we considered to be an empirical puzzle. While we
nd it intuitively that high productive workers should choose to work in high productive rms,
the existing empirical evidence found no such evidence, in fact, several papers claim evidence
for the opposite result.
In order to analyze this counter-intuitive result, the rst part of the paper sets up a the-
oretical search model with two important capabilities. Firstly, the model predicts positive
assortative matching and secondly, the model implies a log wage equation that is additive-
separable in worker and rm productivity. Thus, the model deals with the problem that the
canonical search model needs log-supermodularity of the production function for assortative
matching to arise, which implies that the wage equation is not additive separable. The reason
we want an additive separable wage equation is, that this is a key assumption in the existing
empirical models used to analyze assortative matching, and hence, with this capability our
model can be directly tested against existing estimation procedures. What we do is to allow
workers to determine how many jobs they apply for, which we then prove to imply that a
supermodular production function, which delivers the wage equation needed, implies positive
assortative matching. Furthermore, our model encompasses continuous heterogeneity on both
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the worker and rm side, and we add a match productivity e¤ect. We show that with such
a match e¤ect present and with positive assortative matching taking place in the model, the
existing empirical procedure applied to our simulated data estimates negative correlation be-
tween the worker and rm e¤ects. Also we compute several empirical estimates on Danish
matched employer-employee data and estimate that a match e¤ect in the wages accounts for
15 per cent of overall log wage variation. All combined we conclude, that the evidence suggests
that positive assortative matching is taking place in the Danish labor market.
Chapter 3 and 4 investigate the implications of international trade for skill-upgrading in
Danish manufacturing rms, i.e., increasing demand for skilled labor. The demand for skilled
and educated labor has increased continuously in relation to unskilled labor in all developed
countries at least over the past two decades. Economic theory suggests two important explana-
tions for this development, technological changes especially within information technology and
globalization, in the form of increasing international trade.
A number of industries have faced increased competition due to increased product import.
Theoretically this has a least two consequences for a country like Denmark. Firstly, a number of
rms will have to close and others will emerge. Secondly, existing rms will have to concentrate
on more skill intensive products, where the industrialized countries have the largest comparative
advantages compared to low wage countries. Empirically however, the latter mechanism has
been challenged as several papers have presented evidence that increased demand for educated
labor in developed countries has taken place in all industries and not especially in the industries
exposed to the highest degree of international competition.
The vast majority of existing studies of changes in rmslabor demand are conducted on
industry level data. The employer-employee data base that we gained access to, o¤ered new
and exciting possibilities and a chance to readdress some of the questions raised previously in
the literature.
In chapter 3 (coauthored by Mikael Andersen, Michael Rosholm and Anders Sørensen) two
distinct mechanisms through which internationalization potentially inuences rmsdemand
for skilled and unskilled labor are analyzed.
The rst mechanism is an internal rm e¤ect investigating whether there is a signicant
correlation between skill-upgrading and rm imports. What we have in mind is the standard
story of decreases costs of purchasing inputs from abroad leading rms either to produce fewer
inputs themselves or to buy fewer inputs from domestic producers. Since production of the
relevant inputs is intensive in unskilled labor this leads to lower shares of unskilled workers in
production.
The second mechanism is an external product e¤ect investigating whether skill-upgrading
is caused by aggregate imports of a particular product type. The mechanism that we have
in mind here, is that rms as a consequence of increasing import competition gradually move
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into more skill-intensive production to avoid increasing foreign competition from low-wage
countries. Import competition in domestic product markets is a measure of aggregate imports
of the product types that the rm produces.
According to our knowledge, this is the rst paper that studies both of these aspects si-
multaneously. We have information on origin, value and type of good for nearly all imports in
all Danish manufacturing rms. We use this information to split imports according to coun-
try of origin in two groups; Imports from low- and middle-income countries and imports from
high-income countries. We nd that it is of crucial importance to distinguish imports - both
in the form of rm import and import competition - by country-of-origin. Furthermore, we
conclude that increasing import competition from low-wage countries leads to within-rm skill-
upgrading. This nding is robust to di¤erent denitions of import competition relevant for the
single rm and with respect to the details of the applied product classications (3 to 5 digit
SITC codes). Moreover, the internal rm e¤ect, i.e., rm imports from low-wage countries, is
found to be positively and signicantly correlated with skill-upgrading within rms but only
when restricting the focus to larger rms.
Chapter 4 contributes by showing that rethinking how to use the information on the inter-
nal rm e¤ect can reintroduce this e¤ect as an important determinant for skill-upgrading in
Denmark. Also, this chapter contains a thorough examination of the potential pitfalls posed by
using input-output tables to analyze skill-upgrading. Using information from the UN on their
Broad Economic Categories imports is further decomposed according to whether the goods
are intermediate inputs or nal goods. The ability to decomposed rm level imports both
according to country of origin and level of processing leads to three main conclusions. Firstly,
using gures from input-output tables and thus disregarding import of nal products will sig-
nicantly bias the results and lead to an under-evaluation of imports role for skill-upgrading.
Secondly, distinguishing imports according to country of origin and level of processing is of
vital importance. Thirdly, the explanatory power of import of nal goods for skill-upgrading
is rapidly increasing with rm size. The paper argues that the last fact can be interpreted as
supporting the hypothesis either that larger rms have advantage in utilizing the import of
nal good production from low- and middle-income countries due to scale (e.g. by setting up
own production) or that smaller rms to a larger degree utilize third party trading companies,
whereby, their "imports" simply do not show up in import data statistics.
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4 Summary in Danish
Kapitlerne 2, 3 og 4 er de vigtigste i denne afhandling, men kapitel 1 the determinants of
labor force participation for recipients of social assistance(med Daniel le Maire som medfor-
fatter) er også vigtig og derfor inkluderet. Dette første kapitel er det tidligste af de 4 papirer,
som er medtaget her. Papiret blevet skrevet som arbejde for Velfærdskommission, og er som
sådan ikke nært beslægtet med resten af afhandlingen. Hovedformålet er at kvanticere be-
tydningen af økonomiske incitamenter for personer, der modtager kontanthjælp i Danmark. I
papiret følges to forskellige empiriske strategier for at bestemmer i hvor høj grad økonomiske
incitamenter er vigtige for personer, der modtager kontanthjælp. Første anvendes variationen
i ægtefællers indkomst, og derefter beregnes og anvendes egen potentiel nettogevinst ved at
arbejde i forhold til at modtager kontanthjælp. Vi nder at ægtefællers indkomst er uden be-
tydning for kontanthjælpsmodtageres deltagelsesbeslutning, et resultat, som er konsistent med,
at denne gruppe er marginaliseret på arbejdsmarkedet. Et faktum, der understøttes af denne
gruppes sammenpressede lønstruktur og den høje grad af observeret persistens i gruppens ar-
bejdsmarkeds status. Anvendes egen potentielle nettogevinst ved at arbejde i forhold til at
modtager kontanthjælp nder vi deltagelseselasticiteter i størrelsesordenen 0,28-0,44 for mænd
og 0,62-0,68 for kvinder. Imidlertid argumenters der i papirer for, at uobserverbar heterogenitet
sandsynligvis indebærer, at disse skøn er overvurderet.
Kapitel 2 (med Daniel le Maire som medforfatter) handler om positive assortativ matchn-
ing på arbejdsmarkedet, eller mere specikt forsøger vi at adressere spørgsmålene om hvorvidt
og hvordan arbejdere, som er mere produktive end gennemsnittet, ender i virksomheder, som
ligeledes er mere produktive end gennemsnittet. Papir indeholder både en teoretisk og en em-
pirisk del og er nok det mest omfattende af de re kapitler i denne afhandling. Papiret blev frem-
provokeret af, hvad vi mente, var et kontraintuitivt resultat i eksisterende empiriske metoder.
Mens vi fandt det intuitivt at højproduktive arbejdere burde vælge at arbejde i højproduk-
tive virksomheder, så kunne de eksisterende empiriske metoder ikke underbygge dette. Faktisk
påstod ere papirer at have fundet beviser for det modsatte resultat.
For nærmere at analysere dette kontraintuitive resultat opstilles der i første del af papirer
en teoretisk søgemodel med to vigtige egenskaber. Dels giver modellen anledning til positive
assortativ matchning, dels medfører modellen en log lønligning, der er additiv separabel imellem
arbejder- og virksomhedsproduktivitet. Dermed løser modellen det problem, at den kanoniske
søgemodel kræver en log-supermodulær produktionsfunktion før end assortativ matchning kan
opstå, hvilket så igen indebærer, at lønligningen ikke er additiv separabel. Årsagen til, at vi
ønsker en additiv separabel lønligning, er, at dette er en vigtig forudsætning for de eksisterende
empiriske modeller, der anvendes til at analysere assortativ matchning, og dermed en egenskab,
der medfører, at vores model kan anvendes til direkte at teste eksisterende empiriske estimatorer.
For at opnå de ønskede egenskaber tillader vi arbejderne at vælge antallet af jobs de ansøger,
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hvilket vi så beviser, medfører, at en supermodular produktionsfunktion, som giver den ønskede
lønligning, leder til positive assortativ matchning. Desuden indbefatter vores model kontinuert
heterogenitet på både arbejder- og virksomhedssiden, of vi tilføjer desuden en matchspecik
produktivitets e¤ekt. Vi viser, at når vi inkluderer en matchspecik produktivitets e¤ekt, så
medfører det, at selvom modellen indbefatter positiv assortativ matchning, så estimerer de
eksisterende empiriske procedurer anvendt på simulerede data fra modellen negativ korrelation
imellem arbejder- og virksomhedsproduktivitet. Desuden udføres en række empiriske estimater
på danske arbejder/virksomheds data, og vi estimerer, at den match specikke produktivitets
e¤ekt udgør 15 procent af den samlede variation i (log)lønningerne. Alt i alt konkluderer vi, at
de foreliggende resultater peger på, at positive assortativ matchning nder sted på det danske
arbejdsmarked.
Kapitel 3 og 4 beskæftigede sig med konsekvenserne af international handel for den stigende
efterspørgsel efter uddannet arbejdskraft i danske virksomheder. Efterspørgslen efter uddannet
i forhold til ufaglært arbejdskraft er steget gradvist i alle udviklede lande igennem de seneste
årtier. Økonomisk teori peger på to vigtige forklaringer for denne udvikling, teknologiske
ændringer især inden for it, og globalisering i form af stigende international handel.
En række industrier har oplevet øget konkurrence som følge af øget produkt import. Teo-
retisk har dette mindst to konsekvenser for et land som Danmark. For det første vil en række
virksomheder lukke, mens andre nye vil opstå. For det andet vil eksisterende virksomheder
koncentrere sig om mere uddannelsesintensive produkter, hvor de industrialiserede lande har
størst konkurrencefordele i forhold til lavtlønslande.
Sidstnævnte mekanisme er imidlertid blevet udfordret empirisk af ere papirer, som har
fremlagt beviser for, at en øget efterspørgsel efter uddannet arbejdskraft har fundet sted i
alle brancher og ikke specielt i de brancher, som udsat for den højeste grad af international
konkurrence.
Langt størstedelen af de eksisterende studier af ændringer i virksomhedernes arbejdskraft-
sefterspørgsel gennemføres på industri data. Den arbejder og virksomheds database, som vi
har opnået adgang til her, åbner imidlertid for nye og spændende muligheder og en chance for
at revurdere nogle af de spørgsmåls, som tidligere er blevet opstillet i litteraturen.
I kapitel 3 (med Mikael Andersen, Michael Rosholm og Anders Sørensen som medforfattere)
analyseres to forskellige mekanismer, gennem hvilke internationalisering potentielt påvirker
virksomhedernes efterspørgsel efter uddannet og ufaglært arbejdskraft.
Den første mekanisme, en intern rma e¤ekt, undersøger om der er signikant sammenhæng
imellem den stigende efterspørgsel efter uddannet arbejdskraft og virksomheds import. Det, vi
har i tankerne, er den gængse historie om, at lavere omkostninger ved køb af input fra andre
lande vil medføre at virksomheder enten producerer færre varer selv eller køber færre input fra
andre indenlandske producenter. Da produktionen af de importerede varer er intensiv i ufaglært
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arbejdskraft vil dette medføre en lavere andele af ufaglærte arbejdere i fremstillingserhvervene.
Den anden mekanisme, en ekstern produkt e¤ekt, undersøger hvorvidt den stigende efter-
spørgsel efter uddannet arbejdskraft skyldes den samlede import af bestemte varetyper. Den
mekanisme, som vi har i tankerne her, er, at virksomheder som følge af stigende importkonkur-
rence gradvis bevæger sig imod mere uddannelsesintensiv produktion for at undgå stigende
konkurrence fra lavtlønslande. Importkonkurrence er den samlede import af de varetyper, som
en given virksomheden producerer.
Så vidt vi ved, er dette det første papir, der undersøgelser begge disse aspekter samtidig. Vi
har oplysninger om oprindelse, værdi og type af produkt for næsten al import i alle danske frem-
stillingsvirksomheder. Vi bruger disse oplysninger til at opdele import efter oprindelsesland i to
grupper; import fra lav- og mellemindkomstlande, og import fra højindkomstlande. Vi nder,
at det er af afgørende betydning at skelne import efter oprindelsesland, både når det gælder
virksomhedens import og import konkurrence. Endvidere konkluderer vi, at øget importkonkur-
rence fra lavtlønslande medfører, at virksomheder øger deres efterspørgsel efter uddannet ar-
bejdskraft. Resultat er robust overfor forskellige relevante denitioner af importkonkurrence
for den enkelte virksomhed og med hensyn til aggregeringsniveauet af de anvendte produkt
klassikationer (3 til 5 cifret SITC-koder). Desuden nder vi, at den interne virksomhedse¤ekt,
dvs. virksomhedens egen import fra lavtlønslande, er positivt signikant korreleret med øget
efterspørgsel efter uddannet arbejdskraft, men kun når fokus begrænses til større virksomheder.
Kapitel 4s bidrag er at vise, at ved at revidere hvordan man bruger oplysninger om den
interne virksomhed e¤ekt, kan man reintroducere denne e¤ekt som en vigtig faktor for den
øgede efterspørgsel efter uddannet arbejdskraft i Danmark. Kapitlet indeholder endvidere en
grundig analyse af de potentielle faldgruber ved at anvende input-output tabeller til at analysere
efterspørgsel efter uddannet arbejdskraft. Ved at anvende FNs Broad Economic Categories
opdeles importen yderligere efter, om varerne er til forbrug i produktionen eller til endelig
anvendelse. Evnen til at opdele import på virksomhedsniveau både efter oprindelsesland og
forarbejdningsgrad fører til tre vigtigste konklusioner. For det første vil anvendelse af data, som
man kender det fra input-output tabeller hvor importen af færdigvarer ignoreres, i høj grad fører
til, at e¤ekten af import på den øgede efterspørgsel efter uddannet arbejdskraft undervurderes.
For det andet vises det, at en opdeling af import efter oprindelsesland og forarbejdningsgrad er
af afgørende betydning for resultaterne. For det tredje vises det, at e¤ekten af import af varer
til endelig anvendelse for den øgede efterspørgsel efter uddannet arbejdskraft er kraftig stigende
med virksomhedernes størrelse. Papiret argumenterer for, at dette sidste forhold kan fortolkes
som støtte til en hypotese om, at større virksomheder har en fordel ved at importere produkter
til endelig anvendelse fra lav- og mellemindkomstlande på grund af stordriftsfordele (fx ved at
etablere egen produktion i lavtlønslande) eller, at mindre virksomheder i højere grad udnytter
danske handelsselskaber, hvorefter deres "import" ganske enkelt ikke medtages i importdata
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statistikker.
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Determinants of Labor Force Participation for
Recipients of Social Assistance: A Panel Data Analysis
for Denmark
Daniel le Maire
University of Copenhagen and CAM
Christian Scheuer
Copenhagen Business School and CEBR
June, 2009
Abstract
In this paper we seek to examine the e¤ects of economic incentives for recipients
of social assistance. The workers receiving social assistance benets are found to be
marginalized and we nd strong state dependence in their labor market status. We nd no
employment e¤ects from the within-individual variation in the recipientsspouse incomes,
and in contrast to Hyslop (1999) and Croda and Kyriazidou (2002) we argue that for the
case of Denmark the spouse income is endogenous, so that we cannot use the between
variation of spouse income to obtain meaningful estimates. Therefore, we also compute
the net potential gain of working over receiving social assistance. Using this measure we
nd participation elasticities of 0.28-0.44 for men and in the range of 0.62-0.68 for women.
Transforming the elasticities according to denition in the CGE-model DREAM, that is
the percentage change in the number of recipients from a percentage change in the income,
these amount to 0.09-0.17 and 0.13-0.20 for respectively men and women. However, we
argue that it is likely that unobserved heterogeneity implies that both sets of estimated
elasticities are upward biased.
Keywords: Labor force particpation, incentives, nonemployment, state dependence,
heterogeneity.
JEL Classication: C23, C25, J21, J24.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider intertemporal labor supply and examine the e¤ects of economic
incentives on the labor market participation for recipients of social assistance.
The labor supply decision is usually decomposed into the intensive margin, that is the
choice of hours, and the extensive margin, that is the participation decision. Even though it
is generally believed (see e.g. Heckman (1993)) that the largest e¤ects are to be found on
the extensive margin, most empirical studies have focused on the intensive margin. Empirical
studies for Denmark have typically found numerical small elasticities from wages on the amount
of labor supplied; see e.g. Frederiksen et al. (2001). In fact, the studies that have found largest
elasticities have used a Tobit framework and, hence, it seems as if the small elasticities at the
intensive margin have been polluted by the jointly modeling of the participation decision.
In Denmark several types of benets exist. Each of them is more or less directed to a distinct
group of people. With respect to participation, recipients of sickness benets and disablement
benets are for obvious reasons less interesting. Therefore, we restrict our attention to the
recipients of social assistance that is persons that are not eligible to unemployment benets
either because they are not members of an unemployment insurance fund or since they have
not been in work recently.
We have access to a rich panel dataset, and we present results from employing di¤erent panel
data estimators. The rst set of estimations follow Hyslop (1999) and Croda and Kyriazidou
(2003) closely in the sense that we estimate the e¤ect on the participation decision using spouse
disposable income separated into permanent and temporary income.
Focusing solely on married women Hyslop (1999) and Croda and Kyriazidou (2003) argue
that spouse income is exogenous due to di¤erences in the participation pattern between men
and women. Hyslop (1999) nds elasticities of respectively permanent and transitory spouse
income of -0.2 and -0.04 for the US, while Croda and Kyriazidou (2003) for Germany nd
only very small e¤ects from both permanent and transitory spouse income on the participation
decision. However, in the case of Denmark the di¤erence in participation between men and
women is less pronounced (see e.g. Dex et al. (1995) for a cross-national comparison) and
we should expect a similar picture to emerge for men and women among recipients of social
assistance. Consequently, we also perform the estimations for men.
Instead of solely restricting our attention to the e¤ect of spouse income on participation, we
also estimate a set of models where we analyze the e¤ect of the workers own disposable income
gap from working on the participation decision To compute these income gaps we make panel
data selectivity predictions of the own wage income for each person. From this we can calculate
the disposable income from working full-time and compare this to the disposable income when
receiving social assistance.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a theoretical labor market
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search model. Section 3 outlines the data used in the analysis, and section 4 the econometric
methodology. In section 5 and 6, we examine the results when using respectively disposable
spouse income and own predicted disposable income gaps. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
An important aspect of intertemporal labor supply is the persistence of labor market status. In
this section we will briey consider a stylized labor market search model, which can generate
such pattern.
We extend a standard partial equilibrium search model with a stigmatizing e¤ect of becom-
ing nonemployed and by assuming an instant utility function, which is non-linear in income.
The rst assumption will similarly to Garibaldi and Wasmer (2004) imply state dependence,
whereas the latter assumption will allow us to focus on the e¤ect of the spouses income, which
we take to be exogenous to the worker in consideration.
Consider an indenitely living worker, who is married and whose spouses labor market
status is exogenous. We assume a joint instant utility function u (), where the workers own
labor income w and her spouse labor income s are perfect substitutes. Being employed or
nonemployed, wage o¤ers are distributed according to F (w) and arrive with the exogenous
Poisson rate . Workers who decline the new wage o¤er become non-employed.
When an employed worker becomes nonemployed the worker experiences a one-time stigma-
tization e¤ect . When ht 1 = f0; 1g denotes the labor market state of the previous period the
value of being nonemployed U (ht 1) is given by
rU (ht 1) = u (s+ b  ht 1) + 
Z 1
 1
max (W (x) ; U (0)) dF (x)  U (ht 1)

(1)
where r is the discount rate andW (w) is the value of being employed at wage w. The Bellman
equation for an employed worker is
rW (w) = u (s+ w) + 
Z 1
 1
max (W (x) ; U (1)) dF (x) W (w)

(2)
The reservation wage for an nonemployedRU is the wage where the worker is indi¤erent between
being unemployed and working, that is U (0) = W
 
RU

u (s+ b)  u  s+RU =  Z 1
 1
max (W (x) ; U (1)) dF (x)  
Z 1
 1
max (W (x) ; U (0)) dF (x) (3)
Similarly, the reservation wage for an employed RW is when U (1) = W
 
RW

u (s+ b  )  u  s+RW  =  Z 1
 1
max (W (x) ; U (1)) dF (x)  
Z 1
 1
max (W (x) ; U (0)) dF (x) (4)
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Equating equations (3) and (4) gives us
u
 
s+RU
  u  s+RW  = u (s+ b)  u (s+ b  )
and performing a rst-order Taylor series approximation in respectively s+RU and s+ b gives
us
u0
 
s+RU
  
RW  RU =  u0 (s+ b)  ,
RW = RU   u
0 (s+ b)
u0 (s+RU )
 (5)
where it is obvious that RW < RU which implies that employed persons have a higher proba-
bility of being employed in the subsequent time period.
Re-arranging equation (4) and integrating by parts gives us
u (s+ b  )  u  s+RW  =   
r + 
Z RU
RW
u0 (s+ x)F (x) dx
and by use of a Taylor series expansion in the point s+RW the reservation wage for a nonem-
ployed is
Rw = b   + 
r + 
Z RU
RW
u0 (s+ x)
u0 (s+RW )
F (x) dx (6)
With a strictly concave utility function the fraction inside the integral is always less than 1,
but will be increasing towards 1 as the spouses income increases and, hence, imply a higher
reservation wage RW . Moreover, since RU > b the di¤erence between the two reservation wages
RU and RW is declining in the spouse income.
In the present model state dependence is a result of the stigmatization e¤ect, but also loss
of skill by becoming non-employed can imply state dependence. Furthermore, in Garibaldi and
Wasmer (2004) state dependence arises when search costs are higher for nonemployed workers
and the value of home market production is stochastic. In addition to this, state dependence
can arise if employers use nonemployment as a signal of low productivity. Finally, Hyslop (1999)
argues that state dependence also can arise if the marginal utility of consumption is greater
when working.
3 Data
We have access to an unbalanced panel dataset for 1998-2003.1 The dataset is a representative
10 per cent sample of the Danish population. The variables originate from ve databases. The
rst four databases, the Income Registry, the IDA database, the Housing Registry and the
Health Insurance Registry are all maintained by Statistics Denmark. The fth database is the
1In fact, we also have information for 1997, but these are only used to construct the lagged dependent
variable used when estimating dynamic discrete choice models.
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DREAM database of the Danish Ministry of Employment.
Our interest lies in the group of people in contact with the social assistance system. Social
assistance benets are lower than unemployment benets and the recipients are persons that
are not eligible to unemployment benets either since they are not insured in an unemployment
insurance fund or since they had not recently been in work for a su¢ cient long period of time.
Hence, for most workers in the Danish labor market the relevant alternative to not work is
unemployment benets. Therefore, the characteristics of recipients of social assistance di¤er
remarkably from workers in the labor force, and in this paper we only include persons that in
at least one of the years covered, 1998-2003, have primarily been receiving social assistance.
We dene a recipient of social assistance as a person who has received social assistance benets
in the majority of the year, that is, at least 27 weeks in a given calendar year according to the
DREAM Registry, which contains information on all transfers of public benets on a weekly
basis. For these persons we include information for all years available where the individual was
either primarily receiving social assistance or primarily was in the labor force. In other words,
persons who have been employed in all years are not included in our sample.
Since we are going to model the Danish tax system and compute the taxes paid in vari-
ous scenarios, we further exclude self-employed, assisting wives, and people not fully taxable
in Denmark in a given year from the sample. In addition to this, we have chosen not to in-
clude persons observed only once, since they cannot be used in the majority of our estimation
procedures.
In Table 1 and 2 we present some characteristics of our sample divided by gender. Hourly
gross wage and the partners disposable income are in constant (1997) Danish kroner. Each
table consists of six columns. The rst column contains mean values for our full sample, while
the next four columns have information on di¤erent sub-samples according to the individuals
transition pattern between social assistance and work. The sixth and nal column is included
to facilitate the understanding of how the characteristics of our sample di¤er from the labor
force. Here, we show mean values for a 33 per cent sample of all Danes who have been in the
labor force for at least one year in the period of 1998-2003.
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Table 1: Mean values for males
Full
sam-
ple
Social
assis-
tance all
years
Single
transition
from
social
assistance
Single
transition
from work
Multiple
Transi-
tions
Population
Mean
Experience 4.91 3.13 4.88 8.12 6.58 17.27
(5:95) (4:78) (5:89) (6:86) (6:05) (9:87)
Age 35.89 36.65 35.42 35.89 34.16 40.64
(9:73) (10:02) (9:71) (9:37) (9:01) (10:72)
Neuro medicine() 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0:24) (0:27) (0:17) (0:28) (0:17) (0:39)
Psychiatry() 0.15 0.22 0.07 0.15 0.05 0.03
(1:38) (1:70) (0:90) (1:32) (0:69) (0:64)
General medical treatment() 8.73 10.04 6.76 8.98 7.03 4.91
(17:80) (20:10) (13:13) (18:69) (13:75) (9:86)
Unskilled 0.70 0.73 0.67 0.66 0.69 0.29
(0:46) (0:44) (0:47) (0:48) (0:46) (0:45)
Vocational training 0.23 0.19 0.24 0.29 0.26 0.46
(0:42) (0:39) (0:43) (0:45) (0:44) (0:50)
Short-cycle higher education 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06
(0:15) (0:16) (0:15) (0:13) (0:14) (0:23)
Medium-cycle higher education 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.11
(0:17) (0:17) (0:20) (0:14) (0:14) (0:31)
Long-cycle higher education 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.08
(0:15) (0:16) (0:15) (0:13) (0:12) (0:28)
Immigrant 0.28 0.35 0.35 0.14 0.14 0.04
(0:45) (0:48) (0:48) (0:34) (0:35) (0:20)
Second generation immigrant 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0:09) (0:09) (0:08) (0:08) (0:10) (0:06)
Married 0.25 0.29 0.32 0.16 0.17 0.56
(0:44) (0:45) (0:47) (0:37) (0:37) (0:50)
Copenhagen 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.18 0.19 0.10
(0:41) (0:42) (0:41) (0:39) (0:39) (0:30)
Large city 0.19 0.22 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.14
(0:39) (0:42) (0:39) (0:37) (0:35) (0:35)
Rural area 0.48 0.45 0.48 0.54 0.53 0.64
(0:50) (0:50) (0:50) (0:50) (0:50) (0:48)
Children aged 0-6 years 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.21 0.23 0.30
(0:67) (0:74) (0:68) (0:56) (0:57) (0:63)
Children aged 7-17 years 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.19 0.24 0.42
(0:75) (0:84) (0:76) (0:58) (0:64) (0:76)
Owner 0.42 0.39 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.68
(0:49) (0:49) (0:50) (0:50) (0:50) (0:47)
Hourly gross wage 112.11 - 113.35 110.50 112.07 154.09
(47:47) (45:68) (49:95) (47:19) (71:83)
Partners disposable income 97968 96101 100072 98251 99981 133770
(32749) (29083) (35136) (36272) (35258) (60918)
No. Years in sample 4.67 4.29 4.98 4.78 5.33 -
(1:44) (1:63) (1:23) (1:23) (0:87)
No. Years of Social Assistance
1 25.32 7.48 48.52 37.18 35.21
2 18.05 10.55 22.62 26.39 25.09
3 14.69 13.03 14.85 17.16 16.65
4 13.92 16.27 9.54 12.12 14.65
5 12.81 20.05 4.46 7.15 8.40
6 15.21 32.61 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample Size 41,390 19,298 8,341 7,469 6,282 573,498
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
() These variables originate from the Health Insurance Registry and are computed as the yearly
number of treatments with support from the Danish health system within the given area.
Table 1 shows that the full sample of men consists of 41,390 observations. Looking at the
number of years the individuals received social assistance; about 25 per cent received social
assistance in just one year during 1998-2003 while about 15 per cent received social assistance
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in the full period.
From the sample means a few things are worth noticing. Firstly, even though the mean
age is approximately 36 years the mean value of experience (in years) is only approximately 5
years. Secondly, 70 per cent are unskilled compared to 29 per cent in the active population.
The combination of lower experience and lower levels of education suggest a high degree of
persistence in the labor market status, since males receiving social assistance are clearly less
likely to become employed compared to the average male in the active population.
Furthermore, as the average experience indicates our sample is quite di¤erent from the av-
erage population suggesting that the group under consideration is marginalized in the labor
market. The most prominent di¤erences are that 28 per cent of the sample of men are immi-
grants compared to 4 per cent in the active Danish population. In addition to this, the average
wage is 112 DKK per hour while the mean wage for private employed males was 154 DKK.
Finally, only 42 per cent are homeowners (68 per cent is the active population)
We proceed by splitting the full sample into 4 subgroups; those receiving social assistance all
years (19,298 persons), those who have a single transition from social assistance to work (8,341
persons), those having a single transition from work to social assistance (7,469 persons) and
those who have more than one transition between work and social assistance (6,282 persons).
When breaking the sample down by transition patterns we notice that even though the labor
market experience is quite di¤erent between the three groups of people who at some point have
been on the labor market (4.9-8.1 years) the average wage for the people working is much alike
(111-113 DKK) suggesting that the minimum wage restriction is binding for the majority of
persons belonging to the group. Further, immigrants are much overrepresented among those
receiving social assistance in all years and among those having only one single transition from
social assistance (35 per cent compared to 14 per cent). This may explain why a larger fraction
of these groups is married and why the groups on average have more children.
There is also a striking di¤erence between the spouses average disposable income as it is
much higher for the active population. In particular, the partner income is lowest for those
who are receiving social assistance in all years.
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Table 2: Mean values for females
Full
sam-
ple
Social
assis-
tance all
years
Single
transition
from
social
assistance
Single
transition
from work
Multiple
Transi-
tions
Population
Mean
Experience 2.93 1.82 3.34 6.28 5.05 15.13
(4:60) (3:68) (4:57) (5:80) (5:39) (8:73)
Age 34.36 34.62 33.90 34.48 33.58 41.26
(9:42) (9:69) (9:02) (9:12) (8:75) (10:39)
Neuro medicine() 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0:37) (0:39) (0:32) (0:33) (0:40) (0:26)
Psychiatry() 0.22 0.26 0.13 0.29 0.09 0.07
(1:86) (2:04) (1:24) (2:28) (0:96) (1:21)
General medical treatment() 17.65 19.49 13.66 17.32 15.11 9.38
(31:19) (34:27) (16:08) (37:43) (26:12) (11:37)
Unskilled 0.78 0.83 0.72 0.68 0.71 0.29
(0:42) (0:38) (0:45) (0:47) (0:45) (0:45)
Vocational training 0.16 0.11 0.22 0.27 0.24 0.39
(0:37) (0:32) (0:41) (0:44) (0:42) (0:49)
Short-cycle higher education 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05
(0:13) (0:13) (0:15) (0:10) (0:08) (0:22)
Medium-cycle higher education 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.20
(0:17) (0:17) (0:18) (0:18) (0:16) (0:40)
Long-cycle higher education 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06
(0:10) (0:10) (0:10) (0:11) (0:14) (0:24)
Immigrant 0.32 0.40 0.30 0.11 0.12 0.03
(0:47) (0:49) (0:46) (0:32) (0:33) (0:18)
Second generation immigrant 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0:08) (0:08) (0:10) (0:10) (0:05) (0:05)
Married 0.32 0.37 0.33 0.19 0.18 0.62
(0:47) (0:48) (0:47) (0:39) (0:39) (0:49)
Copenhagen 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.10
(0:38) (0:39) (0:36) (0:38) (0:38) (0:31)
Large city 0.18 0.21 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.14
(0:39) (0:41) (0:37) (0:33) (0:33) (0:35)
Rural area 0.53 0.51 0.55 0.58 0.56 0.63
(0:50) (0:50) (0:50) (0:49) (0:50) (0:48)
Children aged 0-6 years 0.63 0.72 0.53 0.44 0.49 0.30
(0:86) (0:93) (0:74) (0:69) (0:74) (0:61)
Children aged 7-17 years 0.69 0.73 0.69 0.51 0.61 0.50
(1:02) (1:09) (0:94) (0:83) (0:87) (0:80)
Owner 0.28 0.23 0.34 0.38 0.36 0.71
(0:45) (0:42) (0:47) (0:48) (0:48) (0:45)
Hourly gross wage 100.99 - 100.59 100.60 102.53 122.83
(41:81) (36:82) (44:72) (49:80) (47:46)
Partners disposable income 108228 99405 123651 116514 121150 173982
(43080) (38738) (44089) (49192) (45992) (121702)
No. Years in sample 4.62 4.45 4.87 4.57 5.19 -
(1:46) (1:60) (1:25) (1:27) (0:91)
No. Years of Social Assistance
1 19.91 6.44 42.41 37.41 34.08
2 14.78 9.19 22.57 25.14 20.17
3 14.19 11.37 18.69 16.13 20.11
4 14.49 15.88 10.79 14.28 14.30
5 14.57 19.73 5.54 7.04 11.33
6 22.06 37.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample Size 40,170 23,698 8,450 4,686 3,336 532,727
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
() These variables originate from the Health Insurance Registry and are computed as the yearly
number of treatments with support from the Danish health system within the given area.
The corresponding mean values for women are shown in Table 2. The pattern of Table 2 does to
a large extent replicate the pattern in Table 1. Therefore, the most important information we
retrieve is that also female recipients of social assistance seem to be marginalized in the labor
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market. The mean age is 34 years and the mean experience is only 2.9 years, 32 per cent are
immigrants and 78 per cent unskilled. Again breaking down on di¤erent transition patterns we
see that di¤erences in experience are not reected in the wage rate of those employed from the
di¤erent groups, again suggesting the minimum wage restriction to be binding. Furthermore,
the partner income is now somewhat lower for the group receiving social assistance all years.
This may suggest that to some extent persons cohabiting are likely to have a similar attitude
towards participating in the labor market, and that this e¤ect might dominate the positive
income e¤ect exerted by partner earnings as modeled section 2.
4 The Econometric Framework
The estimations dealt with in this paper are reduced-form participation equations. There are
di¤erent possible sources of the persistence in the individual labor market participation. Here,
we study the importance of unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence in generating this
persistence. We do not consider serial correlation in the time-varying error component, which
similar to state dependence implies that transitory changes in the explanatory variable may
have permanent e¤ects on the dependent variable. However, in a similar analysis for Germany
Croda and Kyriazidou (2003) nd that serial correlation in the time-varying error component
does not seem to matter. Hence, we disregarded such error components.
We estimate a number of binary response models. In the following we only shortly consider
the econometric specications, and refer to references mentioned below as well as textbooks
such as Greene (2003) and Wooldridge (2002) for a more detailed treatment.
The rst estimation considered is the pooled probit model
Pr (yit = 1jXit) = 1 (Xit + "it  0) =  (Xit) (7)
where yit is the binary variable for the participation decision of individual i at time t, Xit
contains the explanatory variables, and the error term "it is assumed to be independent of the
explanatory variables and distributed iN (0; 1).
The pooled probit estimator does not exploit the fact that we observe the persons again
and again, and since it is very likely that the errors are correlated because the same persons
are observed several times, we also estimate a random e¤ects probit
Pr (yit = 1jXi; i) = 1 (Xit + i + "it  0) =  (Xit + i) (8)
where the compound error-term i + "it is assumed to be independent of the explanatory
variables and both terms are assumed to be normally distributed.
Absent state dependence transitory changes in X can only cause transitory changes in the
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dependent variable y. Allowing for state dependence is equivalent to allowing transitory changes
in X to have permanent e¤ect on y through the e¤ects of the lagged dependent variable. In
the absence of serial correlation this is the only way in which transitory changes in X can have
permanent e¤ects on y. Failing to allow for state dependence will bias the parameter estimates
in presence of (true) state dependence. In addition, it is of interest whether employment is truly
state-dependent, since this implies that becoming a recipient of social assistance deteriorates
an individuals future labor market prospects. In order to address this issue, we estimate a
dynamic random e¤ects probit
Pr (yit = 1jXi; i; yit 1) = 1 (yit 1 +Xit + i + "it  0) =  (yit 1 +Xit + i) (9)
Estimating a dynamic probit raises the question of how to treat the initial observations of
the dependent variable yi0. Heckman (1981) suggests approximating the conditional density
of the initial dependent variable by estimating a probit using observations from the rst year
only and simultaneously specifying the unobserved heterogeneity conditional on the explana-
tory variables. We use the simpler estimation procedure for the dynamic correlated random
e¤ects probit outlined in Wooldridge (2005) where the approximation of the density of the
initial dependent variable is left out. Instead the unobserved heterogeneity is allowed to be
arbitrarily correlated with the initial dependent variable by inclusion of the initial observation
yi0. Furthermore, we model the unobservable individual component with the means of the
time-varying explanatory variables as in Mundlak (1978) in order to be able to better interpret
the e¤ects of the time-varying variables. This implies that we assume that
i = yi0+ Xi+ i
where   N  0; 2.
We apply these estimators in two scenarios: First, we estimate the e¤ect of changes in
partner income and then we estimate the e¤ect from changes in the workers own potential
disposable income gap from working. Besides these income variables Xit includes a quadratic
term in age and experience, dummy indicators for level of education, living area, ethnic ori-
gin, variables for the number of children, variables for medical treatments as well as variables
capturing the regional demand and supply conditions.
Hyslop argues that the spouses income may have three di¤erent e¤ects on the labor market
participation, a) a direct e¤ect as in the theoretical search model in section 2, b) an expectation
e¤ect as future spouse income increases or decreases may be anticipated, and c) a taste e¤ect
from the spouses having the same taste for work by assortative matching in the marriage
market. In the presence of state dependence, the expectations of future outcomes of explanatory
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variables may a¤ect the current labor market status. This we avoid by assuming that the partner
income follows a stationary process. As in Hyslop (1999) stationarity is achieved by dividing
spouse income into a permanent and a transitory component. The permanent income is just the
average of the spouses income in the period under consideration, while the transitory income
is the yearly deviation from this mean. The taste for work e¤ect can be expected to be in the
individual unobservable component and to be correlated with the permanent spouse income,
which makes the latter endogenous.
For transitory income on the other hand it is probably reasonable to assume no correlation
with taste for work. If this assumption holds there will only be a direct income e¤ect from
transitory income. However, in a life-cycle model transitory income shocks should not have an
e¤ect on labor supply, since agents can smooth out consumption. Only when there exist credit
market constraints transitory spouse income shocks will play a role for the labor supply.
We can take account of possible correlation between i and the time-varying explanatory
variables by estimating correlated random e¤ects and xed e¤ects estimators. Here we ap-
ply two xed e¤ects estimators which both use the logit specication and, hence, instead of
assuming that the error-term "it is normally distributed we assume that it is logistically distrib-
uted. We need to observe a person in two periods when estimating the conditional maximum
likelihood xed e¤ects logit. The idea is that only a person that changes state, that is for a
two-period setting yi1 + yi2 = 1, contributes to the likelihood function. Therefore neither per-
sons employed in all years or persons receiving social assistance in all years a¤ect the likelihood
function in the xed e¤ects logit. For yi1 + yi2 = 1 we have
Pr (yi1 = 1jXi; i; yi1 + yi2 = 1) = exp ((Xi2  Xi1) )
1 + exp ((Xi2  Xi1) ) (10)
As with the random e¤ects probit model, naturally, we want to allow for state dependence.
Chamberlain (1993) has shown that if individuals are only observed in three periods, the para-
meters of the dynamic xed e¤ects logit model are not identied. Subject to some regularity
conditions Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000) have shown that the parameters are identied when
we have four or more consecutive observations per individual. The basic idea follows that of the
conditional likelihood approach. Consider the following events A = fyi0; yi1 = 0; yi2 = 1; yi3g
and B = fyi0; yi1 = 1; yi2 = 0; yi3g where yi0 and yi3 are either 0 or 1. In this case we have
Pr (AjXi; i) = p0 (Xi; i)yi0 (1  p0 (Xi; i))1 yi0  1
1 + exp (Xi1 + yi0 + i)
 exp (Xi2 + i)
1 + exp (Xi2 + i)
 exp (yi3Xi3 + yi3 + yi3i)
1 + exp (Xi3 +  + i)
(11)
23
while
Pr (BjXi; i) = p0 (Xi; i)yi0 (1  p0 (Xi; i))1 yi0  exp (Xi1 + yi0 + i)
1 + exp (Xi1 + yi0 + i)
 1
1 + exp (Xi2 +  + i)
 exp (yi3Xi3 + yi3i)
1 + exp (Xi3 + i)
(12)
Noticing that if Xi2 = Xi3 we can get rid of the is so that we end up with
Pr (AjXi; i; A [B;Xi2 = Xi3) = Pr (AjXi; i; Xi2 = Xi3)
Pr (AjXi; i; Xi2 = Xi3) + Pr (BjXi; i; Xi2 = Xi3)
=
1
1 + exp ((Xi1  Xi2)  +  (yi0   yi3)) (13)
Identication naturally extends to the case with more than 4 observations for each individ-
ual, see Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000). Identication in this case comes from all individuals
changing state between two of the middle periods (that is any period but the rst and last).
Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000) propose to estimate  and  by maximizing
nX
i=1
X
1t<sT 1
24 1 fyit + yis = 1gK Xit+1 Xis+1hn 
ln

exp((Xit Xis)b+g(yit 1 yis+1)+g(yit+1 yis 1)1fs t>1g)yit
1+exp((Xit Xis)b+g(yit 1 yis+1)+g(yit+1 yis 1)1fs t>1g)
 35 (14)
over some compact set and where K () denotes a kernel density function which assigns a large
probability for values where Xit+1 and Xis+1 are close. The advantage of this estimator is that
it is completely agnostic about the nature of individual heterogeneity.
In the second part of the paper we examine the e¤ect of the workers own disposable income
gain between receiving social assistance benets and becoming employed. Since we do not
observe the wage rate of recipients of social assistance we need to make a selectivity-corrected
wage. We do this by estimating the Vella and Verbeek (1998, 1999) sample selection model,
where both the equation of interest and the selection equation include random e¤ects and error
terms that are allowed to be correlated. We have
lnwit = Xit1 + i + it
yit = 1 (yit 1 +Xit2 + i + "it  0) =  (yit 1 +Xit2 + i)
where lnwit is the log of the wage rate, i  iN
 
0; 2

, it  iN
 
0; 2

, i  iN (0; 2), and
"it  iN (0; 2"). Denote the composite error it = i + it. Then, the conditional mean of the
log of the wage rate is given by
E [lnwitjXi; yi0; yi] = Xit +  1it +  2i (15)
24
where the two last terms are the selection bias we correct for, and where  1 = "/2" and
 2 = T
 
   "2

2"
  
2 + T
2


are constants to be estimated.
Similar to Vella and Verbeek (1998) we use the labor market state in the previous year as
exclusion restriction and exploit that the earnings equation is static while the participation
equation is dynamic. This aligns with the theoretical search model in section 2. For example,
consider a negative health shock in the current period. The health shock implies a lower wage
and through the reservation wage a lower probability of participating in the current period and,
thereby, also in the subsequent period. Our identifying assumption is that in the subsequent
period the past periods health shock does not a¤ect the wage, since it is static. Using the
lagged dependent variable as exclusion restriction is not necessary innocuous. For example, if
state dependence arises because employers use unemployment as a signal of low productivity,
it is obviously not reasonable to assume that the wage is not a¤ected by the previous labor
market state.
We compute the workers own disposable income gap on a yearly basis by computing the
disposable income from working full time and subtracting the potential disposable income from
receiving only social assistance.
In order to compute the disposable income when working we begin by estimating the Vella-
Verbeek sample selection model. The resulting wage prediction is used to compute the annual
full-time wage income. Next, we use a detailed modeling of the Danish tax system, which takes
the joint taxation of the spouses into account, in order to calculate the tax payments and nally
we compute the disposable income.
For each person we also make a detailed computation of the social assistance benets they
would be entitled to on a yearly basis. Again, we subtract the appropriate tax payments and
calculate the resulting disposable income.
Furthermore, in both scenarios we take full account of housing benets for renters received
from the government, which depend both on the tenants family income and on the rent.2
With this information we compute the gap between the disposable income when working
full-time and the disposable income of receiving social assistance. We do not take account of
transportation costs and child care costs when we compute the income gaps.
5 Does Partner Income Create Work (dis-)Incentives?
In this section we investigate the importance of the spouses disposable income for the partici-
pation decision by including permanent and transitory spouse income among the explanatory
2The dataset contains information for the yearly rent in 1999. Unfortunately, for only approximately 40 per
cent of dwellings for rent we observe the yearly rent. Following Munch and Svarer (2002) we use Heckmans
(1979) two-step procedure to predict the yearly rent. As exclusion restriction we use the number of apartments
in the building, which has positive e¤ect on the probability of observing a rent.
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variables.
Table 3 gives the results for the estimations on the sample of male workers who at some
point during the sample window primarily received social assistance. As expected, we nd a
signicant hump-shaped e¤ect from higher experience. More experience raises the probability
of participation, but the e¤ect declines with total years of experience. Controlling for this
e¤ect, age actually works in the opposite direction, so that older people ceteris paribus have
lower participation probabilities. Having people with a vocational education as our reference
category, we see that more education increases the probability of working.
We nd that everything else being equal, immigrants have a higher probability of working.
We think this is an e¤ect of immigrants within the social assistance system being a more
heterogenous group than the rest of the recipients. Newly arrived immigrants do not have
access to unemployment benets and this group is likely to contain both marginalized and high
productive individuals.
We have included the local gender specic unemployment rate and the number of regional
vacancies normalized by the labor force to capture demand and supply e¤ects in the regional
labor market. Both variables are signicant with expected signs, that is a positive e¤ect of
more vacancies and a negative e¤ect of a higher unemployment rate.
Having children - and especially young children - lowers the probability of being employed.
Finally, we have included three variables for the health status of the worker. These variables
are dened as the yearly number of treatments with nancial support from the Danish public
health system within the given area. We nd that the more neuro medicine treatments, or the
more consultations with psychiatrists or doctors the lower the probability of being employed.
The rst two specications the pooled probit model and random e¤ects probit model deliver
similar results. Although the pooled probit model correctly predicts 71 per cent of the outcomes,
the confusion matrices in Table 10 appendix A reveal that the pooled probit model only does
a good job in tting the y = 0 outcome, while the dynamic correlated random e¤ects model
in the third column performs much better in tting also the y = 1 outcome. In the dynamic
correlated random e¤ects specication we approximate the unobserved individual part by the
means of age, region dummies, children and health variables besides the random normal term.
Besides the improved overall t the picture does not change much. However, the coe¢ cient
to age becomes positive when the individual mean of age is part of the unobservable part.
Similarly, the children variables become insignicant. The set of parameter estimates obtained
from the xed e¤ects logit are similar to the various probit estimates, while we only can use
the estimation results from the dynamic xed e¤ects to verify the presence of (true) state
dependence.
The nal column in Table 3 shows that using an alternative cut-o¤ level of 42 weeks for the
denition of being a recipient of social assistance compared to the 27 weeks used in all other
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estimations does not matter for the results.
Table 3: Participation probability, partner income, males
Pooled
probit
Random
e¤ects
probit
Dynamic
corre-
lated
random
e¤ects
probit
Fixed
e¤ects
logit
Dynamic
xed
e¤ects
logit
Dynamic
corre-
lated
random
e¤ects
probit, 42
weeks
Spousetemporary income -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.032 -0.017 -0.013
(0:007) (0:009) (0:008) (0:016) (0:052) (0:009)
Spouses permanent income 0.030 0.044 0.027 - - 0.024
(0:004) (0:007) (0:005) - - (0:006)
Age -0.071 -0.108 0.084 - - 0.071
(0:011) (0:019) (0:021) - - (0:025)
Age squared/100 0.041 0.068 0.006 - - 0.000
(0:014) (0:025) (0:017) - - (0:000)
Experience 0.202 0.313 0.118 0.785 0.018 0.101
(0:006) (0:012) (0:009) (0:070) (0:117) (0:010)
Experience squared/100 -0.587 -0.952 -0.343 -2.938 - -0.003
(0:025) (0:050) (0:033) (0:247) - (0:000)
Unskilled -0.117 -0.139 -0.091 - - -0.090
(0:027) (0:053) (0:034) - - (0:039)
Short-cycle higher education 0.097 0.261 0.148 - - 0.116
(0:068) (0:132) (0:085) - - (0:094)
Medium-cycle higher education 0.161 0.208 0.174 - - 0.169
(0:059) (0:119) (0:076) - - (0:082)
Long-cycle higher education 0.182 0.302 0.115 - - 0.185
(0:069) (0:138) (0:089) - - (0:093)
Immigrant 0.336 0.406 0.235 - - 0.151
(0:032) (0:062) (0:041) - - (0:046)
Second generation immigrant -0.039 0.072 0.023 - - 0.088
(0:156) (0:262) (0:182) - - (0:222)
Copenhagen -0.046 -0.012 0.101 0.660 - 0.084
(0:046) (0:085) (0:221) (0:396) - (0:263)
Large city -0.101 -0.186 -0.247 -0.144 - -0.453
(0:046) (0:087) (0:279) (0:502) - (0:317)
Rural area -0.070 -0.125 -0.158 0.141 - -0.131
(0:038) (0:072) (0:234) (0:424) - (0:274)
Children aged 0-6 years -0.128 -0.167 -0.054 -0.207 -0.746 -0.056
(0:014) (0:025) (0:040) (0:072) (0:223) (0:046)
Children aged 7-17 years -0.034 -0.050 0.012 -0.054 - -0.004
(0:013) (0:023) (0:042) (0:078) - (0:048)
Unemp. on municipality and gender -0.062 -0.077 -0.052 -0.148 - -0.047
(0:008) (0:014) (0:010) (0:040) - (0:011)
Regional vacancies 2.603 2.876 1.908 3.574 - 0.845
(0:788) (1:404) (0:976) (5:154) - (1:129)
Neuro medicine -0.187 -0.246 -0.183 -0.370 - -0.150
(0:060) (0:084) (0:085) (0:191) - (0:081)
Psychiatry -0.036 -0.028 0.001 0.010 - 0.023
(0:011) (0:015) (0:019) (0:035) - (0:021)
General medical treatment -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 - -0.004
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:002) - (0:002)
y0 (initial participation) - - 0.014 - - -0.041
- - (0:037) - - (0:044)
Lagged participation - - 1.312 - 2.648 1.292
- - (0:034) - (0:215) (0:040)
Observations 15,383 15,383 15,383 6,761 3,652 11,827
Number of persons 5,212 5,212 5,212 1,626 694 4,067
Standard errors in parentheses. All equations include time-dummies.
The correlated random e¤ects contain the means of age, region dummies, children and health variables.
 signicant at 5 per cent;  signicant at 1 per cent
The spouses temporary income is insignicant in all estimations, but the xed e¤ects logit,
where the coe¢ cient is signicantly negative. In the absence of major tax or benet reforms
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the within change in the spouses income the transitory part is limited. If it takes a certain
amount of change in partner income to a¤ect the labor market status, we could fear that we
actually observe too little variation in our data to obtain signicant estimates. In absence of
credit constraints the insignicant parameter estimates suggest that individuals smooth out
consumption.
The permanent income only varies between individuals and, hence, the coe¢ cient cannot be
identied in the xed e¤ects specications. In the rest of the estimations the spouse permanent
income is signicantly positive. Hence, it seems to be the case that the spouses have the same
taste for work by assortative matching in the marriage market. In other words, the positive
sign implies that Hyslops taste e¤ect dominates and, therefore, that the permanent spouse
income is endogenous to the employment decision.
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Table 4: Participation probability, partner income, females
Pooled
probit
Random
e¤ects
probit
Dynamic
corre-
lated
random
e¤ects
probit
Fixed
e¤ects
logit
Dynamic
xed
e¤ects
logit
Dynamic
corre-
lated
random
e¤ects
probit, 42
weeks
Spousetemporary income 0.033 0.041 0.036 0.056 -0.003 0.031
(0:005) (0:006) (0:006) (0:012) (0:063) (0:006)
Spouses permanent income 0.060 0.076 0.054 - - 0.053
(0:003) (0:005) (0:003) - - (0:004)
Age -0.012 0.006 0.179 - - 0.177
(0:010) (0:019) (0:021) - - (0:023)
Age squared/100 -0.033 -0.080 -0.060 - - -0.001
(0:014) (0:026) (0:018) - - (0:000)
Experience 0.252 0.389 0.144 0.708 0.095 0.135
(0:007) (0:015) (0:011) (0:079) (0:221) (0:013)
Experience squared/100 -0.940 -1.517 -0.539 -3.570 - -0.005
(0:035) (0:067) (0:050) (0:365) - (0:001)
Unskilled -0.348 -0.610 -0.371 - - -0.345
(0:028) (0:055) (0:037) - - (0:042)
Short-cycle higher education 0.090 0.059 0.063 - - 0.052
(0:081)  (0:168)  (0:106) - - (0:119)
Medium-cycle higher education -0.107 -0.151 -0.084 - - -0.159
(0:066)  (0:131)  (0:086) - - (0:101)
Long-cycle higher education -0.245 -0.401 -0.327 - - -0.370
(0:121) (0:226) (0:152) - - (0:177)
Immigrant 0.208 0.178 0.085 - - 0.027
(0:030) (0:058) (0:039) - - (0:043)
Second generation immigrant 0.316 0.479 0.224 - - 0.617
(0:141) (0:261) (0:180) - - (0:197)
Copenhagen -0.031 -0.043 -0.156 -0.203 - 0.014
(0:044) (0:084) (0:242) (0:439) - (0:282)
Large city -0.075 -0.134 -0.586 -0.731 - -0.708
(0:045) (0:086) (0:273) (0:483) - (0:317)
Rural area 0.050 0.025 -0.098 -0.198 - -0.140
(0:038) (0:072) (0:220) (0:374) - 0:258
Children aged 0-6 years -0.278 -0.369 -0.196 -0.570 0.113 -0.247
(0:015) (0:025) (0:041) (0:082) (0:305) (0:0460)
Children aged 7-17 years -0.059 -0.096 -0.107 -0.339 - -0.127
(0:012) (0:022) (0:042) (0:085) - (0:045)
Unemp. on municipality and gender -0.037 -0.052 -0.037 -0.096 - -0.044
(0:007) (0:013) (0:009) (0:042) - (0:010)
Regional vacancies 2.468 2.598 2.276 -5.571 - 1.622
(0:741) (1:341) (0:944) (4:882) - (1:073)
Neuro medicine -0.086 -0.108 -0.079 -0.117 - -0.089
(0:033) (0:046) (0:049) (0:095) - (0:048)
Psychiatry -0.056 -0.057 -0.021 -0.043 - -0.015
(0:010) (0:014) (0:016) (0:033) - (0:018)
General medical treatment -0.006 -0.005 -0.001 0.001 - -0.003
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:002) - (0:001)  
y0 (initial participation) - - -0.202 - - -0.144
- - (0:039) - - (0:044)
Lagged participation - - 1.537 - 3.752 1.461
- - (0:035) - (0:294) (0:039)
Observations 21,149 21,149 21,149 7,048 3,335 17,284
Number of persons 6,985 6,986 6,986 1,736 638 5,808
Standard deviations are in parentheses. All equations include time-dummies.
The correlated random e¤ects contain the means of age, region dummies, children and health variables.
 signicant at 5 per cent;  signicant at 1 per cent
The results for women are shown in Table 4. There are some noticeable di¤erences in the
parameter estimates compared to men. First, whereas men with higher education have a higher
probability of being employed, the comparable e¤ect for women is insignicant or even negative.
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Second, there is no signicant di¤erence in the employment probability between living in the
capital of Copenhagen and in rural areas. For women we nd signicantly positive e¤ects of
both temporary and permanent income, which again reect the taste e¤ect endogeneity.
Table 5 presents elasticities for the previous estimations. From the dynamic random e¤ects
probit model it can be seen that participation in itself increases the probability of also being in
the labor market next year by about 40 per cent. In a recent paper Ahmad (2007) also estimates
reduced-form participation equations for immigrants receiving social assistance benets and
argues that there is a large degree of state dependence among immigrants in Denmark.
Table 5: Elasticities, partner income
Pooled
probit
Random
e¤ects
probit
Dynamic
random
e¤ects
probit
Dynamic
random
e¤ects
probit,
42
weeks
Males
Lagged dependent variable - - 0.405 0.398
- - (0:020) (0:023)
Spouses temporary income -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004
(0:014) (0:013) (0:016) (0:019)
Spouses permanent income 0.339 0.358 0.303 0.276
(0:052) (0:068) (0:067) (0:081)
Females
Lagged dependent variable - - 0.408 0.379
- - (0:022) (0:024)
Spouses temporary income 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006
(0:042) (0:032) (0:045) (0:051)
Spouses permanent income 0.918 0.791 0.805 0.798
(0:054) (0:067) (0:068) (0:075)
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
 signicant at 5 per cent;  signicant at 1 per cent
Unlike both Hyslops (1999) and Croda and Kyriazidous (2003) results for married women we
nd that the permanent part of the spouse income is endogenous for both men and women
and, therefore, that it is not useful for examining the e¤ects of nancial incentives for the
participation decision. The reason seems to be that the di¤erence in the participation rate
between the genders is smaller in Denmark than in Germany and the US. Additionally, the
share of women in part-time work is much higher in Germany. With respect to the transitory
part of the spouses income we similar to Hyslop (1999) and Croda and Kyriazidou (2003) nd
very small and insignicant e¤ects, which suggest that workers are not credit constrained and
can smooth out consumption.
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6 Does Own Income Create Work Incentives?
The results from the previous section show the weakness of using spouses income as predictor
for participation, namely that it may be endogenous. Furthermore, depending on how income
is used in a family, it may be the case that the response is larger for the own disposable income
gain from working. Hence, the results from the previous section do not necessarily imply
that there are low participation elasticities for recipients of social assistance. Instead in this
section we use predicted own disposable income gaps to investigate the importance of nancial
incentives for the participation decision.
Table 6 shows the second step of the Vella-Verbeek sample selection model. It is striking
that most of the variables are insignicant. For example for women there is no signicant wage
di¤erence between being unskilled and having a university degree. This seems to suggest that
for the sample of social assistance recipients the human capital model works poorly. This is
also reected in the low R2 of 7  9 per cent. Using Danish register data it is far from unusual
to obtain an explanatory power of more than 30 per cent. As a matter of fact, by considering
all the persons for whom we observe a wage rate we obtain an R2 of about 20 per cent using
only experience and its square as well as schooling to explain the variation of the log wages.3
In order to understand the results in Table 6 one might again refer to Table 1 and 2 to see that
the level of the mean wage implies, that the minimum wage constraint is binding for a large
part of the recipients of social assistance, perhaps suggesting that these people are unable to
receive a wage matching their marginal productivity measured by the usual Mincer explanatory
variables. Hence, recipients of social assistance seem to be marginalized in the labor market.
For men the selection into the sub-sample of persons for whom we observe the wage is posi-
tive with respect to the time-invariant unobservables. This is as expected because this suggests,
that people with higher ability earn more and have a higher probability of nding employment.
For women we nd no signicant selection in terms of time-invariant unobservables.
3These results are not shown.
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Table 6: Wage equation, random e¤ects
Male Female
Age 0.017 0.005
(0:003) (0:004)
Age squared/100 -0.022 -0.005
(0:004) (0:005)
Experience 0.010 0.006
(0:003) (0:003)
Experience squared/100 -0.023 -0.012
(0:009) (0:013)
Unskilled -0.021 0.002
(0:009) (0:010)
Short-cycle higher education 0.027 0.024
(0:028) (0:036)
Medium-cycle higher education 0.110 0.114
(0:025) (0:024)
Long-cycle higher education 0.171 0.072
(0:030) (0:042)
Immigrant -0.004 -0.002
(0:012) (0:013)
Second generation immigrant -0.016 0.024
(0:042) (0:044)
Copenhagen 0.023 0.042
(0:014) (0:015)
Large city -0.017 0.003
(0:015) (0:017)
Rural area -0.021 -0.011
(0:011) (0:013)
Children aged 0-6 years 0.012 -0.010
(0:006) (0:006)
Children aged 7-17 years -0.003 -0.006
(0:005) (0:005)
Unemp. on municipality and gender -0.004 -0.006
(0:002) (0:003)
Regional vacancies -0.558 0.020
(0:245) (0:282)
Neuro medicine 0.026 -0.004
 (0:014) (0:009)
Psychiatry 0.008 -0.002
(0:003) (0:003)
General medical treatment 0.000 0.000
(0:000) (0:000)
Mean (generalized residual) 0.028 0.003
(0:004) (0:005)
Generalized residual -0.035 -0.032
(0:007) (0:007)
Variance of individual specic error 0.213 0.201
Variance of time-varying error 0.224 0.219
R-squared 0.087 0.075
Observations 11,124 7,823
Persons 4,569 3,485
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Both equations include time-dummies.
signicant at 5 per cent; signicant at 1 per cent
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Table 7: Participation probability, own income, males
Pooled
probit
Random
e¤ects
probit
Dynamic
random
e¤ects
probit
Own income gap/10000 0.031 0.044 0.045
(0:003)

(0:005)

(0:004)

Age -0.067 -0.082 0.040
(0:006)

(0:010)

(0:013)

Age squared/100 0.037 0.041 0.007
(0:008)

(0:013)

(0:009)
Experience 0.185 0.263 0.097
(0:004)

(0:007)

(0:005)

Experience squared/100 -0.526 -0.780 -0.285
(0:016)

(0:030)

(0:020)

Unskilled -0.127 -0.178 -0.088
(0:017)

(0:032)

(0:020)

Short-cycle higher education 0.028 0.076 -0.007
(0:048) (0:088) (0:057)
Medium-cycle higher education 0.166 0.222 0.110
(0:043)

(0:080)

(0:051)

Long-cycle higher education 0.258 0.299 0.077
(0:050)

(0:093)

(0:060)
Immigrant 0.285 0.338 0.219
(0:020)

(0:037)

(0:025)

Second generation immigrant -0.009 0.039 0.001
(0:076) (0:135) (0:089)
Copenhagen 0.011 0.037 0.025
(0:027) (0:046) (0:085)
Large city -0.089 -0.118 -0.105
(0:028)

(0:049)

(0:111)
Rural area -0.030 -0.041 0.024
 (0:022)  (0:040)  (0:089)
Children aged 0-6 years 0.003 0.002 0.025
 (0:012)  (0:019)  (0:026)
Children aged 7-17 years 0.076 0.106 0.122
(0:010)

(0:017)

(0:028)

Unemp. on municipality and gender 0.049 0.064 0.042
(0:005)

(0:008)

(0:006)

Regional vacancies 2.127 1.965 1.632
(0:483)

(0:814)

(0:571)

Neuro medicine 0.077 0.084 -0.068
(0:032)

(0:041)

(0:043)
Psychiatry 0.032 0.032 -0.016
(0:006)

(0:008)

(0:010)
General medical treatment 0.006 0.005 -0.002
(0:000)

(0:001)

(0:001)

y0 (initial participation) 0.000 0.000 0.079
(0:000) (0:000) (0:022)

Lagged participation 0.000 0.000 1.325
(0:000) (0:000) (0:021)

Observations - - 41,390
Number of persons - - 10,689
Standard deviations are in parentheses. All equations include time-dummies.
The correlated random e¤ects contain the means of age, region
dummies, children and health variables.
 signicant at 5 per cent;  signicant at 1 per cent
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Table 8: Participation probability, own income, females
Pooled
probit
Random
e¤ects
probit
Dynamic
random
e¤ects
probit
Own income gap/10000 0.045 0.059 0.049
(0:002)

(0:003)

(0:003)

Age -0.014 0.001 0.173
(0:007)

(0:013) (0:016)

Age squared/100 -0.030 -0.071 -0.047
(0:009)

(0:017)

(0:012)

Experience 0.216 0.320 0.111
(0:005)

(0:010)

(0:007)

Experience squared/100 -0.772 -1.188 -0.412
(0:023)

(0:047)

(0:031)

Unskilled -0.337 -0.617 -0.345
(0:020)

(0:039)

(0:026)

Short-cycle higher education -0.039 -0.134 -0.070
(0:062) (0:125) (0:081)
Medium-cycle higher education -0.195 -0.247 -0.202
(0:046)

(0:089)

(0:058)

Long-cycle higher education 0.079 -0.133 -0.159
(0:073) (0:144) (0:094)
Immigrant 0.041 0.003 -0.031
(0:021) (0:042) (0:028)
Second generation immigrant 0.033 0.083 -0.007
(0:086) (0:164) (0:108)
Copenhagen -0.091 -0.131 -0.109
(0:029)

(0:054)

(0:115)
Large city -0.090 -0.145 -0.356
(0:031)

(0:059)

(0:144)

Rural area 0.028 0.014 -0.082
(0:026) (0:049) (0:114)
Children aged 0-6 years -0.153 -0.206 -0.128
(0:011)

(0:019)

(0:028)

Children aged 7-17 years 0.019 0.006 -0.032
(0:009)

(0:017) (0:028)
Unemp. on municipality and gender -0.026 -0.039 -0.024
(0:005)

(0:009)

(0:006)

Regional vacancies 1.009 1.120 0.387
(0:540) (0:960) (0:684)
Neuro medicine -0.073 -0.081 -0.065
(0:023)

(0:031)

(0:032)

Psychiatry -0.045 -0.051 -0.037
(0:006)

(0:009)

(0:010)

General medical treatment -0.003 -0.002 0.000
(0:000)

(0:000)

(0:001)
y0 (initial participation) 0.000 0.000 -0.075
(0:000) (0:000) (0:027)

Lagged participation - - 1.503
- - (0:025)
Observations 40,170 40,170 40,170
Number of persons 10,586 10,586 10,586
Standard errors in parentheses. All equations include time-dummies.
The correlated random e¤ects contain the means of age, region
dummies, children and health variables.
 signicant at 5 per cent;  signicant at 1 per cent
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The results from the participation equation where we include the workers own disposable
income gain from working is presented in Table 7 and 8. Overall, the picture is similar compared
to Table 3 and 4 although there are some changes due to the fact that Table 7 and 8 also include
singles. When we estimate on both couples and singles we nd that only children aged 0-6 years
have a negative inuence on the employment probability and for men we even nd signicant
positive coe¢ cients to the number of children aged 7-17 years.
For women there are two more changes. First, the coe¢ cient to medium-cycle higher edua-
tion becomes signicantly negative, although this does not change the conclusion that there is
an insignicant or negative e¤ect on the participation probability of having a longer education.
Thus, for workers with a weak attachment to the labor market and low experience, vocational
education, which is the reference category, might be the most favourable education. Further-
more, the signaling e¤ect of a social assistance spell to the employer might be more severe for
educations with an overall very low unemployment rate.
Second, immigrants are no longer more likely to become employed than natives. This sug-
gests that single female immigrants do not participate to the same degree as married female
immigrants. However, the reason might be that single mothers to a larger extent are paid addi-
tional benets in an ad-hoc way, which depends on the local government which, therefore, are
impossible to model. This implies that the calculated income gap for single female immigrants
is overvalued, which in turn may imply that they seem to be less likely to participate.
Own disposable income gap is signicantly positive in both estimation frameworks and for
both genders, and thus, having a higher income gap raises the probability of participation.
Table 9: Elasticities, own income gap
Pooled
probit
Random
e¤ects
probit
Dynamic
random
e¤ects
probit
Males
Lagged dependent variable - - 0.422
- - (0:012)
Own income gap 0.276 0.305 0.422
(0:034) (0:037) (0:044)
Change in own income gap, 5,000 DKK 0.018 0.020 0.028
Females
Lagged dependent variable - - 0.414
- - (0:015)
Own income gap 0.655 0.618 0.678
(0:033) (0:037) (0:044)
Change in own income gap, 5,000 DKK 0.052 0.049 0.054
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
 signicant at 5 per cent;  signicant at 1 per cent
Table 9 presents the elasticities from changing own disposable income gap on the participa-
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tion probability. The elasticities for men are in the range of 0:28   0:44, while the elasticities
for women are roughly double the size. The estimated elasticities imply that increasing the
disposable income with 5; 000 DKK delivers an increase in the particpation probability of 0:025
for men and 0:05 for women. Another way of measuring the participation elasticities, which
for example is used in the CGE model DREAM, is the percentage change in the number of
recipients of social assistance from a percentage change in the income gap. In Appendix B
we show how to convert the elasticities and for men the elasticity is 0:09   0:17, while we for
women obtain 0:13  0:20.
In the absence of major benet and tax policy changes in the considered period we do not
want to identify the e¤ect of the disposable income gap solely from within-individual variation.
Therefore, we do not include the mean of disposable income in the linear approximation for the
unobservable individual e¤ect. However, this implies that we cannot appropriately control for
unobserved heterogeneity, which may bias the results. If receiving social assistance is voluntary,
but joy of working is positively correlated with productivity, the elasticity will be upward biased.
It is obviously pointless to consider the e¤ects of economic incentives if receiving benets is
completely involuntary. Even though this extreme is not the case, it is likely that some recipients
of social assistance would prefer to be employed, but have a low probability of getting a job due
to very low productivities. In this case our estimated model confuses low incentives with low
participation probability and the estimated elasticity will also tend to be upward biased. In
orther words, the e¤ects from an actual tax or benet reform will be smaller than our income
elasticity estimates.
There exist a few other Danish studies also estimating participation income elasticities.
Graversen (1996) estimates participation elasticities for workers in the labor force from a natural
experiment study of the 1987 tax reform. He nds participation elasticities in the range of
0:2   0:7 for single women and 0:05 for married women. Pedersen and Smith (2002) also
computes disposable income gaps from working, but do as Graversen focus on unemployed
workers in the labor force. They use survey information on the unemployed workers expected
wage and use information on employed workerstransportation costs and child care costs. For
1996 they nd an income elasticity of 0:3 for men and 0:7 for women. Pedersen and Smith do
not solve the potential endogeneity problem of the workers disposable income. The elasticities
are strikingly similar in our study and in Pedersen and Smith, which should imply that the
e¤ect of nancial incentives are similar among the unemployed workers in the labor force and
among recipients of social assistance. However, since the share of very low productivity workers
is larger among the repicipents of social assistance than the recipents of unemployment benets,
the share who is involuntary out of employment is probably largest among the repicipents of
social assistance. Hence, it is probably the case that our estimates for the recipients of social
assistance have the largest bias.
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In contrast to the two mentioned studies, Toomet (2005) focus on social assistance and
exploits the fact that the social assistance benets is increased by 70 per cent when recipients
without children turns 25 years, while the benet level remains constant at the age of 25 years
for recipients with children. Hence, Toomet uses the latter group as control group. From a
di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation a participation elasticity of income of 0.4 is found for women
while the income e¤ect for men is found to be insignicant.
In a recent survey-based study, Graversen and Tinggaard (2005) examine the e¤ects of the
implementation of the social assistance ceiling in 2004.4 Approximately 1,000 social assistance
recipients were interviewed just before the implementation and again nine months after the
implementation of the social assistance benet ceiling. Although the ceiling has reduced the
amount of social assistance received and, hence, was expected to provide larger incentives,
Graversen and Tinggaard conclude that there seems to be no e¤ect on participation and on
whether the recipient search or not. Moreover, Graversen and Tinggaard only nd very modest
e¤ects on the search intensity.
Finally, in a recent study Graversen (2006) uses the variation in social assistance benets
from the implementation of the social assistance ceiling. A pooled probit model for participation
is estimated for each month for 18 months. Graversen compute the income gap from working
similar to here although he uses a median wage for all persons rather than a predicted wage. This
way Graversen avoids the potential endogeneity of the wages, but the framework only allows
Graversen to determine e¤ects from di¤erences in benets in the short term. No signicant
employment e¤ects are found from this analysis.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the e¤ects of economic incentives on the labor market par-
ticipation for recipients of social assistance. A simple examination of the characteristics of
recipients of social assistance reveals the group to be marginalized in the labor market. This
conclusion is further strengthened by the poor performance of the human capital model and the
large degree of state dependence in the employment status. Hence, to some extent we would
believe that this group of people is involuntary nonemployed and that only small e¤ects from
economic incentives are to be expected. We nd no employment e¤ects of incentives from the
within variation in the spouses income. Recently, Graversen and Tinggard (2005) and Gra-
versen (2006) have evaluated the short-term e¤ect of the social assistance ceiling. They nd no
or very small e¤ects.
However, from estimations where we use predicted disposable income gain from working
4The social assistance ceiling aimed at providing economic incentives for married social assistance recipients,
by setting a reduced maximum of social assistance benets that a household can receive. It came into e¤ect
January 1, 2004.
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we obtain elasticities in the range of 0:28   0:44 for men and in the range of 0:62   0:68 for
women. These elasticities are of similar magnitude as those Pedersen and Smith (2002) nd for
workers in the labor force. However, neither we, nor Pedersen and Smith are able to su¢ ciently
control for unobserved heterogeneity of the disposable income gap. Therefore, we believe that
the estimates are likely to be upward biased. When converting the elasticities to percentage
change in the number of recipients of social assistance from a percentage change in the income
gap as used in the CGE model DREAM the estimated elasticities correspond to 0:09  0:17 for
men and 0:13  0:20 for women.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Goodness of Fit
Table 10: Confusion matrices, spouse income, males
Pooled probit Dynamic random e¤ects probit
Actual Actual
Predicted 0 1 Total Predicted 0 1 Total
0 9,234 3,248 12,482 0 9,192 1,704 10,896
1 1,250 1,651 2,901 1 1,292 3,195 4,487
Total 10,484 4,899 15,383 Total 10,484 4,899 15,383
Table 11: Confusion matrices, spouse income, females
Pooled probit Dynamic random e¤ects probit
Actual Actual
Predicted 0 1 Total Predicted 0 1 Total
0 15,593 3,380 18,973 0 15,609 1,942 17,551
1 959 1,217 2,176 1 943 2,655 3,598
Total 16,552 4,597 21,149 Total 16,552 4,597 21,149
Table 12: Confusion matrices, own income gap, males
Pooled probit Dynamic random e¤ects probit
Actual Actual
Predicted 0 1 Total Predicted 0 1 Total
0 26,877 9,640 36,517 0 25,068 4,276 29,344
1 2,172 2,701 4,873 1 3,981 8,065 12,046
Total 29,049 12,341 41,390 Total 29,049 12,341 41,390
Table 13: Confusion matrices, own income gap, females
Pooled probit Dynamic random e¤ects probit
Actual Actual
Predicted 0 1 Total Predicted 0 1 Total
0 29,905 7,181 37,086 0 29,254 3,821 33,075
1 1,487 1,597 3,084 1 2,138 4,957 7,095
Total 31,392 8,778 40,170 Total 31,392 8,778 40,170
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Appendix B: Elasticities Measured as Population Changes
Elasticities are most often dened as the percentage change in participation probability for a
percentage change in income gap. Hence, we can dene
"p =
@p
@y
y
p
(16)
where y is the disposable income gap and p is the participation probability. Another way of
thinking about participation elasticities is the percentage change in the number of recipients of
social assistance from a percentage change in the income gap. We can express this alternative
elasticity as
"U =  @U
@y
y
U
(17)
where U is the number of persons receiving social assistance. Letting N denote the total
population, which is constant, and noticing that U = N (1  p) we have that
"U =   @p N
@y
y
N (1  p) =
p
(1  p)"p (18)
Since "U is the denition used in two recent tax reform simulations on the CGE model
DREAM (cf. Danish Economic Council (2004) and Danish Welfare Commission (2005)) we
compute these elasticities from our estimations using the predicted participation probability p^,
for each individual in our samples.
From (18), we see that only for a participation rate of exactly 50 per cent, the two elasticities
are equal. For our sample we have participation rates somewhat below 50 percent, since our
samples consist of only people who have been in contact with the social assistance system.
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Abstract
We propose an equilibrium search model with on-the-job search, where a continuum of
heterogenous workers and continuum of heterogenous rms match. Workers are allowed
to select a sample size of vacancies to apply to, and more productive workers sample
more rms. The possibility of sampling job o¤ers imply that we only need the production
function to be strictly supermodular for assortative matching to arise. The model delivers
a log-linear wage equation with additively separable worker and rm e¤ects. Therefore,
we can simulate the theoretical model and estimate the two-way xed-e¤ects model as
Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999). By adding a match-e¤ect we obtain an estimated
negative correlation between the worker and rm e¤ects even though there is assortative
matching (positive correlation) in the theoretical model.
Keywords: Assortative matching, labor market search, linked employer-employee data,
person and rm e¤ects.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we propose a labor market search model with two new features. First, the model
has three types of continuous heterogeneity, which are worker productivity, rm productivity,
and a random match e¤ect. Each of these three productivity terms enters the production
function. Second, assortative matching arises even though we only use a strictly supermodular
production function.
We solve our search model and simulate data from the model. Using the two-way-xed
e¤ect estimator invented by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) (henceforth, AKM) on this
simulated data, we show that the presence of a match e¤ect can imply an estimated negative
correlation between the worker and rm e¤ects even if there is true positive assortative matching
in the model economy. Therefore, this paper aims at explaining the puzzling negative correlation
between worker and rm e¤ects found empirically.1
Existing models of assignment along the lines of Beckers (1973) marriage model imply
positive assortative matching. In fact, the ranking is such that a more productive worker
always will have a better job than a less productive one. This result holds in a frictionless
economy as long as the production function is strictly supermodular implying that the workers
human capital and rms capital are complements in production. However, Shimer and Smith
(2000) show that for assortative matching to arise in a search model setting it is no longer
su¢ cient that the production function is strictly supermodular. Instead, Shimer and Smith
nd that a su¢ cient condition is that the production function is strictly log supermodular.
As noted by Atakan (2006) the problem is that the higher gains to more search for more
productive workers are o¤set by higher costs of rejecting an o¤er. Using this, Atakan shows
that if unmatched agents have constant ow costs independent of their type and if the discount
rate is zero, the production function only needs to be strictly supermodular in order to imply
assortative matching.
We obtain assortative matching with the strictly supermodular Cobb-Douglas production
function by letting workers choose how many job o¤ers they wish to sample as in the seminal
contribution by Stigler (1961). Assortative matching arises since more productive workers
sample more jobs and, hence, they will, on average, end up in better jobs. In order to isolate
the e¤ect of the workersjob sampling we - similarly to Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) - assume
that each rm that receives more than one application randomly chooses one of its applicants
above a reservation threshold.
Previous studies on assortative models have examined the sets of matches that are acceptable
1See Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002) and Abowd, Kramarz, Lengermann and Perez-Durate (2004) for
results for both the US and France, Gruetter and Lalive (2004) for results for Austria, Piekkola (2005) for
Finland, Andrews, Gill, Schank and Upward (2007) for results for Germany, and Barth and Dale-Olsen (2003)
for results for Norway.
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by both workers and rms. Most of the studies (e.g. Atakan (2006), Becker (1973), Burdett
and Coles (1999), Chade (2001) and Smith (2006)) have found perfect segregation, which
implies that the labor market is segmented into multiple non-overlapping markets. Such an
approach to study assortative matching is not useful with on-the-job search where the same
search technology is available as unemployed and employed, since workers accept any o¤er
greater or equal to the benet level and subsequently climb the wage ladder by searching
on-the-job. Instead of the matching sets approach, we compare the worker distribution over
di¤erent rm and match productivities conditional on worker type. The latter approach is
also used in Lentz (2008), where assortative matching also arises with a strictly supermodular
production function since workers are allowed to choose their own search intensity.
When heterogeneous workers and rms match, it seems obvious that both worker and rm
productivity should a¤ect the wage paid. However, there are no a priori reasons to believe that
these two e¤ects should capture all variation in wages. It is very likely that complementarities
between specic workers and rms could exist, or that human capital is accumulated according
to the quality of the match between the worker and the rm involved. Both suggest a role for
a heterogeneous match specic component. Moreover, several contributions have argued that
the quality of the match between workers and rms in itself inuences the earnings variation.
A prominent example is the search model in Jovanovic (1979), where the ow production is
a match quality plus a stochastic term. However, in principle there need not to be a match
productivity in order to have a match component of the wage. The match e¤ect could be due to
di¤erences in bargaining strength, for instance, as a consequence of the labor market tightness
at the time of contract negotiation.
In the proposed model framework we let the match e¤ect be a random productivity compo-
nent, which enters the production function together with the worker and rm productivity. To
our knowledge the model we propose is the rst to o¤er a theoretical framework encompassing
the idea of heterogeneity in both rm, worker and match e¤ects.
A useful feature of our theoretical model is that it also implies a log linear wage equation
with additively separable worker, rm and match heterogeneity. This is only possible because
we can relax the requirement for assortative matching to be strictly supermodularity of the
production function. The log linear wage equation with additively separable e¤ects enables us
to link the theoretical model directly to the AKM model as also done by Abowd, Kramarz,
Lengermann and Perez-Duarte (2004). However, since the log linear wage equation is built into
an equilibrium search model with assortative matching it gives us the opportunity to simulate
our theoretical model and perform the AKM estimation on this data. When we simulate
our model without the match e¤ect and perform the AKM estimation and apply the bias
correction in Andrews, Gill, Schank and Upward (2007) the estimated correlation equals the
true correlation. In contrast, simulating our model with the match e¤ect and again estimating
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the AKM model and bias-correcting we obtain the very interesting result, that even though
data is generated from a model with positive assortative matching the estimated correlation is
negative.
The intuition behind our results is as follows. The rm e¤ects are identied by workers
making job-to-job transitions, and those with relative low realizations of the match e¤ect will
ceteris paribus be more likely to change jobs. However, since the econometrician does not
estimate the match e¤ect, the rm e¤ect will be under-valued, which in turn will imply an
over-valued worker e¤ect, and the spurious negative correlation is established.
These results are in line with Woodcock (2007) who suggests an estimation procedure for an
empirical model with person, rm and match e¤ects. Using this estimation procedure he nds
that the estimated negative correlation of the AKM model on US-data, in fact, is positive when
taking the match heterogeneity into account. We apply his estimator both to our simulated and
empirical data. From the simulations we learn, that the model performs very well in attributing
the di¤erent parts of variation in the dependent variable to the rm, person and match e¤ects,
but also this estimator consequently underestimates the true correlation between workers and
rms.
We apply both set of estimators to a panel of Danish employer-employee data. We estimate
that the match e¤ect indeed has empirical relevance since it accounts for 15 per cent of the
variation in log wages. Furthermore, we estimate (what consequently is a downward biased)
a correlation of worker and rm e¤ects of 12 per cent, which suggests that the Danish labor
market is characterized by positive assortative matching.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our search model where more
productive workers sort themselves into more productive matches. In section 3 we briey
consider the AKMmodel and the recent alternative estimation procedure outlined in Woodcock
(2007). In section 4, we simulate our theoretical model and estimate both the AKM and
Woodcock models on this model-generated data, whereas we in section 5 perform estimations
on Danish register data. In section 6, we conclude.
2 Theoretical Model
Consider an economy with a continuum of rms and a continuum of workers that participate
in the labor market. Both the measure of workers and rms are xed and normalized to 1.
All agents are rational, forward-looking, risk-neutral and innitely lived. Workers have the
opportunity of searching both while they are unemployed and employed.
Heterogeneity exists on both sides of the market as well as in the match between a worker
and a rm. Workers di¤er in respect to their productivity such that more productive workers
in all types of jobs are more productive. Denote the worker productivity by pw, the rm
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productivity by pf and the match e¤ect by pm. Both the worker and the rm know their
own productivity term as well as the decomposition in a given match and, hence, we rule out
uncertainty and learning about any of the productivity terms.
We assume that we have a Cobb-Douglas production function f (pw; pf ; pm) = p1w p
2
f p
3
m .
The worker searches for the highest possible combination of rm and match productivity. There-
fore, it is useful for us to work with the joint rm and match productivity pfm = p
2
2+3
f p
3
2+3
m ,
allowing us to express the production function as f (pw; pf ; pm) = f (pw; pfm) = p1w p
2+3
fm . The
Cobb-Douglas function has two important properties. First, it is strictly supermodular, that is,
@2f(pw;pfm)
@pw@pfm
> 0 for 1 > 0 and 2+3 > 0. Second, it is multiplicatively separable. We need not
to assume the Cobb-Douglas form, and all implications of the model are true for all functions
admitting strictly supermodularity and multiplicative separability. We use the assumption of
multiplicative separability to ease the derivation of the workers reservation productivity below,
but note also that this assumption rules out comparative advantages, since the ratio of output
of two rms is independent of the workers productivity, cf. Sattinger (1975).
The distribution of worker productivity pw is given by the cumulative distribution function
H (pw) =
R pw
p
¯ w
h (p0w) dp
0
w. The distribution of the rm and match productivity pfm is given by
  (pfm) =
R pfm
p
¯ fm

 
p0fm

dp0fm.
The search environment is closest to Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) although we allow for
on-the-job search, but do not consider the rms investment decision. The model is set in
discrete time and the timing of events is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: One period sequence of events
Period
begins
The worker chooses
her optimal sample size
n and randomly sends
the n applications.
If a vacancy has received
more than one application,
it randomly picks only one
of these.
Existing and potentially
new matches are both
destructed with the
exogenous rate δ.
All joint firm and match
productivities are
revealed and each worker
selects her best option.
If the worker's preferred vacancy
also has picked that particular
worker a match is formed from
the beginning of next period.
Period
ends
The job searcher, whether unemployed or employed, is given the opportunity to apply for
n di¤erent jobs in each time period. Searching is costly and the more jobs applied to, the
larger costs. We assume that this ow cost function is strictly convex in the number of jobs
applied to, c0 (n) > 0 and c00 (n) > 0 and that c (0) = c0 (0) = 0. The more jobs applied to, the
47
more likely the worker is to draw a high joint rm and match productivity. In order for the
worker to realize the joint rm and match productivity, the worker needs to apply for a job
in the particular rm. Hence, the worker applies to all jobs sampled, although he/ she is only
willing to match with the job which turns out to be most productive (if above a reservation
productivity level).
Depending on the number of job applications and vacancies, it is likely that a vacancy gets
more than one application in each discrete time interval. Each vacancy can only employ one
worker and among the applicants with productivity above a reservation value, one application
is chosen randomly. One could think of the rmsrandom choice of worker as a framework,
where the rm is only able to use sequential search in continuous time, and where it is random,
whose application is the rst to arrive.2
The implication of this search environment is that the expected number of job applications
received is the same for all vacancies and that the acceptance rate workers face is independent
of the workers productivity. If both the worker and rm choose each other a match will be
formed from the beginning of next period. Finally, in the end of each period a fraction  of
existing and newly formed matches are exogenously destructed.
There is no traditional job arrival rate in this search context, but by abusing the traditional
notation the workers chance of getting his/ her chosen vacancy is denoted . That is
 = (1  ) #vacancies
# job applications
where the term (1  ) takes account of that  of the new matches are destroyed before they
come to existence.
2.1 The Worker Side
As unemployed, the worker receives benets which depend on her own productivity bp1w . This
takes account of the fact that benets typically are dependent on previous income as employed.
Furthermore, the exact specication used here will simplify the analysis.3 With the usual
notation we denote the value of unemployment U () and the value of employment W (; ).
Letting r denote the discount factor the Bellman equation for an unemployed worker is
(1 + r)U (pw) = bp
1
w   c (n) + 
Z pfm
p
¯ fm
max

W
 
pw; p
0
fm

; U (pw)
	
dQ
 
p0fmjn

+ (1  )U (pw) (1)
2Restricting the rms to consider one worker at a time, makes the model tractable. If also allowing rms
to sample workers it is no longer necessarily the case that all workers will prefer the highest joint rm and
match productivity. Rather, less productive workers may have a higher chance of becoming employed in less
productive rms and, thereby, prefer to join these. Hence, allowing for endogenous sampling on both sides of
the market complicates the math, but will only tend to increase the degree of assortative matching.
3A similar assumption is used in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002).
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where pfm and pfm denote respectively the upper and lower points of the joint rm and match
productivity distribution pfm, and Q (pfmjn) =   (pfm)n denote the distribution conditional on
the number of sampled jobs n. Letting prfm be the workers reservation productivity and using
integration by parts we can express this Bellman equation as
rU (pw) = bp
1
w   c (n) + 
Z pfm
prfm
W 0pfm
 
pw; p
0
fm
  
1     p0fmn dp0fm (2)
As employed the worker earns the wage w (pw; pfm), and as wage setting rule we employ the
simplest: linear output sharing or piece-rate contract as in for example Bagger, Fontaine, Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2007): w (pw; pfm) = p1w p
2+3
fm where  is the workers share of the ow
production. With probability  the job is destructed and the worker returns to unemployment.
The Bellman equation for an employed worker is
(r + )W (pw; pfm) = p
1
w p
2+3
fm   c (n) + 
Z pfm
pfm
W 0pfm
 
pw; p
0
fm
  
1     p0fmn dp0fm + U (pw) (3)
Both workers and rms have minimum values of productivities that they are willing to match
with. On the worker side this reservation value is the rm and match productivity for which
the worker is indi¤erent between being employed compared to staying unemployed. This can
be derived as
p1w
 
prfm
2+3   c (n) +  Z pfm
prfm
W 0pfm
 
pw; p
0
fm
  
1     p0fmn dp0fm
= bp1w   c (n) + 
Z pfm
prfm
W 0pfm
 
pw; p
0
fm
  
1     p0fmn dp0fm
,
prfm =

b

 1
2+3
(4)
Thus, the rm reservation productivity prfm is identical for all workers. This would not have
been the case if all workers received the same amount of unemployment benets. In that case
more productive workers would have a lower joint rm and match reservation productivity than
less productive workers, since more productive workers have higher opportunity costs of staying
unemployed and, therefore, would be more eager to get a job.4 With identical prfm across worker
type, the reservation wage is increasing in the worker productivity pw.
Di¤erentiating the Bellman equation for an unemployed worker (2) and substituting out
W 0pf (pw; pf ) from (3) gives us the rst-order condition for the sample size n for an unemployed
worker
4A similar result appears in the general model of Burdett and Coles (1999).
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c0 (n) = 
Z pfm
( b )
1
2+3
 (2 + 3) p
1
w

p0fm
2+3 1 h  p0fmn ln p0fmi
r +  + 

1   

p0fm
n dp0fm (5)
Since [   (pfm)n ln (  (pfm))]  0 for all pfm, the right hand side is increasing in pw for
1; (2 + 3) > 0. Since c00 (n) > 0 and the r.h.s. is decreasing in n for   (pfm) 2]0; 1[,
more productive workers sample more jobs, that is n0pw (pw; pfm) > 0. The restriction that
1; (2 + 3) > 0 corresponds to the production function having a positive cross derivative,
f 00pw;pfm (pw; pfm) > 0, which again exactly is the requirement of complementarity (or supermod-
ularity) in the production function for Beckers (1973) model implying assortative matching.
n only take on integer values and the nmaximizing (5) is most likely not an integer. However,
since the l.h.s. is increasing in n, while r.h.s. is decreasing in n, the optimal integer value of n
is one of the two integers adjacent to n unless the optimal value of (5) itself is an integer.
Employed workers maximize the right hand side of equation (3) with respect to n
c0 (n) = 
Z pfm
pfm
 (2 + 3) p
1
w

p0fm
2+3 1 h  p0fmn ln p0fmi
r +  + 

1   

p0fm
n dp0fm (6)
For a given joint match and rm productivity, more productive workers sample more jobs than
less productive workers as long as 1; (2 + 3) > 0 corresponding to the production function
being strictly supermodular.
We can summarize the ndings above in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 When the production function f (pw; pfm) admits supermodularity such that
1; (2 + 3) > 0, more productive workers sample more jobs conditional on their current joint
rm and match productivity n0pw (pw; pfm) > 0.
Proof. See the text above.
Since workers are employed at pfm 

b

 1
2+3 they have smaller expected gains of search-
ing than unemployed workers with the same productivity and consequently they search less.
Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that more productive employed workers search more
than less productive employed workers since, on average, they will be employed in more pro-
ductive matches already in the rst match after being unemployed.
2.2 The Firm-Side
Unemployed workers choose the vacancy with the highest productivity among the sampled
vacancies given pfm  prfm, while employed workers only accept to join a vacancy of productivity
pfm if their current productivity is lower and if pfm is the highest productivity sampled. The
vacancy picks the worker at random given that the workers productivity together with the
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drawn match e¤ect is above a reservation threshold. We will express the reservation threshold
in terms of the match e¤ect, but make it depend on the worker productivity, that is prm (pw).
The rms reservation productivity is decreasing in pw, such that the highest reservation match
e¤ect is at the lower support of the worker distribution. To make the model tractable we assume
that workers are accepted at any rm. More formally,
Assumption 1 prm

p
¯ w

p
¯
m for all pf 2
h
p
¯ f
; pf
i
, where p
¯
m is the lowest possible
match e¤ect.
At the time when the rm posts a vacancy it only knows its own rm e¤ect pf . Assume that
the match e¤ect is distributed with(). If the rm randomly selects a worker with productivity
pw currently employed at pfm the probability that the rm of productivity pf o¤ers the highest
wage is
R pm
prm(p
0
w)
I

p
2
2+3
f  (p0m)
3
2+3 > pfm

 

p
2
2+3
f  (p0m)
3
2+3
n(pw;pfm) 1
d(p0m), where
I fg is an indicator function making sure that the worker prefers the new match to the incum-
bent match. Using this, the value of vacancy V (pf ) is given by
rV (pf ) =  cv +
Z pfm
p
¯ fm
Z pw
p
¯ w
Z pm
prm(p
0
w)
I

p
2
2+3
f  (p0m)
3
2+3 > p0fm

 

p
2
2+3
f  (p0m)
3
2+3
n(p0w;p0fm) 1

24 uh (p0w)np0w; prfm+
(1  u) g

p0w; p
0
fm

n

p0w; p
0
fm
 35J p0w; p 22+3f  (p0m) 32+3  V (pf ) d(p0m) dp0wdp0fm (7)
where J (pw; pfm) is the value of lled job, cv is the ow cost of having a vacancy and u denotes
the unemployment rate, which is constant across worker type.
Job separations can happen as the worker is o¤ered a job with a higher joint rm and match
productivity or matches can be dissolved exogenously with rate . The Bellman equation for a
lled job is
rJ (pw; pfm) = (1  ) p1w p2+3fm +
h


1    (pfm)n(pw;pfm)

+ 
i
[V (pf )  J (pw; pfm)] (8)
Rather than matching with a worker of a given pw, a rm may actually prefer to match
with workers of lower productivity since workers with higher productivity sample more jobs
and, hence, are more likely to draw a better rm and leave. In other words the expected value
of a match may not be an increasing function of worker productivity. Nevertheless, since a
rm selects its workers randomly it will be willing to ll its vacancy with a high productivity
worker, since this is better than keeping the job vacant.
2.3 Steady State
Since rms choose workers randomly, we can express the inow to and outow from unemploy-
ment as in usual search models. In steady-state the inow and outow must balance
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 (1  u) = u (9)
The mass G (pw; pfm) is the share of the employed workers with a worker productivity less
or equal to pw working at a joint rm and match productivity less or equal to pfm. The ow into
G (pw; pfm) must equal the outow in steady-state. The outow, on the l.h.s. below, consists
of two terms, the exogenous destruction which happens at the rate  and the endogenous job
quits. When considering outow from G (pw; pfm) in the form of quits, we - by denition -
only consider workers with productivity pw or less, who leaves a job with productivity equal
or below pfm and gets a job with productivity above pfm. Since workers only change to more
productive matches, inow into G (pw; pfm) only comes from unemployment, where the number
of jobs sampled is n
 
pw;p
r
fm

. The steady-state condition is given by
 (1  u)G (pw; pfm) + (1  u)
Z pw
p
¯ w
Z pfm
p
¯ fm

  (pfm)
n(p0w;p
0
fm)     (pfm)n(p
0
w;p
0
fm)

g
 
p0w; p
0
fm

dp0fmdp
0
w
= u
Z pw
p
¯ w

  (pfm)
n(p0w;p
r
fm)    

p
¯ fm
n(p0w;prfm)
h (p0w) dp
0
w (10)
Rearranging and using the equilibrium equation for unemployment gives us
Z pw
p
¯ w
Z pfm
p
¯ fm
h
 + 

1    (pfm)n(p
0
w;p
0
fm)
i
g
 
p0w; p
0
fm

dp0fmdp
0
w = 
Z pw
p
¯ w
  (pfm)
n(p0w;p
r
fm) h (p0w) dp
0
w
Di¤erentiating this with respect to pw givesZ pfm
p
¯ fm
h
 + 

1    (pfm)n(pw;p
0
fm)
i
g
 
pw; p
0
fm

dp0fm =   (pfm)
n(pw;prfm) h (pw) (11)
Evaluating this expression in pfm obviously gives
R pfm
p
¯ fm
g
 
pw; p
0
fm

dp0fm = h (pw), and when
combining this with equation (11), we obtain
Z pfm
p
¯ fm
~g

pw; p
0
fm

dp0fm =

 + 
  (pfm)
n(pw;prfm) +

 + 
Z pfm
p
¯ fm
  (pfm)
n(pw;p0fm) ~g
 
pw; p
0
fm

dp0fm (12)
where
R pfm
p
¯ fm
~g
 
pw; p
0
fm

dp0fm 
R pfm
p
¯ fm
g
 
pw; p
0
fm

dpfm
R pfm
p
¯ fm
g
 
pw; p
0
fm

dp0fm
 1
is the cumula-
tive distribution function of rm productivities conditional on worker skill.
We want to examine whether the allocation of workers in the economy reects positive
sorting. While previous studies on assortative models have studied the sets of matches that
are acceptable by both workers and rms, this approach is not useful with on-the-job search.
Instead, we compare the worker distribution over di¤erent rms conditional on worker type
similarly to Lentz (2008). For this purpose we use the following denition:
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Denition 1 Consider two workers A and B, where pAw > p
B
w . Assortative matching im-
plies that GB (pfm) 
R pfm
p
¯ fm
~g
 
pBw ; p
0
fm

dp0fm 
R pfm
p
¯ fm
~g
 
pAw; p
0
fm

dp0fm  GA (pfm) for pfm 2i
p
¯ fm
; pfm
h
.
In the present model set-up, it is not immediately clear on the grounds of equation (12)
whether or not the model framework implies assortative matching. Before we more formally
prove this, we can gain some intuition by assuming that the number of jobs sampled is inde-
pendent of the current rm and match productivity, that is n (pw; pfm) = n (pw). With this
assumption it is clear that we have
Z pfm
p
¯ fm
~g (pw; pfmjn (pw) = n (pw; pfm)) dp0fm =
  (pfm)
n(pw)
 + 

1    (pfm)n(pw)
 (13)
which for the number of jobs sampled being constant across worker type, that is n (pw) = 1
gives us the usual distribution of realized matches (see e.g. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)).
If equation (13) is di¤erentiated with respect to pw, we see that the r.h.s. becomes negative
implying assortative matching. However, assuming that n (pw; pfm) = n (pw) will overvalue
the degree of assortative matching since it does not take into account that workers in better
matches searches less.
A formal proposition for assortative matching is below. The proof uses a discretized version
of equation (12) and is in Appendix A.5
Proposition 2 When the production function f (pw; pfm) admits supermodularity such that
1; (2 + 3) > 0, and the workers are allowed to sample n = 0; 1; 2 jobs the model features
assortative matching.
Proof. See appendix A.
Furthermore, the steady-state equilibrium is a tuple

prfm; n (pw; pfm) ; n
 
pw; p
r
fm

; G (pw; pfm) ; u
	
satisfying equations (4), (5), (6), (9) and (10), which leads us to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique steady-state.
Proof. See appendix B.
5This proposition only encompass n = 0; 1; 2 since allowing for higher n makes the math very cumbersome.
By computer simulation it is fairly straight-forward to show that this property of assortative matching holds
as we let the maximum number of jobs sampled increase far above 2. These programs are available from the
authors upon request.
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3 Econometric Methodology
3.1 The Two-Way Fixed E¤ects Model
Our theoretical model implies a log-linear wage equation where the log of worker productivity
and the log of rm productivity are additively separable. This property is very convenient,
since it aligns perfectly with the leading empirical model for estimating the degree of assortative
matching in the labor market developed by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) (henceforth
AKM). Before we exploit this direct link between the theoretical and empirical model, we will
give a brief introduction to the AKM model which takes the following form
yit = xit + i +  J(i;t) + "it i = 1; :::; N ; t = 1; ::; Ti (14)
where yit is the log of the hourly wage rate for individual i in period t, xit is a 1 k vector of
time-varying explanatory variables that may both relate to the individual and the rm,  is the
parameter vector, i is the unobserved person e¤ect,  J(i;t) is the unobserved rm e¤ect, and
"it is the error term with E
 
"itjxit; i;  J(i;t)

= 0. The function J (i; t) associates an employer,
indexed by J , with an individual i at time t.
Since most empirical applications relate to data with more individuals than rms (N > J),
we begin by making a within-individual transformation that sweeps away i. Expressing the
model in matrix form, using  to denote within transformed variables and letting D be the
matrix of rm dummies gives us the following model to estimate
~Y = ~X + ~D	+ ~" (15)
where 	 is a vector of rm e¤ects for every rm in the sample.6 The parameter estimates can
be found by solving "
^
	^
#
=
"
~X 0 ~X ~X 0 ~D
~D0 ~X ~D0 ~D
# 1 "
~X 0 ~Y
~D0 ~Y
#
(16)
The problem of estimating the resulting model is that the cross-product matrix is potentially
very high-dimensional due to ~D0 ~D containing a dummy for each rm. However, with use of
sparse matrix algebra we can estimate the
h
^; 	^
i
and afterwards recover ^.
One key aspect of this estimator worth noticing is that the rm coe¢ cient is only identied
by workers moving between rms in the sample period. Hence, looking only at a worker
employed in the same rm in all years there is no way for the econometrician to disentangle
6Identication of rm e¤ects is in principle only possible within a group, where a group is dened by the
movement of workers between rms. For a thorough discussion see Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002). For
expositional simplicity we assume that we already have identied the groups, dropped one rm dummy for each
group, and normalized the mean in each group to zero to allow for cross-group comparison. All while redened
~D accordingly.
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the person and rm xed element of log wages.
As in all xed e¤ects models the variances of the xed e¤ects have a positive bias. Fur-
thermore, due to the additive structure the covariance of the estimated worker and rm e¤ects
will be biased, since an over-estimate of the one xed e¤ect will lead to an under-estimate
of the other. Andrews, Gill, Schank and Upward (2007) develop the formulae to correct for
these biases. We use their method of correcting the estimates under the assumption that the
explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the worker and rm e¤ects.7
3.2 Woodcocks Hybrid Mixed E¤ects Estimation
Woodcock (2007) argues that the presence of a match e¤ect will bias the correlation between
worker and rm e¤ects, but his agenda is broader than this, since omitted match e¤ects will
bias all estimates unless the match e¤ect is completely orthogonal. Estimating an AKM model
which also includes a match e¤ect is impossible and, therefore, Woodcock suggest using the
mixed e¤ects model. Instead of estimating all the individual e¤ects, Woodcocks estimation
procedure implies estimating the variances of the worker, rm, match e¤ects and error term and
subsequently predicting all the individual e¤ects. Woodcock needs to assume that the three
random e¤ects are uncorrelated with each other, when estimating the variances. However, there
is no such restriction on the predicted individual e¤ects. Woodcocks model is
yit = xit + i +  j + ij + "it i = 1; :::; N ; t = 1; ::; Ti; j = 1; :::; J
where ij is the match e¤ect. It is easy to estimate  even if the worker e¤ect i, the rm e¤ect
 j, and the match e¤ect ij are xed e¤ects, since  is the within-match estimator. However,
separately identifying the worker, rm, and match e¤ects in a xed e¤ects context is impossible
since we from, say,M matches cannot estimateM+N+J e¤ects. However, if we are willing to
assume that the worker, rm and match e¤ects are orthogonal random e¤ects, we can estimate
the model. Obviously, the orthogonality assumption is a strong assumption - especially since
we are mainly interested in the correlation between the worker and rm e¤ects.
Woodcock suggests the following 3-step estimation procedure: First, estimate ^ as the
within-match estimator in the rst stage and compute

yit   xit^

. In the second stage, the
variance of the random e¤ects
 
2; 
2
 ; 
2


and the error variance 2" are estimated by Restricted
Maximum Likelihood (REML) on

yit   xit^

. These REML estimates are computed with the
use of the average information algorithm of Gilmour, Thompson and Cullis (1995), which
exploits the sparsity of the matrix design. In the third and nal stage, Woodcock makes the
7This assumption is made since without it we need too invert a N N matrix to solve for the biases, and
this is not feasible with our current computational power. Note also that unlike in the empirical estimation
we have no explanatory variables when we simulate data from our theoretical model. Hence, in that case the
assumption is met by denition.
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Best Linear Unbiased Predictor (BLUP) of the random e¤ects and estimate the correlations
between the various terms.
4 Simulating of the Search Model
Since our theoretical model delivers a log-linear wage equation it seems as a natural starting
point to solve and simulate data from the theoretical model and estimate the AKM model as
well as Woodcocks mixed e¤ect model on this simulated data.
To simulate our model we need a number of functional assumptions. In the following we
assume that worker productivity pw, rm productivity pf and match productivity pm all are
log-normal distributed; pw  LN (w; 2w), pf  LN
 
f ; 
2
f

, pm  LN (m; 2m) and specify
the search cost function as c (n) = c1nc2 .
Before we can simulate data from our model, we need to approximate the function n (pw; pfm).
To do this, we solve equations (5) and (6) for n using quadrature methods to approximate the
integrals. The function n (pw; pfm) is stepwise increasing in pw and decreasing in pfm, as illus-
trated in Figure 2, so we just need to know precisely in what values of (pw; pfm) that n changes.
We use an algorithm that determines the number of points where n changes in the (pw; pfm)
space with a precision such that the maximum deviation in pfm and pw from their true values is
0:01.8 Next, we use cubic splines to approximate a curve for each change in n in the (pw; pfm)
space. These cubic splines are then use to draw n (pw; pfm) in the actual simulation.
Notice that since the production function is given by f (pw; pfm) = p1w p
2
f p
3
m our as-
sumption of log-normality in all inputs implies that the joint rm and match productiv-
ity pfm = p
2
2+3
f p
3
2+3
m is also log-normally distributed pfm  LN
 
fm; 
2
fm

with fm =
2
2+3
f +
3
2+3
m and fm =
q
( 2
2+3
f )2 + (
3
2+3
m)2. This again implies that when we
want to simulate from a model without a match e¤ect, we can simply let 3  0 which implies
that fm = f and fm = f such that pfm = pf and f (pw; pfm) = f (pw; pf ).
To facilitate comparison between simulations with and without match e¤ect below in the
simulations with match e¤ect we always choose m and m such that we have fm = w and
fm = w, and in the simulations without the match e¤ect we simply choose f = w and
f = w.
We wish to simulate an economy inhabited with rms whose size is log-normal distributed.
Given f and f we dene the minimum and maximum pf as the values corresponding to the
0:05 percentile and the 99:5 percentile. In between the minimum and maximum values, we
let each rm productivity be equally spaced, whereas each rms share of the job o¤ers is the
log-normal density. Hence, the rm productivity is only approximately log-normal, but will
8First, we set pfm = 0 and determine for which values of pw n changes. Then for p
¯
w, each of these points
in pw, pw, and two additional values evenly distributed among each of these points we determine all values of
pfm where n changes.
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as the number of rms increases, converge to the log-normal distribution. Given our initial
guess of a correlation between worker and the joint rm and match e¤ect, the model runs for
30 periods before the worker allocation is completely stable and, hence, we discard the rst 29
simulated periods.
We also need to choose values for our parameters. The parameters describing ows in labor
market are xed at  = 0:9 and  = 0:1, which implies an equilibrium unemployment of 10 per
cent. We have set the parameters of the log normal distributions such that 3 = 0:25 implying
that the match e¤ect constitutes roughly 25 per cent of the explained variation in log wages.
Obviously, the inuence of the match e¤ect that we nd below will be smaller (larger) if the
match e¤ect constitutes a smaller (larger) share of the wage than the assumed 25 per cent. The
rest of the parameters in the two simulations are given in Table 3.
Table 1: Parameter values
Match E¤ect Included:
1 2 3 w = fm w = fm f f m m  c1 c2 r
0.40 0.35 0.25 5.00 0.60 5.00 0.84 5.00 0.84 0.50 5.50 1.20 0.05
Match E¤ect Not Included:
1 2 3 w = fm w = fm f f m m  c1 c2 r
0.40 0.60 0.00 5.00 0.60 5.00 0.60 . . 0.50 5.50 1.20 0.05
To complete the link between the theoretical model and empirical model we add a normal
distributed error term to the log linear wage equation. We set the variance of the error term,
such that it contributes with 5-10 per cent of the total wage variation.
With the assumed parameter values, the maximum number of jobs that any worker samples
is 3. In Figure 2 a surface plot of the n-function is shown. Unemployed workers with produc-
tivity above approximately 225, corresponding to 25 per cent of the workers, sample 3 jobs.
Since almost no unemployed workers sample just one job, almost 75 per cent sample 2 jobs.
The gure also shows that as workers climb the rm and match productivity ladder they reduce
the number of jobs they sample and when they reach su¢ ciently far, they stop searching.
Since the workers in the economy without a match e¤ect and in the economy with a match
e¤ect draw productivities from the same distribution the n-function in the two scenarios is
identical.
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Figure 2: The optimal job sample size
pfm pw
n = 0
n = 1
n = 2
n = 3
In Table 2 we show the results from the AKM estimation on the simulated data. There are
only small di¤erences in the overall labor market between the two scenarios. The di¤erences in
the dispersion of wages arise, since whereas we assume a discrete distribution of rm productiv-
ities which is cut o¤, the match e¤ect is allowed to be continuous. Therefore, the joint rm and
match distribution will have a larger dispersion than the rm productivity in the case without
match e¤ect. Furthermore, in the economy with a match e¤ect workers can get a better job
within a rm by drawing an o¤er from the exact same rm, but with a higher match e¤ect.
This might have a small positive e¤ect on both the mean wage and the dispersion of wages.
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Table 2: Monte-carlo estimations
Match e¤ect included Match e¤ect not
included
No. of replications 100 100
No. time periods 6 6
No. of observations 66,760 66,760
No. of persons 12,500 12,500
No. of rms 495 473
Average of wages 124.7 124.4
Variance of wages 47.1 41.2
Ave. no. of obs per rm 135 141
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean
AKM, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) -0.086 -0.035 -0.064 0.107 0.140 0.125
AKM, Corrected cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) -0.076 -0.023 -0.052 0.112 0.146 0.131
MIXED, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.014 0.042 0.029 . . .
True cor(1  ln(pw); 2  ln(pf )) 0.079 0.115 0.095 0.112 0.147 0.131
True cor(1  ln(pw); (2 + 3)  ln(pfm)) 0.093 0.135 0.112 0.112 0.147 0.131
Mean inuence on var(Y ):
True AKM Mixed True AKM
Firm e¤ect 0.208 0.194 0.193 0.392 0.392
Person e¤ect 0.442 0.678 0.444 0.543 0.555
Match e¤ect 0.272 . 0.285 0.000 .
Error term 0.077 0.128 0.078 0.065 0.052
In the right panel of the table we show the results for the case without a match e¤ect. The
estimated correlation is very close to the true correlation. With the bias correction we obtain
the true correlation.
In the left panel of the table we include the match e¤ect. Here, workers change jobs on the
grounds of the composite rm and match productivity rather than just the rm productivity.
This implies that the true correlation between the worker and rm productivities, on average, is
0:095. However, with the presence of the match e¤ect both the estimated and corrected corre-
lations from the xed e¤ects estimation are severely biased and even negative with mean values
of  0:064 and  0:052 respectively. Therefore, existing studies nding a negative correlation
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between worker and rm e¤ects may actually reect a labor market with positive assortative
matching. Moreover, the bias from the match e¤ect seems to be more important than the statis-
tical bias. Woodcocks mixed e¤ects model does considerably better with a positive correlation
of 0:029 although it is also biased downwards.
The assumed wage setting in our theoretical model is the piece-rate contract. Cahuc, Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2006) and Lentz (2008) use an alternative bargaining mechanism, in which
employers are allowed to respond to an outside bid for its workers. Besides the workers own
productivity and her current rms productivity, the workers current wage also depends on the
productivity of the previous rm. Thereby, this wage-setting mechanism would compared to
the piece-rate contract ceteris paribus imply a lower correlation between the worker and rm
productivities. To some extent the match e¤ect plays a similar role here, and it is also apparent
that the correlation between the worker productivity and the rm productivity is lower when
there is a match component in the wages.
Woodcock (2007) argues that a match e¤ect, which is positively correlated with the worker
e¤ect and negatively correlated with the rm e¤ect, will imply that the AKM model overes-
timates the proportion of variation attributable to the worker e¤ect and underestimates the
proportion attributable to the rm e¤ect. Our simulation results show that this is certainly
true; while the true worker e¤ect amounts 44 per cent of the variation, the estimated is 68 per
cent. In this perspective Woodcocks model performs much better since it attributes exactly
44 per cent of variation to the worker e¤ect.
Andrews, Gill, Schank and Upward (2007) argue that the negative correlation between
worker and rm e¤ects to a large extent is due to limited mobility bias. Perhaps, limited
mobility bias and the bias due to match e¤ects are the same. In other words, will the match
e¤ect bias disappear if we consider rms with more worker mobility? Due to the lognormal rm
size distribution rms with the highest rm productivity advertise the fewest jobs. Thus, if we
only estimate the AKM model using a 6 period sample of rms with more than 100 workers,
we are essentially restricting the range of rm productivities and the estimated correlation will
be biased due to the selection on an endogenous variable. Hence, for the simulated data the
sample selection bias makes such exercise useless.
Instead of estimating on a sample of large rms, as we will do for the empirical estimation
in the next section, we extend the sample length. Table 3 shows that more estimation periods
imply that the gap between the true and the corrected estimate narrows since as the number
of observations per rm increases, the rm e¤ects become more precisely estimated. With 20
periods the estimated correlation from the AKM estimation turns positive, but even with 50
periods the bias still amounts to approximately 20 per cent. Nevertheless, we can conclude
that the match e¤ect bias is a cause of the limited mobility bias. Furthermore, Table 3 reveals
that the correlation from the mixed e¤ects estimation in all simulations lies in between the true
60
correlation and the correlation from the AKM estimation.
Table 3: Limited mobility bias
No.of timeperiods No. of obs. Ave. obs. per rm True correlation AKM corrected MIXED
6 66; 760 135 0:095  0:052 0:029
10 111; 281 224 0:096  0:013 0:033
20 222; 523 447 0:095 0:026 0:050
30 333; 746 670 0:095 0:045 0:063
50 555; 296 1115 0:096 0:062 0:075
Note: The complete set of results for the simulations can be found in Table 2 and Tables 8-11 in Appendix C.
5 Empirical Results
We have access to a population register data set from Statistics Denmark and we restrict
attention to all workers aged 25-59 years and employed in the private sector. The data set is an
unbalanced panel data set for 1999-2004 and the variables originate from three databases and
include detailed information on a wide range of variables. Due to the nature of a xed e¤ect
estimator, which precludes the use of time-invariant explanatory variables, we only include
a small number of explanatory variables. The dependent variable is the log of hourly wages
taken from the IDA database. We use two groups of explanatory variables. Firstly, we include
a second order polynomial in the actual labor market experience and dummies for whether
the individual lives in a rural area or in a large city. These variables are also drawn from the
IDA database. Secondly, rm variables including value added per employee, capital stock per
employee, the ratio of males in the rms workforce and log of number of employees drawn from
the IDA and FIDA databases. Furthermore, we include time dummies in the regression. All
nominal variables are deated with the GDP deator.
Since rm e¤ects are only identied by movers we have chosen to restrict our estimation to
rms with more than 50 worker observations in the 6-year sample window. The resulting data
set has 4 million observations on 925; 000 persons employed in approximately 15; 000 rms.
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Table 4: AKM parameter estimates
AKM Estimator MIXED Estimator
Experience 0.0187 0.0200
(80:20) (237:22)
(Experience)2 -0.0062 -0.0041
 (233:40)  (190:91)
Large cities() -0.0022 -0.0273
 (3:66)  (52:22)
Rural area() 0.0027 -0.0269
(7:65)  (83:70)
Value added per employee (mill. DKK) 0.0085 0.0189
(33:55) (85:74)
Capital stock per employee (thousands DKK) 0.0049 0.0000
(1:89) (6:42)
Male ratio -0.0175 0.1379
 (7:74) (116:44)
ln(employees) 0.0194 0.0127
(54:02) (90:53)
R2 0.8939 0.8874
No. of observations 4,003,929
No. of persons 925,011
No. of rms 15,455
No. of worker-rm spells 1,350,944
No. of groups 95
Note: () The omitted category is the greater Copenhagen area. t-values are in parenthesis.
Table 4 presents the parameter estimates. All coe¢ cients are signicant besides the coe¢ -
cient for the capital stock per employee 9, and all have the expected signs. As our main focus is
assortative matching we proceed to look at the estimated correlation between worker and rm
xed e¤ects.
9In Appendix D it is shown that the coe¢ cient to capital stock per employee is signicantly positive when
restricting the sample to rms with more than 300 observations, where the rm e¤ect is better identied.
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Table 5: AKM Estimator, Standard Deviations and Correlation Matrix (obs per firm >50)
Correlations
Standard
deviation
Y Xw^w Xf ^f T^dum  ^J(i;t) ^i Xf ^f+
 ^J(i;t)
Xw^w+
^i
"^it
Y 0:351 1:000  0:049 0:044 0:010 0:281 0:886 0:294 0:905 0:326
Xw^w 0:068  0:049 1:000  0:018  0:042 0:003  0:256  0:004  0:051 0:000
Xf ^f 0:037 0:044  0:018 1:000 0:009  0:165  0:018 0:235  0:022 0:000
T^dum 0:017 0:010  0:042 0:009 1:000  0:001  0:032 0:003  0:042 0:000
 ^J(i;t) 0:009
(0:008)
0:281 0:003  0:165  0:001 1:000 0:036
(0:064)
0:920 0:037 0:000
^i 0:107
(0:102)
0:886  0:256  0:018  0:032 0:036
(0:064)
1:000 0:028 0:978 0:000
Xf ^f +  ^J(i;t) 0:094 0:294  0:004 0:235 0:003 0:920 0:028 1:000 0:028
(0:056)
0:000
Xw^w + ^i 0:316 0:905  0:051  0:022  0:042 0:037 0:978 0:028
(0:056)
1:000 0:000
"^it 0:114 0:326 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 1:000
Note: Lower case parenthesis denotes the correlation corrected for statistical bias. Xw includes experience,
(experience)2, large cities and rural areas. Xf includes value added per employee, capital stock per
employee, male ratio and ln(employees).
The resulting correlation matrix from the AKM model is shown in the Table 5. The es-
timated correlation between the unobserved worker and rm e¤ects is 0:036, while the bias
corrected correlation, shown in parenthesis, is 0:064. Taking account of both observed and un-
observed e¤ects, we estimate the correlation between the overall worker e¤ect and the overall
rm e¤ect to be 0:028, while the corrected is 0:056.10 With the two-way xed e¤ects model we
explain 89 per cent of the variation of the log wages, and approximately 3=4 of this variation
is due to observed and unobserved worker characteristics.
The positive correlation is in contrast to existing international studies which have almost all
found negative correlations. Hence, the evidence from the AKM estimation implies that there
is positive assortative matching in the Danish labor market. It turns out that the positive
correlation is not robust to inclusion of persons aged 18-24 years. In this case the estimated
correlation is  0:0047 while the corrected correlation is 0:0155. This result suggests that the
process of sorting takes time.
In addition to the statistical bias, both Abowd, Kramarz, Lengermann and Perez-Duarte
(2004) and Andrews, Gill, Schank and Upward (2007) argue that there might also exist a
10To compute the corrected correlation we simply subtract the bias in the cov

^i;  ^J(i;t)

from
cov

Xw^w + ^i; Xf ^f +  ^J(i;t)

, and subtract the biases in var

^i

and var

 ^J(i;t)

from respectively
var

Xw^w + ^i

and var

Xf ^f +  ^J(i;t)

.
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negative bias due to poorly identied rm e¤ects, when there is limited mobility. We can
quantify this bias by only estimating the AKM model on larger rms.11 As Andrews, Gill,
Schank and Upward we also nd that this bias is more important than the statistical bias,
and as shown in Appendix D the corrected correlation between the unobserved e¤ects becomes
0:092 and 0:111 when we estimate on samples, where the minimum number of observations per
rm are respectively 100 and 300. The correlation between the overall worker and rm e¤ects
are respectively 0:085 and 0:113.
Table 6: MIXED Estimator, Standard Deviations and Correlation Matrix (obs per firm >50)
Correlations
Standard
deviation
Y Xw^w Xf ^f T^dum  ^J(i;t) ^i ^ij Xf ^f+
 ^J(i;t)
Xw^w+
^i
"^it
Y 0:351 1:000 0:145 0:155 0:027 0:477 0:837 0:706 0:492 0:851 0:398
Xw^w 0:055 0:145 1:000 0:066  0:039  0:009  0:019  0:011 0:008 0:228 0:001
Xf ^f 0:037 0:155 0:066 1:000  0:011 0:069 0:025 0:001 0:320 0:041  0:007
T^dum 0:012 0:027  0:039  0:011 1:000 0:003  0:002 0:001 0:000  0:012 0:000
 ^J(i;t) 0:137 0:477  0:009 0:069 0:003 1:000 0:119 0:038 0:967 0:114 0:004
^i 0:217 0:837  0:019 0:025  0:002 0:119 1:000 0:690 0:119 0:969 0:114
^ij 0:072 0:706  0:011 0:001 0:001 0:038 0:690 1:000 0:036 0:670 0:216
Xf ^f +  ^J(i;t) 0:144 0:492 0:008 0:320 0:000 0:967 0:119 0:036 1:000 0:118 0:002
Xw^w + ^i 0:223 0:851 0:228 0:041  0:012 0:114 0:969 0:670 0:118 1:000 0:111
"^it 0:099 0:398 0:001  0:007 0:000 0:004 0:114 0:216 0:002 0:111 1:000
Note: Lower case parenthesis denotes the correlation corrected for statistical bias. Xw includes experience, (experience)2, large
cities and rural areas. Xf includes value added per employee, capital stock per employee, male ratio and ln(employees).
Table 6 presents the correlation matrix when estimating using Woodcocks hybrid mixed
e¤ects model. We obtain a correlation of 0:119 on the sample where the minimum number
of observations per rm is 50. In Table 7 we compute the mean inuence of each term on
the variance of the log of the wage rate. While the AKM estimation suggests that roughly 80
per cent of the variance in the wages can be attributed to the individual heterogeneity, the
mixed e¤ects estimation only suggests about 50 per cent are due to worker heterogeneity. This
repeats the nding from the simulated data and is due to the high positive correlation of 0:69
between the match e¤ect and the worker e¤ect. From the mixed e¤ects estimation we nd that
the match e¤ect explains 14:5 per cent of the variation in the log wages, which is of the same
magnitude as Woodcock nds using US data.
11Andrews, Gill, Schank and Upward examine this by estimating on a sample of plants with 30 or more
workers moving during the sample period.
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Table 7: Mean Influence On var(Y )
AKM Estimator MIXED Estimator
Xw^w (0.0097) 0.0226
Xf ^f 0.0049 0.0161
T^dum 0.0008 0.0009
 ^J(i;t) 0.0745 0.1854
^i 0.8235 0.5173
^ij . 0.1450
"^it 0.1061 0.1126
The correlation from Woodcocks mixed e¤ects estimation is higher than the estimated
correlation from the AKM model. Still our simulation results from section 4 combined with
the sizeable match e¤ect found using the Woodcock estimator show that the true correlation
in the Danish labor market will be above the estimated 11.9 per cent.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we argue that thepresence of a match e¤ect in the wages will imply that the
estimated correlation in an AKM estimation will be negatively biased. In order to analyze this
we develop a theoretical search model with continuous heterogeneity on both worker and rm
sides. Like the empirical model, the theoretical model implies a log-linear wage equation which
is additively separable in the worker e¤ects and the rm e¤ects. Besides this, the theoretical
model also provides the opportunity of having an additively separable match e¤ect. Importantly
for our agenda, the model implies assortative matching even though we only use a strictly
supermodular production function. We achieve this by letting the workers choose how many
jobs they want to sample. Compared to Shimer and Smith (2000) we can as Lentz (2008) relax
the assumption of log supermodularity and re-instate Beckers frictionless result.
Our model shares similarities with Lentz (2008), but has the desirable feature that more
productive workers, on average, leave unemployment or any given employment level to nd
better matches than their less productive colleagues. However, compared to Lentzmodel this
is at the expense of no di¤erences in unemployment durations. A model that could combine
the di¤erences in expected unemployment duration and that more productive workers leave
unemployment to nd more productive matches than less productive workers would be most
appealing. It seems to be the case that such a model can be achieved by allowing not only
workers to choose the sample, but also rms to choose the optimal sample of job candidates.
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Thus, for future research on assortative matching the discrete time sampling approach seems
to be more relevant than its continuous approximation.
In the case of Denmark the correlation between the worker and rm e¤ects is estimated to
be 0:12. We argue that it is most likely still a downward biased estimate, since from simulations
of the search model we show that we can obtain the standard negative correlation estimate from
an economy where there is indeed positive assortative matching.
In conclusion, although researches have found negative correlations from estimating the
AKM model for a series of countries, labor markets might after all be characterized by positive
assortative matching.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The number of jobs sampled is necessarily discrete and recognizing this, it is useful
for us to work with segments of pfm for which a given worker with productivity pw does not
change her number of jobs sampled n (pw; pfm). Dening g^
 
pw; p
j
fm
  R pjfm
pj 1fm
~g
 
pw; p
0
fm

dp0fm
and p0fm  prfm we can express equation (12) evaluated in pifm as
iX
j=1
g^

pw; p
j
fm

=

 + 
 
 
pifm
n(pw;p0fm) + 
 + 
iX
j=1
 
 
pifm
n(pw;pj 1fm ) g^ pw; pjfm (17)
Rearranging to solve for g^
 
pw; p
i
f

we get
g^
 
pw; p
i
fm

=

+ 

pifm
n(pw;p0fm)
1  + 

pifm
n(pw;pi 1fm )   fi > 1g
i 1X
j=1
1  + 

pifm
n(pw;pj 1fm )
1  + 

pifm
n(pw;pi 1fm ) g^

pw; p
j
fm

(18)
Next, for some workers of productivity pXw we have that
G^X
 
pIfm

=
IX
i=1

+ 

pIfm
n(pXw ;p0;Xfm )
1  + 

pIfm
n(pXw ;pI 1;Xfm )   fI > 1g
IX
i=2
i 1X
j=1
0BB@1  + 

pi;Xfm
n(pXw ;pj 1;Xfm )
1  + 

pi;Xfm
n(pXw ;pi 1;Xfm )  g^

pXw ; p
j;X
fm
1CCA
(19)
Consider two workers A and B, where pAw > p
B
w , so that we by proposition 1 have that
n
 
pAw; pfm
  n  pBw ; pfm. Furthermore, assume that n = 0; 1; 2. Using Denition 1, we
wish to compare the allocation of the two worker types to show that GB
 
pIfm
  GA  pIfm.
The proof is in two parts. In part A we show that for the particular example depicted in Figure
3 GB
 
pIfm
  GA  pIfm for any pIfm 2 [0; 1]. In part B of the proof, we show that all other
possible scenarios are special cases of the example in part A.
68
Figure 3
1
2
0
fmp
n
A
fmp
,2B
fmp
,2A
fmp
,1B
fmp
,1BA
fmp
,,0
fmp
A
wp
B
wp
Part A: The discreteness of the number of jobs sampled implies that n in the interval
[0; 2] is a decreasing step-wise function of pfm with ve segments. As illustrated in Figure 3,
the considered example implies that pAw and p
B
w are su¢ ciently close so that workers A and
B are sampling the same number of jobs for some ranges of pfm. Next, we will use that if
n
 
pAw; pfm

= n
 
pBw ; pfm

it must be the case that person B will decrease her n at some rm
productivity pfm lower than the rm productivity where A will decrease her n.
By the use of equation (18) and (19) we have that G^B
 
pIfm
   G^A  pIfm  0 no matter
which segment pIfm is situated on in Figure 3. The solutions for each segment are:
G^B
 
pIfm
  G^A  pIfm j0pIfm<p1;Bfm = 0 (20)

G^B
 
pIfm
  G^A  pIfm jp1;BfmpIfm<p1;Afm =

( + )
2 
 
pIfm
0B@  

pIfm
2
1  + 

pIfm
2    

p1;Bfm
2
1  + 

p1;Bfm
2
1CA 1   

pIfm

1  + 

pIfm
 > 0 (21)

G^B
 
pIfm
  G^A  pIfm
p1;AfmpIfm<p2;Bfm
=

( + )
2 
 
pIfm
0B@  

p1;Afm
2
1  + 

p1;Afm
2  

p1;Bfm
2
1  + 

p1;Bfm
2
1CA 1   

pIfm

1  + 

pIfm
 > 0 (22)
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
G^B
 
pIfm
  G^A  pIfm jp2;BfmpIfm<p2;Afm =

( + )
2
1   

pIfm

1  +
1
1  + 

p1;Afm
2
0B@ 

pIfm
2
   

p1;Afm
2
1  + 

pIfm
    

p2;Bfm
2
   

p1;Afm
2
1  + 

p2;Bfm

1CA
+

( + )
2
1   

pIfm

1  +
0B@  

p1;Afm
2
1  + 

p1;Afm
2    

p1;Bfm
2
1  + 

p1;Bfm
2
1CA
0B@1   

pIfm
2
1   

pIfm
   1  + 

p2;Bfm
2
1  + 

p2;Bfm

1CA
> 0 (23)

G^B
 
pIfm
  G^A  pIfm jp2;AfmpIfm<1 =

( + )
2
1   

pIfm

1  +
 1
1  +

p1;Afm
2
0B@ 

p2;Afm
2
   

p1;Afm
2
1  + 

p2;Afm
    

p2;Bfm
2
   

p1;Afm
2

1  + 

p2;Bfm

1CA
+

( + )
2
1   

pIfm

1  +
0B@  

p2;Afm
2
1  + 

p2;Afm
2    

p1;Bfm
2
1  + 

p1;Bfm
2
1CA
0B@1   

pIfm
2
1   

pIfm
   1  + 

p2;Bfm
2
1  + 

p2;Bfm

1CA
> 0 (24)
where the only term not immediately seen to be positive is0B@1   

pIfm
2
1   

pIfm
   1  + 

p2;Bfm
2
1  + 

p2;Bfm

1CA
But since
@ 1 x
2
1 x
@x
= 1 > 0 this term as well is clearly positive. Hence, we conclude that
G^B
 
pIfm
  G^A  pIfm 8pIfm 2 [0; 1]
.
Part B: Since we know that
pAw > p
B
w ; n
0
pw (pw; pfm) > 0 =) n
 
pAw; pfm
  n  pBw ; pfm (25)
it is straightforward to show that every possible scenario satisfying (25) can be included either
directly as part of the main case above or be re-stated as combinations of a number of sub-cases,
all part of the main case above.
To illustrate consider the two examples in Figure 4.
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Case I) just parallels the last four segments of the main case from part A since from (20)
G^B
 
pIfm

= G^A
 
pIfm

for 0  pIfm < p1fm. In case II) one can include a worker C with
pAw > p
C
w > p
B
w (as illustrated with the middle line). By the proof in part A we know that
G^B
 
pIfm
  G^C  pIfm and G^C  pIfm  G^A  pIfm, whereby we also have that G^B  pIfm 
G^A
 
pIfm

. By the same line of argument, all cases in the n 2 [0; 1; 2] space can be showed to
have assortative matching by using only part A of this proof.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Existence of a unique reservation productivity prw and a unique unemployment rate u
follows trivially from equations (4) and (9). The l.h.s. of equations (5) and (6) is increasing
in n, while the r.h.s. is decreasing in n, which implies that there is a unique solution for each
of the equations. If this value is not an integer, it is possible that the two integers adjacent to
the solution of rst-order condition imply the same value of the value function. In this case,
we assume that the worker chooses the lowest n. Under this assumption there exist a unique
n (pw; b) and n (pw; pfm) for any pw 2
h
p
¯ w
; pw
i
and any pfm 2
h
p
¯ f
; pfm
i
. Di¤erentiating (12)
with respect to pfm gives
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g^ (pw; pfm) =

 + 
n (pw; b)   (pfm)
n(pw;b) 1 +

 + 
  (pfm)
n(pw;pfm) g^ (pw; pfm)
+

 + 
Z pfm
p
fm
n
 
pw; p
0
fm

  (pfm)
n(pw;p0fm) 1 g^
 
pw; p
0
fm

dp0fm
,
g^ (pw; pfm) =

+n (pw; b)   (pfm)
n(pw;b) 1
1  +  (pfm)n(pw;pfm)
+

+
R pfm
p
fm
n

pw; p
0
fm

  (pfm)
n(pw;p0fm) 1 g^

pw; p
0
fm

dp0fm
1  +  (pfm)n(pw;pfm)
which is an inhomogenous Volterra equation of second kind with an everywhere continuous and
uniformly bounded integral kernel. Given uniqueness of n (pw; b) and n (pw; pfm) we also have
a unique solution for g^ (pw; pfm) for any pw 2
h
p
¯ w
; pw
i
and any pfm 2
h
p
¯ fm
; pfm
i
.
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Appendix C: Tables from Simulation
Table 8: Monte-carlo estimations with 10 periods
Match e¤ect included Match e¤ect not
included
No. of replications 100 100
No. time periods 10 10
No. of observations 111,281 111,281
No. of persons 12,500 12,500
No. of rms 496 477
Average of wages 124.7 124.4
Variance of wages 47.2 41.3
Ave. no. of obs per rm 224 233
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean
AKM, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) -0.035 0.004 -0.018 0.114 0.145 0.130
AKM, Corrected cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) -0.031 0.010 -0.013 0.116 0.147 0.132
MIXED, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.019 0.049 0.033 . . .
True cor(1  ln(pw); 2  ln(pf )) 0.082 0.110 0.096 0.116 0.146 0.132
True cor(1  ln(pw); (2 + 3)  ln(pfm)) 0.097 0.128 0.113 0.116 0.146 0.132
Mean inuence on var(Y ):
True AKM Mixed True AKM
Firm e¤ect 0.208 0.189 0.191 0.392 0.392
Person e¤ect 0.443 0.642 0.448 0.543 0.551
Match e¤ect 0.272 . 0.284 0.000 .
Error term 0.078 0.169 0.078 0.065 0.057
73
Table 9: Monte-carlo estimations with 20 periods
Match e¤ect included Match e¤ect not
included
No. of replications 100 100
No. time periods 20 20
No. of observations 222,523 222,523
No. of persons 12,500 12,500
No. of rms 498 481
Average of wages 124.7 124.4
Variance of wages 47.2 41.4
Ave. no. of obs per rm 447 462
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean
AKM, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.007 0.038 0.024 0.118 0.143 0.131
AKM, Corrected cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.009 0.040 0.026 0.118 0.144 0.131
MIXED, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.035 0.061 0.050 . . .
True cor(1  ln(pw); 2  ln(pf )) 0.080 0.109 0.095 0.118 0.144 0.131
True cor(1  ln(pw); (2 + 3)  ln(pfm)) 0.099 0.124 0.113 0.118 0.144 0.131
Mean inuence on var(Y ):
True AKM Mixed True AKM
Firm e¤ect 0.208 0.181 0.187 0.392 0.392
Person e¤ect 0.442 0.592 0.453 0.544 0.547
Match e¤ect 0.272 . 0.282 0.000 .
Error term 0.078 0.227 0.078 0.065 0.061
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Table 10: Monte-carlo estimations with 30 periods
Match e¤ect included Match e¤ect not
included
No. of replications 100 100
No. time periods 30 30
No. of observations 333,746 333,746
No. of persons 12,500 12,500
No. of rms 498 484
Average of wages 124.8 124.4
Variance of wages 47.3 41.4
Ave. no. of obs per rm 670 689
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean
AKM, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.032 0.060 0.043 0.120 0.143 0.131
AKM, Corrected cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.034 0.062 0.045 0.120 0.143 0.132
MIXED, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.052 0.076 0.063 . . .
True cor(1  ln(pw); 2  ln(pf )) 0.084 0.108 0.095 0.119 0.143 0.132
True cor(1  ln(pw); (2 + 3)  ln(pfm)) 0.101 0.124 0.112 0.119 0.143 0.132
Mean inuence on var(Y ):
True AKM Mixed True AKM
Firm e¤ect 0.208 0.177 0.185 0.391 0.391
Person e¤ect 0.443 0.564 0.458 0.544 0.546
Match e¤ect 0.271 . 0.279 0.000 .
Error term 0.078 0.259 0.078 0.065 0.063
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Table 11: Monte-carlo estimations with 50 periods
Match e¤ect included Match e¤ect not
included
No. of replications 100 100
No. time periods 50 50
No. of observations 556,296 556,296
No. of persons 12,500 12,500
No. of rms 499 487
Average of wages 124.8 124.5
Variance of wages 47.3 41.3
Ave. no. of obs per rm 1115 1142
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean
AKM, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.051 0.070 0.061 0.124 0.140 0.132
AKM, Corrected cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.052 0.070 0.062 0.124 0.140 0.132
MIXED, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.066 0.084 0.075 . . .
True cor(1  ln(pw); 2  ln(pf )) 0.086 0.104 0.096 0.124 0.141 0.132
True cor(1  ln(pw); (2 + 3)  ln(pfm)) 0.102 0.123 0.113 0.124 0.141 0.132
Mean inuence on var(Y ):
True AKM Mixed True AKM
Firm e¤ect 0.208 0.173 0.183 0.392 0.392
Person e¤ect 0.442 0.534 0.462 0.543 0.545
Match e¤ect 0.272 . 0.276 0.000 .
Error term 0.078 0.294 0.078 0.065 0.063
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Appendix D: Tables from Empirical Estimation
Table 12: AKM parameter estimates
(obs per rm >100) (obs per rm >300)
Experience 0.0168 0.0137
(67:34) (47:76)
(Experience)2 -0.0061 -0.0060
 (219:63)  (191:50)
Large cities() -0.0018 -0.0022
 (2:92)  (3:18)
Rural area() 0.0024 0.0014
(6:41) (3:25)
Value added per employee (mill. DKK) 0.0082 0.0067
(31:23) (19:12)
Capital stock per employee (thousands DKK) 0.0047 0.4968
(1:82) (18:63)
Male ratio -0.0190 -0.0260
 (6:87)  (6:89)
ln(employees) 0.0182 0.0211
(47:64) (45:37)
R2 0.8986 0.9045
No. of observations 3,458,066 2,596,705
No. of persons 820,883 645,302
No. of rms 7,585 2,293
No. of groups 11 1
Note: () The omitted category is the greater Copenhagen area.
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Table 13: AKM Estimator, Standard Deviations and Correlation Matrix (obs per firm >100)
Correlations
Standard
deviation
Y Xw^w Xf ^f T^dum  ^J(i;t) ^i Xf ^f+
 ^J(i;t)
Xw^w+
^i
"^it
Y 0:351 1:000  0:067 0:020 0:009 0:286 0:891 0:296 0:916 0:318
Xw^w 0:079  0:067 1:000  0:009  0:048  0:001  0:303  0:004  0:070 0:000
Xf ^f 0:033 0:020  0:009 1:000 0:013  0:210  0:024 0:183  0:027 0:000
T^dum 0:020 0:009  0:048 0:013 1:000 0:001  0:038 0:007  0:052 0:000
 ^J(i;t) 0:007
(0:007)
0:286  0:001  0:210 0:001 1:000 0:071
(0:092)
0:923 0:075 0:000
^i 0:110
(0:106)
0:891  0:303  0:024  0:038 0:071
(0:092)
1:000 0:063 0:972 0:000
Xf ^f +  ^J(i;t) 0:083 0:296  0:004 0:183 0:007 0:923 0:063 1:000 0:064
(0:085)
0:000
Xw^w + ^i 0:317 0:916  0:070  0:027  0:052 0:075 0:972 0:064
(0:085)
1:000 0:000
"^it 0:112 0:318 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 1:000
Note: Lower case paranthesis denotes the correlation corrected for statistical bias. Xw includes experi-
ence, (experience)2, large cities and rural areas. Xf includes value added per employee, capital stock per
employee, male ratio and ln(employees).
Table 14: AKM Estimator, Standard Deviations and Correlation Matrix (obs per firm >300)
Correlations
Standard
deviation
Y Xw^w Xf ^f T^dum  ^J(i;t) ^i Xf ^f+
 ^J(i;t)
Xw^w+
^i
"^it
Y 0:350 1:000  0:081  0:005 0:007 0:282 0:887 0:299 0:926 0:309
Xw^w 0:099  0:081 1:000 0:000  0:051  0:008  0:367  0:009  0:083 0:000
Xf ^f 0:033  0:005 0:000 1:000 0:016  0:356  0:023 0:079  0:025 0:000
T^dum 0:022 0:007  0:051 0:016 1:000 0:004  0:048 0:011  0:067 0:000
 ^J(i;t) 0:006
(0:006)
0:282  0:008  0:356 0:004 1:000 0:099
(0:111)
0:904 0:104 0:000
^i 0:116
(0:112)
0:887  0:367  0:023  0:048 0:099
(0:111)
1:000 0:095 0:957 0:000
Xf ^f +  ^J(i;t) 0:073 0:299  0:009 0:079 0:011 0:904 0:095 1:000 0:099
(0:113)
0:000
Xw^w + ^i 0:318 0:926  0:083  0:025  0:067 0:104 0:957 0:099
(0:113)
1:000 0:000
"^it 0:108 0:309 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 1:000
Note: Lower case paranthesis denotes the correlation corrected for statistical bias. Xw includes experi-
ence, (experience)2, large cities and rural areas. Xf includes value added per employee, capital stock per
employee, male ratio and ln(employees).
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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of imports on the demand for skills in Danish manufacturing
companies. We nd that it is of crucial importance to distinguish imports by country-of-origin.
The main nding is that increasing imports from low-wage countries and skill-upgrading in
Danish manufacturing rms are positively and signicantly correlated. Especially, this is the
case for the external rm e¤ect as measured by imports of product types that is used to proxy
import competition in product markets; but also for the internal rm e¤ect for larger rms as
measured by rm imports. Since import competition by construction is an aggregate measure
it is considered external to the rm, which implies that the correlation can be given an causal
interpretation.
Keywords: Skill-upgrading, rm imports, import competition, low-wage countries
JEL: F14, J24, L60
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the implications of imports for skill-upgrading in Danish manufacturing
rms, i.e., increasing demand for skilled labor. We analyze two distinct mechanisms through
which imports potentially inuences rmsdemand for skilled and unskilled labor. The rst
mechanism is an internal rm e¤ect based on the increasing possibility for rms to import
cheap inputs from low-wage countries. The second mechanism is an external product e¤ect
based on rms meeting stronger competition in domestic product markets through increasing
imports from low-wage countries. We refer to the latter e¤ect as import competition.
The internal rm e¤ect investigates whether there is a signicant correlation between skill-
upgrading and rm imports. What we have in mind is the standard story of decreases costs
of purchasing inputs from abroad leading rms either to produce fewer inputs themselves or to
buy fewer inputs from domestic producers. Since production of the relevant inputs are intensive
in unskilled labor this leads to lower shares of unskilled workers in production.
The external product e¤ect investigates whether skill-upgrading is caused by aggregate im-
ports of a particular product type. The mechanism that we have in mind is that rms as a
consequence of increasing import competition gradually move into more skill-intensive produc-
tion to avoid increasing foreign competition from low-wage countries. Import competition in
domestic product markets is a measure of aggregate imports of the product types that the rm
produces. Because the measure by construction is an aggregate measure, it is considered exter-
nal to the rm, which implies that the indentied e¤ects can be given a causal interpretation.
The main nding is that increasing import competition from low-wage countries leads to
within-rm skill-upgrading. This nding is robust to di¤erent denitions of import competition
relevant for the single rm and with respect to the details of the applied product classications.
Moreover, the internal rm e¤ect, i.e., rm imports from low-wage countries, is found to be
positively and signicantly correlated with skill-upgrading within larger rms.
The nding that import competition from low-wage countries leads to skill-upgrading is of
interest because of the big increases in trade with countries like India and China, which means
that studies of globalization e¤ects with this newer form of trade are high on the research
agenda.1 In the past, economists have not found much evidence for import competition to play
a major role in the changing demand for skills. Instead the primarily focus has been on rm
imports that are sometimes referred to as international outsourcing. However, there begin to be
a renewed interest in the e¤ects of imports on the labor market. This interest has been absent
for some time since there has been a consensus that imports has not been important.2 This is
1China became member of WTO in late 2001 and India has grown to become an important player in the
world markets.
2In the Journal of Economic Perspectives, summer 1995, there was a symposium on income inequality and
trade. For example, Wood (1995) "..argue[s] for what is still a minority view among economists: that the main
cause of the deteriorating situation of unskilled workers in developed countries has been expansion of trade with
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due to the existing literature that has not found much evidence for trade to be a major cause
of increasing inequality. This consensus is, however, problematic, because it is based on studies
that use data that to a high degree are outdated. This argument is put forward by Krugman
(2008), who states: "Until recently .. surprisingly little attention was given to the increasingly
out-of-date nature of data behind the reassuring consensus that trade has only modest e¤ects
on income distribution". This was also noted by Bernanke (2007): "Unfortunately, much of the
available empirical research on the inuence of trade on inequality dates from the 1980s and
1990s and thus does not address later developments".
This paper o¤ers an analysis that solves some of the issues pointed out above. First, the
empirical study is based on resent data covering the period 1999-2003. Second, imports are split-
up after country-of-origin; more precisely, imports are divided after low-wage and high-wage
countries. In addition to the two data improvements, we construct rm-specic measures of
import competition by combining external trade information with industrial sales broken-down
after product categories. More precisely, we construct our base measure of import competition
after product types and use weights based on sales broken-down after product types to obtain
measures of import competition relevant for the individual rm. To illustrate the measure,
imagine that sales in a rm are constituted by 30 percent of product type A and 70 percent of
product type B, then the rm-specic measure of import competition is determined as the sum
of aggregate imports of product A weighted by 30 percent and aggregate imports of product
B weighted by 70 percent. In this sense, import competition is rm-specic. We also apply an
alternative measure of import competition that is dened as aggregate imports of the product
type for which the rm has the largest sales share; i.e., import competition is equal to aggregate
imports of product type B in the example. The latter measure of import competition is closer
to the standard measure as used by Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006), because this measure is
constructed for the US manufacturing industries and because rms are assigned to an industry
according to the product type with the largest sales share.
According to our best knowledge this paper is novel since it is the rst rm-level study
of the relative importance of rm imports and import competition for skill-upgrading that
distinguishes imports after country-of-origin, and applies rm-specic measures of import com-
petition.
The study is based on a unique combination of data sets yielding a matched employer-
employee sample of manufacturing rms containing information on output, sales broken-down
after product types, labor inputs, and imports, all measured at the rm level, and covering
the period 1999-2003. This data set enables us to develop measures of cost shares for workers
of di¤erent education categories and imports both for the single rm and for product types
after country-of-origin. We estimate labor demand functions derived from a translog cost
developing countries."
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function and all regressions are performed using xed e¤ects estimation techniques, implying
that the model parameters are identied using variation within rms over time. This reects
our hypothesis that a change in imports causes a change in the cost share between skilled and
unskilled workers.
As mentioned, the international trade literature has mainly focussed on the inuence of im-
ports of intermediate inputs on skill-upgrading; thereby to a large extent ignoring the impact
from import competition. Since the work of Feenstra and Hanson (1996), the idea that rms
o¤shore production activities that use unskilled labor intensively to low-wage countries has
been investigated intensively. Empirically, international trade in intermediate inputs is often
found to be of signicant importance for skill-upgrading, see Feenstra and Hanson (1999), and
Feenstra (2004). The relationship between trade in intermediate inputs and skill-upgrading is
usually investigated using industry data from input-output tables, and hence, there is no dis-
tinction between country-of-origin, i.e., the approach does not allow a decomposition of trade
in intermediate inputs in low- and high-wage countries; exceptions are Ekholm and Hakkala
(2006), and Hijzen, Görg and Hine (2005). Moreover, using data from input-output tables
exclude the possibility of investigating the importance of imports of the nal stage of pro-
duction for skill-upgrading, e.g., assembly; an activity where many low-wage countries have a
comparative advantage, see Ng and Yeats (1999).
In the empirical literature, the hypothesis that industries shift towards more skill-intensive
activities as a consequence of increasing import competition is investigated using measures
based on overall imports. That is, the measures are based on aggregate imports from all coun-
tries. There has only been weak support for this hypothesis. See for example, Autor, Katz, and
Krueger (1998). The nding that import competition is without importance for skill-upgrading
is also based on shift-share analyses. Using this method it is found that within-industry e¤ects
dominate skill-upgrading, whereas between-industry e¤ects are rather modest. The interpre-
tation is that import competition is without importance for skill-upgrading, because industry
imports - according to this view - should a¤ect the composition of skills through a changing
industry structures, see for example Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994).
The view that import competition mainly a¤ects the composition of skills through changing
industry structures is only valid as long as rms or products are homogeneous within industries.
There is, however, room for rms to adjust the product-mix towards skill-intensive production
without switching industry if rms or products to a larger extent are heterogeneous within
industries. Sørensen (2008) nds industry level evidence that import competition from low-
wage countries is important for within industry skill-upgrading in Danish Manufacturing. It is
shown that the break-down into low- and high-wage countries is of crucial importance, implying
that imports from low-wage countries leads to comprehensive skill-upgrading. Due to the nature
of the study, it is however not clear whether skill-upgrading takes place between rms and within
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industries; or whether it takes place within rms. This issue is addressed in the present paper. If
it takes place within rms, this suggests that increasing foreign competition in product markets
makes rms change their product mix.3
Exceptions from using industry data are Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) and Bernard, Jensen
and Schott (2006) that use rm data. The former paper is focused on the relationship between
rm imports and labor market outcomes in domestic rms. In other words, the focus is on the
internal rm e¤ect of internationalization and skill-upgrading. The authors nd that increased
imports especially of nished goods have a negative association with the demand for production
workers, as well as for unskilled workers. This is consistent with our ndings for the internal
rm e¤ect. Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) nds support for import competition from
low-wage countries to play an important role for rms to adjust their product mix in order to
avoid trade pressures. This suggests that rms shift towards more skill-intensive activities as
a consequence of increasing international competition from low-wage countries and that this
shift may take place within industries. Moreover, the authors study skill-upgrading using the
cost shares of production workers but do not establish any signicant correlations. However,
measures of skill-intensity based on educational attainment should be better indicators of those
most likely to be a¤ected by trade; and such measures are not available to the authors.Finally
it is worth noticiing that our data is much more recent since Bernard, Jensen, and Schott
(2006) use data for the period 1977-1997, whereas Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) use data for
1986-1992.
Another studies relevant for the present paper is Harrison and McMillan (2006), where
the dependent variable is employment; not relative demand for skills. The focus is on the
importance of rm imports for reductions of employment in US multinationals. The authors
argue that o¤shoring play a minor role for rm employment, whereas import competition from
low-wage countries are of greater importance. A nding similar to our results for skill-upgrading.
The next section describes the main idea of the analysis in a simple theoretical model. After
this we present the basic equations in the translog cost model and discusses the econometric
strategy. Section 4 describes the data set applied in the analysis, as well as the constructed
measures of international trade. Section 5 presents the baseline empirical results, while section
6 and 7 futher analyses the robustness of these results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Factor Proportions Framework
We have the factor proportions framework in mind when theoretically approaching the impor-
tance of imports from low-wage countries for skill-upgrading. Three products can potentially
3A more radical consequence of import competition is that domestic rms may be pressured out of business
and exit the market. This is not an issue that we address in this paper. The issue of plant survival and import
competition is addressed in Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006).
84
be produced in the skill-abundant domestic economy; two nal products and a pure interme-
diate product. We assume that production of nal product 1 is more skill-intensive than the
other products, whereas the intermediate input is more skill-intensive than nal product 2. The
model is presented in the Appendix.
Prices are determined in the world market and exogenous to the high-wage country under
investigation. The prices relevant for the domestic economy are the world price multiplied by
a product specic transportation cost of the "iceberg" type. What we have in mind is that
unskilled-intensive nal product 2 has a higher transportation cost than the intermediate input
and nal product 1, whereas the intermediate input has a higher transportation cost than nal
product 1. When the degree of internationalization increases, we assume that the transportation
costs for the products fall in similar proportions implying that relative prices for products
leads to higher relative prices of skill-intensive products in the skill-abundant country. These
assumptions capture that the largest e¤ect from increasing internationalization is on unskilled-
intensive products. A numerical example of the consequences of increased internationalization
in this setup is presented in appendix A.
In this model increased internationalization in the form of decreasing transportation costs
imply that the skill-abundant country will specialize further in the skill-intensive nal prod-
uct compared to both the intermediate input and the unskilled-intensive nal product. The
change in the specialization pattern also implies that imports of intermediate inputs will in-
crease. Moreover, the economy will specialize more in the production of intermediate products
compared to the unskilled intensive products. Actually, the home country will even restrain
from producing nal product 2 if  is above a threshold level. In other words, production of
nal product 2 becomes unprotable when internationalization increases and consumption of
nal product 2 equals imports of the product. This is another mechanism that leads rms to
specialize in skill-intensive production as a consequence of increasing internationalization.
One di¢ culty in using the factor proportion framework to analyze e¤ects of international-
ization on rm behavior is that the model focuses on products or industries. We follow Bernard,
Jensen and, Schott (2006) and use the interpretation that rms produce in bundles of disag-
gregate products. Following this interpretation, rms in the domestic economy both produce
the nal products and the intermediate input. When internationalization increases rms have
the incentive to shift towards skill-intensive production. The rst mechanism above can be
thought of as an e¤ect related to what we label for the internal rm e¤ect in the empirical
section, which focuses on decreases costs of purchasing inputs from abroad. The second mecha-
nism focuses on foreign rms having a cost advantage in unskilled-intensive products, implying
that production is unprotable in the skill-abundant country. This will lead rms to move into
more skill-intensive production and therefore upgrade the employed skills. This mechanism can
be thought of as import competition.
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Based on the above discussion, we consider two testable hypotheses from the factor propor-
tions framework:
 Hypothesis 1: The relative demand for skilled labor at the rm level increases with the
extent of rm imports from low-wage countries.
 Hypothesis 2: Exposure to import competition from low-wage countries increases the
relative demand for skilled labor at the rm level.
3 Econometric Framework
Our empirical specication is based on the translog cost function. We follow Brown and Chris-
tensen (1981) assuming that the di¤erent types of labor are variable inputs, whereas physical
capital is quasi xed. We add rm imports and import competition that are assumed to be
quasi xed inputs (or cost shifters). Finally, we add a technology measures. Below the model
for two labor types is described.
Using Shephards lemma, the translog cost function generates a wage cost share equation
of the following form:
Sskilled;i;t = 0 + 1 ln

wskilled;i;t
wunskilled;i;t

+ 2 ln (Yi;t) + 3 ln (Ki;t)
+4 ln

Mrm, LWi;t

+ 5 ln

Mrm, HWi;t

+6 ln

Mproduct, LWi;t

+ 7 ln

Mproduct, HWi;t

+8 ln (TECHi;t) + skilled;i + "skilled;i;t
where Sskilled;i;t is the cost share of skilled labor to total labor costs in rm i observed at time
t. wskilled=wunskilled is the relative wage of skilled labor to unskilled labor, Y is total production,
K is the capital stock, M is imports. rmdenotes rm imports, whereas productdenotes
import competition; LWand HWdenote low-wage and high-wage countries, respectively.
skilled;i is a rm xed e¤ect, and "skilled;i;t is an i:i:d: error component.
In general a translog cost function generates a series of wage cost share equations, one for
each type of variable labor input. Imposing the standard restrictions of symmetry and homo-
geneity of degree 1 in prices allows us to reach the specication above where one of the equations
becomes redundant. In the case of two labor inputs, the estimates of the similar equation for
the wage cost share of unskilled labor can be recovered from the symmetry restrictions without
estimating the equation.
In a latter subsection, the labor demand functions are estimated for three skill levels. In
this case, the restrictions of symmetry and homogeneity of degree one in prices are imposed on
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the model. This model is estimated using restricted maximum likelihood, incorporating all the
structural parameter restrictions.
4 Data
The applied data set originate from administrative registers maintained by Statistics Denmark.
Using these data we construct a matched employer-employee database covering the entire pop-
ulation. The sampling unit is the "private manufacturing rm with more than 10 employees",
and we observe these annually over the period 1999 to 2003. Specically, the applied data
sets are the Danish Firm Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (FIDA), the Ex-
ternal Trade Statistics, and the Industrial Sales of Product Types from Statistics Denmark.
Moreover, the OECD ANBERD database is applied to construct a proxy for technical changes.
Below we discuss the variables applied in the empirical analysis and our sampling strategy.
4.1 Skill-Upgrading
The FIDA database includes variables for individual rms. It is possible to identify all workers
in each rm for each year, and for each worker we have access to detailed information on
educational attainment and wages. The data thus permit us to construct wage cost shares for
di¤erent types of labor at the rm level. We mainly perform the analyses for two skill types
by classifying labor into unskilled labor and skilled labor that includes all workers with formal
qualifying education.
We also perform the analysis for three types of labor. This latter classication groups
labor in unskilled labor, labor with vocational training, and labor with academic education.
The choice of dividing labor into three skill groups is motivated by the educational system of
Denmark, which consists of a vocational track and an academic track. Moreover, this additional
decomposition of the educated labor group enables us to study the nature and composition of
skill-upgrading in more details. Vocational education is a mix of schooling and training in rms
with a typical duration of approximately 3 years and this category also includes workers with
a short acedemic education. Labor with academic education includes workers with medium
or long academic education. Medium academic education corresponds to the bachelor level,
whereas long academic education corresponds to the master level or more.
We include rms with more than 10 employees because this is the minimum size for data
collected in the Industrial Sales of Product Types. When the focus is on three labor types, we
restrict the sample to rms with more than 50 employees. This additional sampling restriction
is made to avoid the technical problem of small rms with zero employees of a specic skill
type. This would result in a corner solution in the model for relative labor demand. The vast
majority of rms with more than 10 employees employ unskilled workers as well as workers
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with formal skills. Moreover, we nd that most rms with more than 50 employees employ all
three labor types, i.e., unskilled, vocational, and academically educated workers. The few rms
that do not employ all labor types are excluded from our sample.
The FIDA database provides background information such as turnover and the value of xed
assets from the rmsbalance sheet. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the samples. The
average number of Manufacturing rms over the period 1999-2003 is around 5,000 rms with
more that 10 employees and 1,400 rms with more than 50 employees. For both samples there
are a falling tendency of the number of rms over time. Our samples represents approximately
95 and 80 percent of total manufacturing turnover and around 95 and 85 percent of the total
xed assets in manufacturing.
Table 1 also presents total wage cost share composition and its development over the sam-
pling period for the di¤erent samples. The main impression is that skill-upgrading takes places
over time and the cost share of workers without formal education falls with approximately 3
percentage point over the ve year period.
Table 1: Total Wage Cost Shares Composition in Danish Manufacturing
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
   Manufacturing Firms with 10 or More Employees   
Wage: No Education 33.9% 33.6% 32.7% 32.0% 31.0%
Wage: All Educations 66.1% 66.4% 67.3% 68.0% 69.0%
Total Number of Firms 5,192 5,131 5,004 4,800 4,664
Total Number of Workers 391,711 397,042 390,589 379,857 361,337
Total Turnover, Billions DKK 435.4 487.6 520.5 520.5 514.8
Total Capital, Billions DKK 413.8 456.6 467.4 474.5 485.3
   Manufacturing Firms with 50 or More Employees   
Wage: No Education 34.4% 34.0% 33.1% 32.3% 31.3%
Wage: Vocational or Short Acad-
emic Education
48.2% 48.8% 49.2% 49.3% 49.4%
Wage: Medium or Long Academic
Education
17.4% 17.2% 17.7% 18.4% 19.3%
Total Number of Firms 1,415 1,451 1,405 1,345 1,289
Total Number of Workers 310,766 317,990 312,751 304,211 288,723
Total Turnover, Billions DKK 361.8 412.4 443.6 443.1 439.0
Total Capital, Billions DKK 363.3 405.8 415.6 421.6 430.4
4.2 Measuring Imports
We apply two measures of internationalization; rm imports and product imports. The di¤er-
ences between rm imports and product imports is the level of aggregation where rm imports
is a rm specic measure and product imports is an product specic aggregate. However, there
is another important di¤erence between the two measures, namely, that rm imports measure
imports of all foreign produced products to a particular rm, whereas product imports measure
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aggregate imports of a particular foreign produced product over all domestic industries and nal
use categories. The interpretation is that rm imports is a measure focusing on input markets
of the rm; i.e., the higher is rm imports the better possibility has the rm to take advantage
of cheaper foreign produced inputs in the production process. On the other hand, product
imports is a measure focused on the competitive state on the domestic product marked of the
rm in the sense that a higher value implies that the rm faces increased competition from
abroad. Therefore, the relevant imports is imports of products that the rm produces.
Table 2 presents the overall import data for Danish rms. Despite the short time span,
imports from low and middle-income countries have increased from 36.1 to 53 billions DKK
from 1999 to 2003, an increase of almost 50 percent, and a pattern we see repeated in both
samples of manufacturing rms.
Table 2: Imports in Danish Firms by Country-of-Origins Income per Capita
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
   Billion DKK   
 All Firms 
Low and Middle Income Countries 36.1 45.0 49.4 48.9 53.0
High Income Countries 272.1 311.2 279.0 294.7 276.6
 All Manufacturing Firms 
Low and Middle Income Countries 10.9 12.7 14.6 14.2 15.3
High Income Countries 61.2 69.7 79.6 80.3 77.0
 Manufacturing Firms with 10 or
More Employees 
Low and Middle Income Countries 10.5 12.3 14.0 13.8 14.7
High Income Countries 60.1 68.5 77.8 79.0 75.8
 Manufacturing Firms with 50 or
More Employees 
Low and Middle Income Countries 8.9 10.5 12.3 12.2 13.3
High Income Countries 54.6 62.1 71.2 72.1 69.2
Firm imports is based on imports in individual manufacturing rms from the External Trade
Statistics of Statistics Denmark, which contains information on the value, type, and origin for
every product imported to Denmark from countries outside the EU and for products imported
from countries within EU by rms with total EU imports exceeding 1.8 million DKK.
Import competition is an aggregate measure of imports of foreign produced product types.
This measure includes all import to Denmark, that means, also import of rms outside man-
ufacturing, e.g., trading companies located in the service sector. We apply two alternative
measures of import competition; one is proportional to sales broken-down after product types
in the single rm; the other is related to the product with the largest sales share for the single
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rm. More precisely, the rst measure is dened as:
Mproducti;t (1) =
PX
p=1
p;i;tM
product
p;t
where Mproductp;t is total imports of product p at time t and p;i;t is product ps share of sales in
rm i at time t, i.e., p;i;t = salesp;i;t=
NX
p=1
salesp;i;t. The second measure is dened as
Mproducti;t (2) =M
product
p;i;t with p max
 
1;i;t; ::; p;i;t; ::; P;i;t

:
The calculation of measures of import competition is based on the External Trade Statistics
forMproductp;i;t and Industrial Sales of Product Types for p;i;t. The second measure comes closest
to the measure applied by Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006). They use a measure of import
competition for the industry level. However, the way rms are assigned to specic industry is
precisely using the product with the largest sales share.
The measures of import competition is calculated for di¤erent levels of aggregation. For
the most detailed level, we use SITC 5 digit including 2915 products in the data set, whereas
SITC 4 and SITC 3 include respectively 998 and 260 products in the data set.
Both rm imports and import competition are calculated separately for low-wage and high-
wage countries. The country-split that we apply are low and middle income countries (LW)
versus high income countries (HW) according to 2005 GNI per capita, calculated using the
World Bank Atlas method. Hence, the groups are diveded at $10,726 2005 GNI per capita.
4.3 Other Variables
We use relative wages measured at the municipality level. The municipality group-specic wage
measures are calculated from information on individual wage for all workers of all types. We do
this because using the relative wage measure at the rm level may be problematic. Endogeneity
of rmswage policies is an issue that we cannot neglect, since wage policies are a crucial part
of the strategic positioning of the rm in the context of internationalization. 4
We do not have technology measures at the rm level. However, given the role of techno-
logical change as a potential confounding variable, it is important to try to include a measure
of it. In the literature, di¤erent variables have been used to capture the increasing e¢ ciency
of skilled and educated labor. Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) show that the di¤usion of
computers and related technologies is an important source of changes in the relative demand of
4Data on individual wages and working hours are aggregated to the municipality level for individuals working
in the rms that are included in our sample. These aggregates are used to calculate the relevant hourly wage
rate for each labor type in each of Denmarks 271 municipalities.
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skills and thereby in the relative e¢ ciency of skilled labor. We follow Machin and Van Reenen
(1998), who use R&D intensities to explain skill-upgrading. Hence, R&D intensities are used as
measures of the technological stage of development using the OECD ANBERD database. R&D
data that are compatible with the applied databases, i.e., industry-structure ISIC Revision 3
within manufacturing, only exist at the 13 industry level. R&D intensities are dened as R&D
expenditures in an industry divided by industry production.5
5 Results
The empirical results presented in this section are all regressions performed using xed e¤ects
estimation techniques, implying that the model parameters are identied using only variation
in the explanatory variables within rms over time. In this sense, we investigate the importance
of increasing imports for skill-upgrading within rms; not between. Hence, our hypothesis is
that increasing imports is associated with increasing cost share of skilled workers within rms.
Table 3 presents the main results that is based on the rst measure of import competi-
tion, Mrmi;t (1), where aggregated imports are allocated proportional to sales broken-down after
product types in each rm, and the most disaggregate product code, i.e., SITC 5 digit. Models
1-2 include measures of rm imports only. No signicant correlation between skill-upgrading
as measured by the wage share of skilled labor and rm imports is detected; neither when total
rm imports are included nor when rm imports is decomposed after country-of-origin.
5The technology indicator is linked to the single rm using information on industry attachment, whereas
measures of import competition is linked to rms using information on attachment to product types.
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Table 3: Change in Skilled Wage Share as Dependent Variable, 1999-2003, Fixed
Effects Estimation Two Education Groups, firm and industry import.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Relative wagemun; -0.0521
 -0.0515 -0.0534 -0.0477 -0.0514 -0.0456
Skilled (3 .903) (3.852) (3 .998) (3 .566) (3 .851) (3 .411)
ln (Yi) -0.0032 -0.0033 -0.0029 -0.0032 -0.0034 -0.0038
(2 .079) (2 .147) (1 .897) (2 .149) (2 .239) (2 .492)
ln (Ki) 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007
(0 .895) (0 .922) (0 .870) (0 .862) (0 .845) (0 .865)
ln (Firm_imp) 0.0002 0.0001
(0 .457) (0 .349)
ln (LW_Firm_imp) 0.0005 0.0004
(1 .162) (1 .014)
ln (HW_Firm_imp) -0.0001 -0.0002
(0 .395) (0 .492)
ln (Indu_imp) 0.0013 0.0013
(1 .397) (1 .334)
ln (LW_Indu_imp) 0.0028 0.0027
(6 .162) (5 .938)
ln (HW_Indu_imp) -0.0030 -0.0029
(3 .087) (2 .966)
ln (TECH) 0.0059 0.0058 0.0061 0.0061 0.0058 0.0058
(7 .105) (7 .025) (7 .377) (7 .385) (7 .040) (7 .005)
Firms 6932 6932 6932 6932 6932 6932
Obs: 24615 24615 24615 24615 24615 24615
T-value in parentheses
* signicant at 10 per cent; ** signicant at 5 per cent; *** signicant at 1 per cent
Next we turn to product imports in Models 3-4. In Model 3, it is seen that total product
imports have a positive but insignicant impact on the relative demand for skilled labor. The
point estimate is consistent with our expectations, namely, that rms susceptible to import
competition tend to reduce demand for skills when import competition increases. Moreover,
the result supports the consensus that import competition is not important for changing demand
for skilled labor.
When decomposing the measure of import competition after high- and low-wage countries
in Model 4, we see that the overall picture in Model 3 hides important heterogeneity. Firms
producing product types exposed to extensive product imports from low-wage countries increase
the relative demand for skilled labor more than other rms, while rms producing products
exposed to extensive import competition from high-wage countries lower their relative demand
for skilled labor, that is, product imports from high-wage countries leads to skill-downgrading.
Overall, this picture suggests that Danish manufacturing rms have comparative advantages in
skill-intensive production when compared to low-wage countries and comparative advantages
in production intensive in unskilled labor when compared to other high-wage countries.
Finally, both measures of rm and product imports are included in Models 5-6. The results
are robust to the inclusion of both measures, implying that skill-upgrading is a¤ected positively
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by product imports from low-wage countries. Moreover, there is some indications that product
imports from high-wage countries lead to skill-downgrading. Firm imports do not display
important correlations with relative demand for skills. In the following we apply Model 6 as
our baseline model.
In conclusion this supports Hypothesis 2; that relative demand for skilled labor increases
with the extent of import competition from low-wage countries. On the contrary, we do not nd
signicant support for Hypothesis 1 that the relative demand for skilled labor increases with
the extent of manufacturing rm imports from low-wage countries. In the following section, we
analyze the robustness of these conclusions.
Other explanatory variables also a¤ect the relative demand for skilled labor. The relative
demand decreases in the relative wage of skilled labor and by the size of the rm in terms of
output. The measure of physical capital enters with a positive but insignicant e¤ect on relative
demand for skilled. The positive point estimate is consistent with capital-skill complementarity.
The insignicant correlation is potentially explained by the nature of time series for physical
capital that are smooth and therefore it is di¢ cult statistically to distinguish between a time
trend and the development in physical capital, see for example Islam (1995). In all models
presented in Table 3, the TECH variable capturing technological progress has a signicant
positive e¤ect on the relative demand for skilled to unskilled labor.
To evaluate the importance of imports for skill-upgrading at the rm level, we compute
elasticities for each rm and take the mean over all rms. The average elasticity for the wage
share of changing import competition are around 0.005 for low wage countries and -0.005 from
high wage countries. For rm imports the elasticities are insignicant. The signicance of
the elasticities follows the results presented in Table 3. These elasticities translate into an
explained variation in the skilled wage share of 30% percent for import competition from
low wage countries and an explained variation in the skilled wage share of -15% percent
for import competition from high wage countries6. This suggests that product imports from
low-wage countries have an important impact on skill-uprading in the average rm.
6 Robustness
The purpose of the present section is to investigate the robustness of the results established
in Table 3. We check the results under three modications: (i) alternative measure of import
competition, (ii) restriction of the samples by rms size, and (iii) rms with dominating home
market sales share.
6Computed as (for low wage countries):
mean
i;t

"
LW_Firm_imp
i;t

mean
i;t
(% increase in LW_Firm_imp)

=mean
i;t
(% increase in skilled wage share),
where the few rms with outlying % increase in LW_Firm_imp are disregarded
93
6.1 Alternative Measures
An important objection to the main nding is that the association between skill-upgrading
and import competition from low-wage countries may not represent a causal relationship, or
expressed di¤erently import competition may be endogenous. This could be the case due to
omitted variables that a¤ect both skill-upgrading and import competition or, due to incentives
causing rms to simultanously change the cost share of skilled labor and import competition.
E.g., imagine that the rm wins a patent for a new and promising skill intensive product,
and hence, decides to expand production and thereby sales of skill-intensive product types.
Such a choice would increase the cost share of skilled labor and a¤ect the measure of import
competition relevant to the rm because shares of sales, i.e., p;i;t, will change, thus rendering
import competition endougenous.
We try to adress this problem by introducing other import competition measures that
potentially are less prone to endogeneity. Firstly, we apply the alternative measure as dened
by Mproducti;t (2) ;where import competion is measured only by the dominating product of each
rm, which can be argued to be less sensitive to the issue described above. Moreover, we develop
two additional measures of import competition for higher levels of aggregation, since the higher
the level of aggregation, the less each rm inuences the measure of import penetration. Where
SITC 5 Digit are based on 2915 products, SITC 4 Digit are based on 998 and SITC 3 on 260
products.
In Table 4 column (1), we present our baseline model. In the remainder of the columns
alternative measures of import competition are applied. In Column 2, we apply, Mproducti;t (2).
It is evident that, we nd a similar conclusion with respect to import competition from low-wage
countries leading to skill-upgrading. The parameter value is a little lower when the alternative
measure of import competition is applied.
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Table 4: Change in Skilled Wage Share as Dependent Variable, 1999-2003, Fixed
Effects Estimation Two Education Groups, Alternative measures of firm import
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline
M(1) M(2) M(1) M(2) M(1) M(2)
5 Digit 5 Digit 4 Digit 4 Digit 3 Digit 3 Digit
ln (LW_Firm_imp) 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004
(1 .014) (1 .046) (0 .890) (0 .895) (0 .858) (0 .955)
ln (HW_Firm_imp) -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0 .492) (0 .510) (0 .450) (0 .426) (0 .420) (0 .408)
ln (LW_Indu_imp) 0.0027 0.0021 0.0040 0.0031 0.0059 0.0053
(5 .938) (5 .380) (6 .817) (6 .198) (6 .888) (6 .773)
ln (HW_Indu_imp) -0.0029 -0.0024 -0.0060 -0.0043 -0.0097 -0.0073
(2 .966) (3 .060) (4 .489) (3 .863) (5 .274) (4 .556)
Firms 6932 6932 6932 6932 6932 6932
Obs: 24615 24615 24615 24615 24615 24615
T-value in parentheses
* signicant at 10 per cent; ** signicant at 5 per cent; *** signicant at 1 per cent
Our baseline model is also estimated for two measures of import competition at higher
levels of aggregation. The main impression of Table 4, Columns 3-6, is that the result, that
increasing import competition from low-wage countries lead to skill-upgrading carries through
for all specications.
6.2 Firm size
In Table 3 all rms with more than 10 employees are included in our regressions. This may not
be appropriate because it could be the case that small rms do not have the capacity to identify
the foreign produced inputs relevant for their production and thereby choose not to exploit the
benets from cheap imports directly. Instead it may be the case that smaller rms utilize ad-
vantages from imports indirectly through the purchase of cheaper inputs from domestic trading
companies/rms located in the service sector. If this is an important channel, the cheaper
foreign imports will be deliveries from domestic trading rms to domestic manufacturing rms;
deliveries that do not show up in rm imports. These considerations suggests that rm size
may play an important role in relation to skill-upgrading and rm imports in manufacturing
rms and, consequently, we check the robustness of the main results presented in Table 3 by
estimation the labor demand functions for di¤erent restrictions on rm size.
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Table 5: Change in Skilled Wage Share as Dependent Variable,
1999-2003, Fixed Effects Estimation Two Education Groups, By
Maximum Annual Number of Employees in Sample Period
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline <50 +50-100 +100
ln (LW_Firm_imp) 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0014 0.0016
(1 .014) (0 .579) (2 .032) (3 .575)
ln (HW_Firm_imp) -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0015 -0.0007
(0 .492) (0 .676) (2 .074) (1 .119)
ln (LW_Indu_imp) 0.0027 0.0028 0.0038 0.0021
(5 .938) (4255) (4 .181) (3 .171)
ln (HW_Indu_imp) -0.0029 -0.0031 -0.0012 -0.0041
(2 .966) (2 .278) (0 .584) (3 .051)
Firms 6932 5055 922 955
Obs: 24615 16748 3845 4022
T-value in parentheses
* signicant at 10 per cent; ** signicant at 5 per cent; *** signicant at 1 per cent
The results are presented in Table 5 Models 2-4; Column 1 presents Model 6, Table 3. It
is evident that there is a positive and signicant correlation between the change in relative
demand for labor and rm imports from low-wage countries when the rm size is larger than
or equal to 100 employees. This suggests that rm imports are important for skill-upgrading
and that a small rm bias towards domestic deliveries (of foreign produced inputs) hide the
correlation when such rms are included. Thus, looking only on larger rms Hypothesis 1 is
supported.
6.3 Dominating Home Market
A last objection is that the main result that more foreign competition in the home market
leads to more skill-upgrading may be picking up an e¤ect from exports markets. It may well
be that exporting rms are forced to skill-upgrade and move into niche products to stand up
to competition from low-wage countries in the world market. Battu et al. (2003) nds positive
externalities at the workplace from hiring certain types of human capital, and so do Munch
and Skaksen (2008) using Danish data. Moreover, they nd that the human capital spillovers
are stronger, the more the rm is exporting. They interpret this as evidence of exporting rms
using high-skilled workers to escape the intense competition at international markets.
If the world markets experience the same change in the supply from low-wage countries as
those that lead to the changes in the applied measures of import competition from low-wage
countries, we cannot rule out that skill-upgrading is a consequence of changing competition in
export markets; not home markets. We approach this potential critique by splitting up the
sample of manufacturing rms into a group that depends heavily on the home market in terms
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of the share of sales delivered to the home market and a group that are more internationally
oriented.
Table 6: Change in Skilled Wage Share as Dependent Variable, 1999-2003, Fixed Ef-
fects Estimation Two Education Groups, By Maximum Annual Export/Sales Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline 0-25 +25-50 +50-75 +75-100
ln (LW_Firm_imp) 0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0003 0.0008 0.0017
(1 .014) (1 .497) (0 .278) (0 .788) (2 .860)
ln (HW_Firm_imp) -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002
(0 .492) (0 .293) (0 .275) (0 .330) (0 .326)
ln (LW_Indu_imp) 0.0027 0.0022 0.0039 0.0035 0.0030
(5 .938) (3 .465) (2 .979) (2 .325) (3 .379)
ln (HW_Indu_imp) -0.0029 -0.0022 -0.0074 -0.0014 -0.0023
(2 .966) (1 .517) (2 .937) (0.452) (1 .449)
Firms 6932 5,341 1,265 1,103 965
Obs: 24615 16,727 2,747 2,458 2,683
T-value in parentheses
* signicant at 10 per cent; ** signicant at 5 per cent; *** signicant at 1 per cent
The results are presented in Table 6 Columns 2-5; Column 1 presents Model 6, Table 3.
Firstly it can be seen that total product imports from low wage countries have signicant
positivt e¤ect for skill upgrading across all groups of rm. Secondly the e¤ect is somewhat
increasing in rm export/sales ratios. Hence this may be some support for the hyphotehesis
that exporting rms are forced to skill-upgrade and move into niche products to stand up to
competition from low-wage countries. But as we also se signicant positiv e¤ects for rms with
low export/sale ratios this is not the only explanation.
7 Three Education Types
Until now, we have investigated the skill-upgrading using two skill types. In the following,
we apply 3 education types; unskilled, vocational, and academically educated workers. This
division is interesting because it can be investigated if skill-upgrading takes place between
unskilled labor and vocationally skilled labor or between unskilled labor and academically
educated labor.
97
Table 7: Change in Vocational and Educated Wage Shares as Dependent
Variables, 1999-2003, Fixed Effects Estimation Three Education Groups,
firm and industry import
Baseline Firm Size 100+
VOC EDU VOC EDU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative wagemun; vocational 0.0107 -0.0256
 0.0189 -0.0411
(0 .749) (4.573) (1 .063) (5.810)
Relative wagemun; education -0.0256
 0.0272 -0.0411 0.0421
(4 .573) (5.349) (5 .810) (5.802)
ln (Yi) 0.0038 -0.0153 0.0053 -0.0201
(2 .005) (9.250) (2 .507) (9.435)
ln (Ki) 0.0004 0.0064 -0.0007 0.0080
(0 .268) (4.898) (0 .428) (4.977)
ln (LW_Firm_imp) 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006 0.0004
(0 .908) (1.470) (1 .787) (1.261)
ln (HW_Firm_imp) 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0001
(1 .088) (0.811) (0 .316) (0.164)
ln (LW_Indu_imp) 0.0012 0.0012 0.0010 0.0013
(2 .953) (3.460) (2 .039) (2.628)
ln (HW_Indu_imp) 0.0009 -0.0035 0.0004 -0.0044
(1 .051) (4.642) (0 .397) (4.624)
ln (TECH) 0.0008 0.0053 0.0009 0.0071
(1 .043) (7.646) (0 .969) (7.721)
Obs: 6905 6905 3994 3994
T-value in parentheses
* signicant at 10 per cent; ** signicant at 5 per cent; *** signicant at 1 per cent
The main results are presented in Table 7, columns 1-2. Interestingly, the relative demand for
both vocationally and academically educated labor is positively a¤ected by increasing import
competition from low-wage countries, whereas import competition from high-wage countries
leads to skill-downgrading only for academically educated workers. When it comes to rm
imports, there is no correlation between the relative demand for vocationally and academically
educated labor and rm imports. Finally, technological progress and physical capital are seen
to increase the demand for academically educated labor in relations to unskilled labor only,
whereas workers with vocational education are almost una¤ected.7
Column 3-4 presents the same estimations for rms with more than 100 employes. The
main nding is that this restrictions have no major impact on the overall results from the full
sample presented in columns 1-2,
7Higher wages of vocational and academically educated workers in relation to wages of unskilled workers lead
to higher demand for vocational and academic skills, respectively. The results can arise because the relative
wage enters in the wage cost share. When the relative wage rate increases, this can result in a higher wage cost
share even when the employment share decreases. We have estimated the models of Table 7 using employment
shares, rather than wage cost shares, as the dependent variable and nd that higher relative wages of both
vocationally and academically educated workers lead to lower employment shares for both types. Moreover,
the e¤ect on skill-upgrading from changing relative cross wages are negative. Our regressions based on the
employment share as dependent variable suggest that this is due to correlation between the two relative wages.
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8 Conclusion
The relation between skill-upgrading and imports from low-wage countries is studied in this
paper. The broader idea is that rms can follow two strategies to stand up to increasing
internationalization. One strategy is to lower production costs, which can be accomplished
through rm imports of cheap unskilled-labor intensive production from low-wage countries.
Another strategy is to switch towards skill-intensive production and avoid import competition
from low-wage countries by moving into products markets that are less exposed to imports from
low-wage countries.
The study is based on data for Danish Manufacturing that enables us to develop measures
of rm imports and product imports that focus on where imports originate rather than on their
overall level. The main nding suggests that it is of crucial importance to distinguish import
by country-of-origin. It is found that imports from low-wage countries lead to skill-upgrading.
Especially, this is the case for product imports, and for imports for larger rms. Moreover, we
nd that product imports from high-wage countries lead to skill-downgrading.
In order to evaluate the importance of internationalization for skill-upgrading, we estimate
the elasticities in the mean of the data. It is found that the elasticity on the relative demand for
skilled labor of import competition are around 0.005 for low-wage countries. This elasticities
translate into an explained variation in the skilled wage share of 30% percent for import
competition from low wage countries
The present analysis raises new questions worth exploring in future research. Since the
demand for skilled labor, especially, workers with academic education, increases as a conse-
quence of product imports from low-wage countries, it is of interest to understand the tasks
that skilled labor performs. If related to more skill-intensive production, it is important to
know whether more qualied labor work as production workers or whether they work on tasks
such as di¤erent types of managers, research and development workers, innovation, marketing
personnel, etc. This type of knowledge is of crucial importance to understand how rms in the
developed world compete in the world marked. In a broader perspective, it is also important,
for example, for education policy within the tertiary education.
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A Appendix 1: The Factor Proportions Framework
In this appendix we present a simple model that analyzes e¤ects on the specialization pattern
in a simple setting of 2 nal products and 1 pure intermediate input produced using 2 primary
production factors. The two primary production factors are skilled labor, S, and unskilled labor,
U , whereas the pure intermediate input is labelled I. The domestic economy is abundant in
skilled labor.
Production of the two nal products Q1 and Q2 are determined by production functions
Q1 = AS

1 U
1 
1 +QI1, 0 <  < 1
Q2 = BS

2U
1 
2 +QI2, 0 <  < 1: (1)
where QIi measures the use of intermediate input in the production of nal product i. The
production of pure intermediate input QI is determined by the production function
QI = CS

IU
1 
I , 0 <  < 1 (2)
We apply the following simplifying assumptions: (i) the two skill types determine value
added according to a Cobb-Douglas aggregate, (ii) the pure intermediate input and value
added determines gross output according to a Leontief technology, and (iii) QIi are determined
according to QIi = a3iQi where a3i is constant, i 2 1; 2.
We assume that production of product 1 is more intensive in the use of skilled labor that
other products, whereas the intermediate product is more skill intensive than product 2, i.e.,
 >  > .
Prices are determined in the world market and are given by p1, p2, and pI . Given that
the intermediate product is produced in the skill intensive economy, cost minimizing behavior
implies that unit costs equal:
c1 =
(1  a31)w1 U wS
A
+ a31
w1 U w

S
C
(3)
cI =
w1 U w

S
C
c2 =
(1  a32)w1 U wS
B
+ a32
w1 U w

S
C
where A  A (1  )(1 ), B  B (1  )(1 ) and C  C (1  )(1 ).
Prices are determined in the world market and exogenous to the high-wage country under
investigation. Implementing product specic transportation costs of the "iceberg" type,  i,
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implies that the domestic economy has to supply (1 +  i) units of product i for each unit demand
of the product in the foreign economy. Likewise, the foreign economy has to supply (1 +  i)
units of each product type per unit demand in the domestic economy. The prices relevant for
the domestic economy are the world price multiplied by a product specic transportation cost
of the "iceberg" type.
We assume that the skill-intensive products are produced in the country, implying that
wages are solved by:
(1 +  I)pI =
w1 U w

S
C
(1 +  1)p1 =
(1  a31)w1 U wS
A
+
a31w
1 
U w

S
C
Product 2 is produced if (1 +  2) p2 = c2.
What we have in mind is that unskilled-intensive nal product 2 has a higher transporta-
tion cost than the intermediate input and nal product 1, whereas the intermediate input has
a higher transportation cost than nal product 1( 1 <  I <  2). When the degree of interna-
tionalization increases, we assume that the transportation costs for the products fall in similar
proportions implying that relative prices for products leads to higher relative prices of skill-
intensive products in the skill-abundant country. These assumptions capture that the largest
e¤ect from increasing internationalization is on unskilled-intensive products.
A nummerical example is presented in Figure 1, where we let  = 1
1+I
measure the degree
of internationalization. The gure illustrate a possible change in the production pattern as the
degree of internationalization increases:
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Figure 1: Product Prices, Production Costs and the Degree of Internation-
alization
Note: The panels are derived for the parameters = 0:6, = 0:4, = 0:5, a31= 0:3, a32= 0:25, A = 1:96,
B = 4, C = 2, p1= 2, pI= 1, p2= 0:3, and  2= 3 I ,  =
1
1+I
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the implications of imports for skill-upgrading in Danish manufacturing
rms. The ability to decompose rm level imports combined with the information contained in
a full panel of matched employer-employee data are utilized to show that it is of crucial impor-
tance to distinguish imports by country-of-origin and level of processing when analyzing skill-
upgrading. It is shown that pooling imports from all countries and disregarding import of nal
products, as is the case when using input-output tables, will signicantly bias the inuence of
imports on skill-upgrading, leading to an under-evaluation of the role of imports. Furthermore,
the empirical evidence suggests that imports explanatory power for skill-upgrading increases
with rm size.
Keywords: Skill-upgrading, rm import, low-wage country outsourcing, comparative advantage
JEL: F14, F16, J21, J24, L60
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the implications of imports for skill-upgrading in
Danish manufacturing rms. Based on high quality micro level evidence the novel approach
applied allow for several new and important insights. Firstly, disregarding imports of nal
products signicantly bias the results and lead to under-evaluation of imports role for skill-
upgrading. Secondly, the ability to distinguish imports according to country of origin and level
of processing is shown to be of vital importance for understanding the implications of imports
on skill-upgrading. Thirdly, it is shown that the explanatory power of import of nal goods for
skill-upgrading is increasing with rm size.
In the seminal paper by Feenstra and Hanson (1996), the authors investigate the idea
that US rms o¤shore production activities that use unskilled labor intensively. Feenstra and
Hanson use input-output data to show that trade in intermediate inputs between countries
plays an important role as driving mechanism for skill-upgrading. Since then, their method
has been widely applied to establish evidence that skill-upgrading is a¤ected by imports for
many developed countries, see e.g. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Feenstra (2004) for US,
and Hijzen, Görg and Hine (2005) for UK.
Nevertheless, using import information from input-output data has two potential pitfalls as
illustrated in gure 11:
1. It does not distinguish imports by country-of origin.2
2. It does not include import of nal products.
Figure 1: Potential Pitfalls when using input-output tables
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1For simplication, the illustration is made for a three sector economy.
2An exception are Ekholm and Hakkala (2006) who address the issue using input-output tables for Sweden
combined with Swedish trade statistics to construct proxies of import from low- or high-income countries.
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The current paper contributes by addressing both of these problems.
The left panel of gure 1 illustrates the basic principle behind an input-output table. That
is, how domestic and foreign industries supply intermediate input to domestic industries and
nal products for domestic end-use.
The middle panel illustrates how an input-output table only contains industry level infor-
mation on import of intermediate goods. Such information is limited to analysis on industry
level, e.g. how is domestic industry Ad a¤ected by total imports from foreign industry Af , or
how is domestic industry Bd a¤ected by total imports from foreign industry Cf , etc.
Finally, the right panel illustrates how rm level evidence, as used in this study, contributes
by adding additional information on import of end products, and the ability to distinguish
import according to country of origin. Hence, o¤ering the following advantages over input-
output data:
1. As the data used contain information on the exact country of origin of almost every good
imported to every rm in Denmark, one can split imports by country of origin and analyze
its importance for skill-upgrading for di¤erent countries or group of countries. Section
2 of this paper presents a theoretical argument why trading with foreign countries with
lower income levels and abundance of unskilled labor will lead to domestic skill-upgrading.
However, it is not immediately clear why trade with similar countries in respect to income
levels and skill distribution should have the same e¤ects. Hence, this paper splits imports
according to whether it originates from low- or high-income countries. And, as a matter of
fact, it is shown that pooling trade from all countries will signicantly bias the empirical
e¤ect of imports on skill upgrading.
2. Firm level evidence allows adding import of nal goods to the analysis. This may po-
tentially be of great importance, as economies today become more integrated leading to
increased trade, also in nal goods, and as we actually observe lot of import of nal goods
in Danish manufacturing rms in the sample period.
3. Firm level evidence will capture any within industry di¤erences in imports e¤ect on skill-
upgrading neglected in industry level data. Hence, adding potential important e¤ects from
rms or groups of rms within industries adjusting their product-mix without changing
industry.
4. Employer-employee data can be used to identify and analyze groups or types of rms
across the traditional industry classication where the e¤ects of import on skill-upgrading
are especially pronounced. More specically, this paper examines three sources of vari-
ation that may cause manufacturing rms skill-upgrading to be exposed to a varying
extent to changes in imports; di¤erence in trade patterns, industry stability and rm size.
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This paper is not the rst study to depart from the traditional use of input-output tables.
Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006), Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) and Scheuer et al (2008) all
use micro level evidence.
Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) have a rather di¤erent perspective than the current
study, since their focus are on the e¤ect of import competition measured at the rm level as
domestic total import of goods from the particular industry of the given rm. Their main result
is that import competition from low-income countries imposes trade pressure, which leads rms
to adjust their product mix.
Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) are more closely related to the present study and are based on
French micro data for the period 1986-1992 in many ways similar to data used here. Biscourp
and Kramarz (2007) nd a strong correlation between import of nal goods and job destruc-
tion of production jobs. Also in line with the ndings here, they nd the relation between
job destruction and imports to be stronger for larger rms. Besides the somewhat di¤erent
framework they use, the two major di¤erences to the present study are the period covered, and
the availability of educational attainment of workers. The period covered in the present study
(1999-2003) is a period of increased trade with low-income countries that has been taking place
due to the opening of the markets in Russia, East Europe, India and China. Also here, the
data allows for a distinguishing of workers according to their education instead of the usual
production/ non-production categorization. This may be of importance as the correlation be-
tween educational level and production/ non-production is low (see e.g. Doms, Dunne, and
Troske (1997)), and since education is a better measure of workersskills.
Scheuer et al (2008) use the same data as the present study to compare two distinct mecha-
nisms through which internationalization potentially inuences rmsrelative demand for skilled
labor. The rst mechanism is "the internal rm e¤ect" which is based on rm level imports and
captures the increasing possibility for rms to lower production costs by taking advantage of
cheap inputs produced in low-income countries. The second mechanism is "the external prod-
uct e¤ect" which is based on import competition and seeks to capture the e¤ect that rms meet
stronger competition in their domestic product markets when imports from low-wage countries
of products they themselves produce, increase. Scheuer et al (2008) conclude that the external
industry e¤ect is the most important for explaining skill-upgrading. This paper contributes by
rethinking how to use information on the internal rm e¤ect, and shows that accounting for
level of processing, especially in the case of larger rms, reintroduces the internal rm e¤ect as
an important determinant for skill-upgrading in Denmark.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the main hypothesis
tested. Section 3 presents the basic econometric specication used and discusses the econometric
strategy. Section 4 describes the data set applied in the analysis. Section 5 presents empirical
results, while section 6 concludes.
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2 Model
The following model leading to the main hypothesis tested "that the relative demand for skilled
labor in high-income countries increases with the extent of manufacturing rm imports from low-
income countries" is based on the factor proportions framework. The full model is explained
and derived in the appendix to Scheuer et al (2008).
The model is a two-country model with a domestic and a foreign (denoted by a ) coun-
try. The economy has two nal goods and one intermediate input (1; 2; I) and two primary
inputs; skilled and unskilled workers (S; U). The ranking of skill intensity in production is
such that the production of good 1 is most skill intensive, and the product of good 2 least skill
intensive:

S1
U1
> S
I
UI
> S
2
U2

. Furthermore, it is assumed that the home country is endowed with
more skilled labor than the foreign country

Sd
Ud
> S

U

. Finally price is assumed exogenous to
the domestic economy (determined in the world market), and hence, the prices relevant for
the domestic economy are the world price plus a product specic transportation cost of the
"iceberg" type. In the initial setting these "iceberg"-type transportation costs are assumed
inversely related to skilled intensity such that
 2 >  I >  1
When the degree of internationalization increases, it is assume that the transportation
costs for the products fall in similar proportions implying that relative prices for products
leads to higher relative prices of skill-intensive products in the skill-abundant country. These
assumptions capture that the largest e¤ect from increasing internationalization is on unskilled-
intensive products.
Under these conditions it is shown that an increase in internationalization will lead the
skill-abundant economy to specialize further in skill-intensive product 1, implying that imports
of intermediate inputs will increase, and that the skill-abundant country also will specialize in
skill-intensive product 1 over unskill-intensive product 2. It is further shown that at a threshold
level the home country will restrain from producing product 2.
Departing from the traditional factor proportion framework and interpreting the results
as if domestic rms produce in bundles of disaggregate products allowing them to potentially
produce both the nal products and the intermediate input, means that increasing interna-
tionalization as measured by the lower transportation costs will cause domestic rms to shift
production towards more skill-intensive product bundles. I.e., lower transportation cost will
lead domestic rms to alter their product mix, and eventually switch completely away from
producing certain products - here nal product 2.
Hence, leading us to the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis: The relative demand for skilled labor at the rm level increases with the extent
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of rm imports from low-wage countries.
3 Econometric Framework
The empirical specication is based on the translog cost function.3 The cost function is log-
linearized and following the framework in Brown and Christensen (1981) ; the di¤erent types of
labor are assumed to be variable inputs whereas capital is assumed to be a quasi xed input.
The specication here applies to the rm level rather than the industry level.
Next, measures of international trade and technology are included as shift share variables.
Imports at the rm level are included dened as intensities and split according to country of
origin (LIC: low-income countries, HIC: high-income countries) and level of processing (INT :
Intermediate goods, FIN : Final goods). Unfortunately, no technology measures are available
in the data at the rm level, so instead an industry measure tech is used (as explained in more
details in next section).
In the model for two labor types the translog cost function generates a wage cost share
equation of the following form:
Sskilled;i;j;t = 0 + 1 ln

wskilled;i;t
wunskilled;i;t

+ 2 ln (Yi;t) + 3 ln (Ki;t)
+4
impLIC;INTi;t
Yi;t
+ 5
impHIC;INTi;t
Yi;t
+6
impLIC;FINi;t
Yi;t
+ 7
impHIC;FINi;t
Yi;t
+8
techj;t
Yj;t
+ skilled;i + "skilled;i;t
where Sskilled;i;j;t is the cost share of skilled labor to total labor costs in rm i, located in industry
j, observed at time t. The cost share of skilled labor measures the rms demand for skilled
labor, which is derived using Shephards lemma. wskilled=wunskilled is the relative wage of skilled
labor to unskilled labor, Y is total production, K is the capital stock, skilled is a rm xed
e¤ect and "skilled is assumed to be an i.i.d. error component.
In general, estimating a translog cost function generates a series of wage cost share equa-
tions, one for each type of variable input. Imposing the standard restrictions of symmetry and
homogeneity of degree 1 in prices allows for reaching the specication above where one of the
equations is redundant. In the case of two labor inputs, the estimates of the similar equation for
the wage cost share of unskilled labor can be recovered from the symmetry restrictions without
actually estimating the equation.
3The transcendental logarithmic function was developed in Kmenta (1967) to approximate the CES-function,
but this study is more closely related to Christensen and Greene (1976) and Berndt (1991).
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All regressions are performed using xed e¤ects estimation, implying that the model para-
meters are identied using only variation within rms over time. Thus, the hypothesis tested is
whether change in imports will cause a change in the cost share between skilled and unskilled
workers. Or put di¤erently, this paper does not test the absolute hypothesis that rms with the
highest imports from low-income countries have the highest share of skilled labor. The latter is
disregarded since empirically there are several examples of very high-skilled industries with no
or little low-income country imports, and vice-versa, e.g. caused by lack of production facilities
or workers in low-income countries qualied for very skill intensive production. Such patterns
would cause omitted variable bias and/or endogeneity issues if estimating our model using a
linear specication.
4 Data
The data used in this study is primarily drawn from Statistics Denmarks registers. A matched
employer-employee dataset with yearly information on workers and rms covering the period
1999-2003 is constructed from the Danish Firm Integrated Database for Labor Market Research
(FIDA), the Danish Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (IDA) and the External
Trade Statistics.
Since the External Trade Statistics are limited to trade in goods and not services the sample
used is restricted to private manufacturing rms. Furthermore, the attention is restricted to
rms with more than 10 employees in any given year to avoid the technical problem of many
small rms having zero employees of a given skill type which would represent a corner solution
in a model of relative labor demand.4
From the databases it is possible to identify any workers in any rm in all the years covered.
The IDA database contains variables for every worker in the Danish labor market and the FIDA
database contains variables for every active rm in the Danish labor market.
The analysis here is performed on the basis of two types of labor; skilled and unskilled.
Skilled labor is dened as persons with a qualifying education above high-school level, which in
Denmark includes the following categories: Vocational education, most often a mix of school-
ing and training in rms with a typical duration around 3 years. Short academic education;
typically up to two years on top of high school and with a practical focus. Medium academic ed-
ucation corresponds to the bachelor level. Long academic education corresponds to the master
level or more.
The dependent variable in the analysis, wage cost share, is constructed for each type of
labor at the rm level using information on education and wages.
4Finally, the few rms that still do not employ both labor types are excluded from the sample. A restriction,
that represents well below a one per cent reduction in the sample for any of the two labor types in any sample
year.
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Table 1 compares the sample used to the sample of all manufacturing rms and illustrates
the development of key variables over the sampling period.
Table 1: Total Wage Cost Shares Composition in Danish
Manufacturing
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
All Manufacturing Firms
No education 34:0% 33:6% 32:8% 32:0% 31:0%
Vocational Education 44:4% 44:6% 44:8% 44:6% 44:2%
Short Academic Education 6:4% 6:5% 6:8% 7:1% 7:6%
Medium Academic Education 10:1% 10:0% 10:2% 10:4% 10:7%
Long Academic Education 5:2% 5:2% 5:5% 6:0% 6:5%
Firms 13; 335 13; 130 12; 787 12; 374 12; 100
Workers / 1000 433:0 436:8 430:3 416:9 397:2
Turnover, DKK Billions 465:0 517:7 551:9 550:2 543:7
Capital, DKK Billions 434:2 477:9 488:5 495:8 506:5
Full Sample
No education 33:9% 33:6% 32:7% 32:0% 31:0%
All Educations 66:1% 66:4% 67:3% 68:0% 69:0%
Firms 5; 192 5; 131 5; 004 4; 800 4; 664
Workers / 1000 391:7 397:0 390:6 379:9 361:3
Turnover, DKK Billions 435:4 487:6 520:5 520:5 514:8
Capital, DKK Billions 413:8 456:6 467:4 474:5 485:3
It is evident from table 1 that skill-upgrading has taken place in Denmark over the relative
short time span covered by the sample, as the wage cost share of unskilled workers have fallen
with almost three percentage points over the ve years from 1999-2003.
Moreover, the sample is seen to contain annual observations for slightly less than 400,000
workers in around 5,000 Danish manufacturing rms.
Comparing the full sample with all manufacturing rms, one sees, that although the re-
strictions imply an exclusion of approximately 7,000 of the smallest rms, the full sample still
represents the vast majority of manufacturing covering more than 90 per cent of total manu-
facturing turnover and more than 90 per cent of manufacturing workers.
Having dened the sample used, the remainder of this section is devoted to the development
of the explanatory variables needed for the analysis as outlined in the econometric framework
in section 3.
First variable needed is the relative wage between skilled and unskilled workers in each
year in each rm in the sample. This variable is immediately available, but since wage policies
are a crucial part of the strategic positioning of rms in the context of globalization one may
rightfully fear that rm level relative wages are potentially endogenous. Therefore, the empirical
analysis is carried out using the relative wage measured at the municipality level (mun). The
municipality skill-specic wage measures are calculated from information on individual wage
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for all workers of all types.5
The next set of variables, the log of total production and the capital stock at the rm level
are readily available. Firm level information on turnover and capital stock measured by the
value of xed assets from the rmsbalance sheet are drawn from the FIDA database.
Next group of variables to be constructed are rm level imports. Imports are split in two
dimensions according to country of origin and the level of processing of the goods traded.
Information on imports at the rm level is drawn from the External Trade Statistics, which
contains information on the value, origin and type of all goods imported to Denmark. The
database contains information on all goods imported from outside the EU but is limited to all
products imported from within the EU by rms with total EU-imports of more than 1.8 million
DKK (or around $300,000). This restriction is fairly unproblematic since the limit is fairly low
considering that the sample only contains rms with more than 10 employees.
The rst split on country of origin is done separating imports in two groups according to
which countries trade takes place with; low and middle income countries (LMIC) or high
income countries (HIC) according to 2005 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank
Atlas method.6
The next split according to the level of processing is done separating imported goods ac-
cording to whether they are intermediate or nal goods. This split is done using the available
product codes in the External Trade Statistics to group goods according to the UN BEC clas-
sication.7
Table 2 presents import data for Danish rms.
5Data on individual wages and working hours are aggregated to the municipality level for all workers in all
rms included in the sample. These aggregates are used to calculate the relevant hourly wage rate for each
labor type in each of the 271 municipalities.
6These groups are dened as: low income, $875 or less; lower middle income, $876 - $3,465; up-
per middle income, $3,466 - $10,725; and high income, $10,726 or more. For the exact method, see
http://go.worldbank.org/IEH2RL06U0.
7See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/class/intercop/expertgroup/2007/AC124-8.PDF. More specically the
BEC coding described on page 9 of the document is used. 5 BEC codes are not directly classied accord-
ing to intermediate/ consumptions goods. These are: Capital goods (41 & 521), Motor spirit (321), Passenger
motor cars (51) and Goods not elsewhere specied (7). Here, they are all categorized as consumption goods.
The sensitivity of the placement of these groups of goods has been tested and it is of minor importance for the
results reported in this paper.
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Table 2: Import in Danish Firms by Country of Origins Income per Capita,
DKK Billions
Countries by          Year         
Income Group: 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
All Firms
Total 256.1 261.0 293.1 309.8 310.6 358.9 331.0 346.4 332.2
High OECD 220.9 223.8 249.8 264.8 263.3 299.1 269.2 284.8 264.4
High Non-OECD 7.1 7.0 8.0 8.3 8.8 12.1 9.8 9.9 12.2
Upper Middle 13.5 14.5 16.4 17.8 19.0 24.0 28.4 28.0 28.9
Lower Middle 9.7 10.3 13.7 13.5 14.1 17.3 17.1 16.7 19.7
Low 2.7 3.2 2.9 3.2 3.0 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.4
Unknown 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.5
All Manufacturing Firms
Low & Middle 10.9 12.7 14.6 14.2 15.3
High 61.2 69.7 79.6 80.3 77.0
Full Sample
Low & Middle 10.5 12.3 14.0 13.8 14.7
High 60.1 68.5 77.8 79.0 75.8
The table shows that imports from low and middle-income countries have increased by
nearly 50 per cent from 36 to 53 billion DKK in the time span (1999-2003) covered in this
study. Furthermore, it is evident that the imports included in the sample represents the vast
majority of all manufacturing rmsimports in the period covered.
The last variable needed for the analysis is a technology measure, but unfortunately Sta-
tistics Denmarks data does not contain such a measure at the rm level. Since technological
change is a potential confounding variable in explaining skill-upgrading the solution here is to
include an industry level measure. In the existing literature, di¤erent measures have been used
in pursuit of capturing the increase in e¢ ciency of skilled and educated labor. Autor, Katz,
and Krueger (1998) show that the di¤usion of computers and related technologies is an impor-
tant source of changes in the relative demand of skills and, thereby, in the relative e¢ ciency of
skilled labor. This paper follows Machin and Van Reenen (1998) in using R&D intensities to
explain skill-upgrading.
The data on R&D intensities is taken from the OECD ANBERD database. R&D intensities
are included as R&D expenditures within each industry divided by the industry production.
R&D intensities compatible with the applied databases, i.e., industry-structure ISIC Revision
3 within manufacturing, only exist on an aggregated 13 manufacturing industry level, and thus,
these are used in the analysis.
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5 Results
This section presents and analyzes the empirical estimations.
First subsection contains full sample estimates of the empirical e¤ects on skill-upgrading in
the form of changing wage share in the sample period 1999-2003. Most importantly, the section
addresses the empirical importance of distinguishing the e¤ect of imports on skill-upgrading
according to country of origin and level of processing of the goods imported.
The second and nal subsection explores the mechanisms behind skill-upgrading in further
details, seeking to nd the groups or types of rms within manufacturing, that are especially
prone to skill-upgrading as a consequence of imports. Here, a number of subsamples are iden-
tied according to appropriate measures and the resulting estimates for each subsample are
analyzed in more detail.
5.1 The Importance of Distinguishing Between Country of Origin
and Level of Processing
Table 3 presents full sample estimates (including approximately 7,000 rms and 25,000 workers)
of four models all with the dependent variable being the wage share of skilled workers. The
models are arranged according to the level of details in the imports information used.
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Table 3: Change in Skilled Wage Share,
1999-2003, Different Measures of Firm Import
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative wage; -0.057 -0.057 -0.056 -0.057
Skilled (4 .25)** (4.26)** (4.25)** (4.26)**
ln (Yi) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(1 .87) (1 .90) (1 .90) (1 .84)
ln (Ki) 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
(1 .04) (1 .06) (1 .07) (1 .06)
Impi
Yi
0.002
(0 .59)
Imp_int
i
Yi
-0.002
(0 .38)
Imp_n
i
Yi
0.006
(1 .18)
Imp_int_lmic
i
Yi
0.043 0.041
(2 .31)* (2.23)*
Imp_int_hic
i
Yi
-0.009 -0.009
(1 .54) (1 .52)
Imp_n_lmic
i
Yi
0.011
(1 .76)
Imp_n_hic
i
Yi
-0.004
(0 .43)
R&Dj
Yj
0.382 0.382 0.378 0.377
(7 .63)** (7.63)** (7.56)** (7.53)**
Firms 6970 6970 6970 6970
Obs: 24791 24791 24791 24791
Standard errors in parentheses
* signicant at 5 per cent; ** signicant at 1 per cent
The rst reported model (model 1) mimics the information contained in an ordinary input-
output table and, hence, the only measure of rm import intensities included is total import
of intermediate goods. This model shows only small and insignicant e¤ects of changes in the
intermediate import intensity on skill-upgrading.
Furthermore, it is seen, that there are only two signicant explanatory variables for skill-
upgrading in model 1. Firstly, ceteris paribus, increasing relative wages for skilled workers
leads to lower wage shares for skilled workers, which points to a substitution between skilled
and unskilled workers according to their relative price. Secondly, industry R&D is positively
related to the wage share of skilled workers, which is in line with the general idea that skilled
workers are complementary to new technology.
Next, neither the log of output nor the log of the measure of rm capital stock appears
to a¤ect the relative demand for skilled labor. That output does not a¤ect the relative cost
shares, is in line with constant returns to scale. A potential explanation for the latter e¤ect,
that capital stock has no e¤ect on skill-upgrading, is that the time series for physical capital
is smooth and therefore it is di¢ cult statistically to distinguish between a time trend and the
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development in physical capital, see for example Islam (1995).
The next model (model 2) investigates the e¤ect of adding import intensities of nal goods as
an additional explanatory variable. Neither of the import intensities have signicant e¤ects on
skill-upgrading. In conclusion, simply adding nal goods do not aid the empirical explanatory
power of imports on skill-upgrading.
Model 3 includes information on imports of intermediate goods. Splitting the intermediate
imports according to country of origin has interesting implications. Intermediate import in-
tensities from low- and middle-income countries are now seen to have signicant positive e¤ect
on skill-upgrading, whereas there is no signicant e¤ect from intermediate import intensities
from high-income countries. These results are fully in line with the theoretical framework that
predicts positive impact on skill-upgrading in a high-income country as a consequence of trade
with low- and middle-income countries. Thus, this points to the fact, that pooling imports from
all countries contaminates this positive e¤ect on skill-upgrading from low- and middle-income
country import of intermediate goods.
This suggests that Danish manufacturing rms have comparative advantages in skill-intensive
production when compared to low- and middle-income countries and no special comparative
advantages in production when compared to other high-income countries.
In model 4 nal good import intensities are split according to country of origin and added
as explanatory variables. Estimating on the full sample there is no signicant e¤ect on skill-
upgrading from import of nal goods from neither low- and middle- nor high-income countries,
although the nal good import intensity from low- and middle-income countries is close to
borderline signicance.
In conclusion, the results of table 3 support the hypothesis that the relative demand for skilled
labor in high-income countries (in this case Denmark) increases with the extent of manufactur-
ing rm imports from low-income countries
Hence, it is of crucial importance to distinguish imports by country of origin, since pooling
imports from all countries will signicantly bias the results and lead to under-evaluation of the
e¤ect of imports on skill-upgrading. However, including nal goods have not yet shown to be
of high importance. The latter result is somewhat puzzling and, hence, the next subsection is
devoted to investigating these results in more details and, especially, to explore to what extent
the results of this section hold for di¤erent subsamples of manufacturing rms.
5.2 For Whom Imports Really Matters
In this subsection three sources of potential importance for manufacturing rms exposure
to skill-upgrading are investigated in detail; di¤erence in trade patterns, industry stability
and rm size (here approximated by the number of employees). For each of these factors in
turn, potential subsamples within all manufacturing rms are selected, and the degree of skill-
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upgrading in each subsample due to changing import intensities according to country of origin
and level of processing is examined.
First it is tested whether rms more engaged in international trade are especially prone
to skill-upgrading caused by rm level imports. This is investigated by constructing three
subsamples with respectively rms engaged in imports, rms engaged in export and rms
engaged in both.
Secondly, the subsample of rms who stay within the same industry in the period covered
is investigated.8 Changing industry is not very pronounced. Almost 90 per cent of the rms
in the sample stay within the same industry during the period covered. There are two main
reasons to focus on rms staying within the same industry. One may argue that a rm actually
changing industry is much more likely to be inuenced by external factors not controlled for in
this analysis, e.g. environmental or legal regulation etc. And, when a rm changes industry it
will potentially (depending on the degree of change) also get assigned a new industry specic
R&D intensity, which potentially may conict with the interpretation of the results.
Thirdly it is tested whether rm size matters for imports e¤ect on skill-upgrading. There
are several reasons to expect di¤erent empirical evidence according to rm size.
One could imagine that smaller rms are not rewarded to the same degree as larger rms for
nding their own foreign suppliers, simply due to di¤erences in scale. Furthermore, import of
nal goods may be a stage of production (e.g. assembly) where many low- and middle-income
countries have a comparative advantage, see Ng and Yeats (1999). However, the most obvious
way for rms to utilize this advantage is to set up own plants in the foreign country, an activity
that predominantly takes place in the case of larger rms.
Besides this, the available data is likely to be less informative for smaller rms. The reason
is that smaller rms do not have the same possibility for nding low- and middle-income
country suppliers and, therefore, smaller rms are likely to a larger extent to choose to buy
their intermediate inputs or nal goods from a third part trading company located in Denmark
outside the manufacturing sector. Hence, these goods do not show up as imports in the data
used.
Both hypotheses suggest that estimating using samples of larger rms, the e¤ect of low- and
middle-income country imports on skill-upgrading should increase. Therefore, all estimations
are performed for groups of rms according to size, where size is dened as the maximum
annual number of employees from the ve year sample period. The rms are split into ve
groups; rms with a maximum of 10-50 employees, 51-100 employees, 101-200 employees, 201-
500 employees and above 500 employees.
Before presenting the estimation results, table 4 and 5 introduce characteristics of the chosen
8Here industry is dened using the DB nomenclature, which is Statistics Denmarks more disaggregated
version of NACE rev. 1 industrial classication. The classication is used in its most disaggregated version
implying 316 di¤erent manufacturing industries (DB03).
119
subsamples. Table 4 presents the number of workers covered by the subsamples as well as the
developments in wage share composition over the sample period and table 5 the pattern of
imports by country of origin over the sample period.
Table 4: Total Wage Cost Shares Composition, Selected Groups within Danish
Manufacturing
   Year         Year    
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Full Sample 10-50 Employees
Workers / 1000 391.7 397.0 390.6 379.9 361.3 72.9 72.2 70.2 66.9 64.3
No Education 33:9% 33:6% 32:7% 32:0% 31:0% 32:0% 31:4% 30:6% 30:0% 29:3%
All Educations 66:1% 66:4% 67:3% 68:0% 69:0% 68:0% 68:6% 69:4% 70:0% 70:7%
Importing Firms 51-100 Employees
Workers / 1000 359.0 364.1 359.1 349.9 330.3 48.5 49.0 46.7 45.1 43.0
No Education 34:2% 33:8% 32:9% 32:2% 31:3% 34:0% 33:7% 32:6% 32:0% 31:2%
All Educations 65:8% 66:2% 67:1% 67:8% 68:7% 66:0% 66:3% 67:4% 68:0% 68:8%
Exporting Firms 101-200 Employees
Workers / 1000 355.0 360.4 353.7 344.9 328.7 49.9 51.1 50.3 47.7 44.4
No Education 34:1% 33:8% 32:9% 32:2% 31:2% 35:2% 34:8% 34:3% 33:5% 32:5%
All Educations 65:9% 66:2% 67:1% 67:8% 68:8% 64:8% 65:2% 65:7% 66:5% 67:5%
Im- and Exporting Firms 201-500 Employees
Workers / 1000 342.6 348.1 341.9 334.5 316.7 75.3 77.1 76.5 74.2 69.5
No Education 34:2% 33:9% 33:1% 32:3% 31:4% 35:0% 34:6% 33:0% 32:6% 32:2%
All Educations 65:8% 66:1% 66:9% 67:7% 68:6% 65:0% 65:4% 67:0% 67:4% 67:8%
Same Industry Firms +500 Employees
Workers / 1000 347.4 350.2 343.1 334.9 320.4 145.0 147.7 146.9 146.0 140.0
No Education 34:3% 33:9% 33:0% 32:3% 31:3% 33:9% 33:5% 32:9% 32:0% 30:6%
All Educations 65:7% 66:1% 67:0% 67:7% 68:7% 66:1% 66:5% 67:1% 68:0% 69:4%
Naturally there will be a high degree of overlap between rms importing, rms exporting and
rms engaged in both. Table 4 shows that the majority of workers are employed in rms both
importing and exporting and in rms not changing industry, and that the wage share patterns
for all three subsamples of rms with distinct trade patterns and those rms not changing
industry all resemble the full sample pattern.
Also for the subsamples of rms of di¤erent sizes similar wage share patterns are observed,
although with slightly more variation. Further, it is seen that almost 20 per cent of workers
are employed in the groups of rms with either 10-50 or 201-500 employees, around 12 per cent
are employed in the groups of rms with either 51-100 or 101-200 employees and the remaining
35-40 per cent in rms with + 500 employees.
Table 5 presents the pattern of imports by country of origin for all the subsamples over the
sample period.
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Table 5: Imports in Danish Firms by Country of Origins Income per Capita,
Selected Groups within Danish Manufacturing, DKK Billions
Countries by     Year        Year    
Income Group: 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Full Sample 10-50 Employees
Low & Middle 10.5 12.3 14.0 13.8 14.7 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5
High 60.1 68.5 77.8 79.0 75.8 5.6 6.5 6.6 6.9 6.6
Importing Firms 51-100 Employees
Low & Middle 10.5 12.3 14.0 13.8 14.7 1.6 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.8
High 60.1 68.5 77.8 79.0 75.8 6.4 7.3 7.3 7.5 7.4
Exporting Firms 101-200 Employees
Low & Middle 10.4 12.3 13.9 13.7 14.7 1.5 1.8 2.4 2.4 2.2
High 59.8 68.1 77.3 78.4 75.3 8.5 10.1 10.8 10.8 10.1
Im- and Exporting Firms 201-500 Employees
Low & Middle 10.4 12.3 13.9 13.7 14.7 2.0 2.4 2.7 2.9 3.6
High 59.8 68.1 77.3 78.4 75.3 16.2 18.3 19.1 18.3 18.7
Same Industry Firms +500 Employees
Low & Middle 9.9 11.4 12.7 12.5 13.7 3.7 4.2 5.2 5.0 5.6
High 55.1 62.3 71.5 72.3 69.3 23.5 26.3 34.0 35.5 33.0
As expected the group of importing rms exactly resembles the overall pattern. Slightly more
surprising, the group of exporting rms also account for almost the entire imports within Danish
manufacturing rms. This underlines the fact, that importing and exporting activities are
closely related within Danish manufacturing rms. The group of rms staying within the same
industry is seen to account for more than 90 per cent of the overall imports in manufacturing
rms, and the pattern of low- and middle-income and high-income imports is seen to resemble
the full sample pattern.
For the subsamples of rms of di¤erent sizes two observations are worth noticing. Firstly,
although the amount of imports for each subsample relative to the overall imports are seen to
be related to the share of workers in each subsample, the imports per worker increases with
rm-size (at least up until the group with 200-500 employees). Secondly, the increase in imports
over the sample period, especially for imports from low- and middle-income countries, is clearly
positively correlated with rm size.
Having introduced the most important characteristics of the subsamples table 6 and 7
present estimates for all subsamples. Both tables only present the model that fully utilizes the
import information and includes import intensities by country of origin and level of processing.9
9The remaining models for all subsamples (1-3 in table 3 above) are available from the author upon request.
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Table 6: Change in Skilled Wage Share, 1999-2003, Trade & Industry
Patterns
Full
Sample
Importing
Firms
Exporting
Firms
Im- and
Exporting
Firms
Same
Industry
Firms
Relative wage; -0.057 -0.046 -0.051 -0.047 -0.058
Skilled (4 .26)** (3.02)** (3.42)** (3.01)** (3.97)**
ln (Yi) -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.002
(1 .84) (3 .39)** (3.30)** (3.58)** (1.13)
ln (Ki) 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.001
(1 .06) (2 .46)* (1.48) (2 .41)* (0.33)
Imp_int_lmic
i
Yi
0.041 0.039 0.044 0.043 0.070
(2 .23)* (2.22)* (2.45)* (2.46)* (3.22)**
Imp_int_hic
i
Yi
-0.009 -0.010 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013
(1 .52) (1 .73) (2 .37)* (2.36)* (2.13)*
Imp_n_lmic
i
Yi
0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011
(1 .76) (1 .77) (1 .79) (1 .81) (1 .84)
Imp_n_hic
i
Yi
-0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
(0 .43) (0 .54) (0 .56) (0 .60) (0 .66)
R&Dj
Yj
0.377 0.401 0.359 0.398 0.629
(7 .53)** (7.68)** (6.87)** (7.42)** (9.14)**
Firms 6970 4453 4597 3895 6114
Obs: 24791 17530 18016 15620 21027
Standard errors in parentheses
* signicant at 5 per cent; ** signicant at 1 per cent
The rst observation from table 6 is that focusing only on importing manufacturing rms
does not change the magnitude or signicance of how imports a¤ects skill-upgrading.
Next, restricting to exporting or im- and exporting rms the signicance and magnitude of
intermediate import intensities from low- and middle-income countries increases slightly and
intermediate import intensities from high-income countries becomes signicantly negative. The
latter indicates that Danish manufacturing rms that export have comparative advantages in
production processes that are intensive in unskilled labor when compared to other high-income
countries.
Finally, restricting to rms staying in the same industry the signicance and magnitude of
intermediate import intensities from low- and middle-income countries increase considerably
and as for the exporting rms the intermediate import intensities from high-income countries
becomes signicantly negative. Also, the R&D intensities become much larger and more sig-
nicant. Combined, these factors suggest either the wage share composition within this group
is more a¤ected by import patterns, or data considerations make the e¤ects easier recoverable.
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Table 7: Change in Skilled Wage Share, 1999-2003, Firm Size Patterns
Full
Sample
10-50
Emp.
51-100
Emp.
101-200
Emp.
201-500
Emp.
+500
Emp.
Relative wage; -0.057 -0.056 -0.062 -0.084 -0.031 -0.061
Skilled (4 .26)** (3.25)** (2.27)* (2.33)* (0.74) (0 .96)
ln (Yi) -0.003 0.001 -0.008 -0.013 -0.011 -0.034
(1 .84) (0 .60) (2 .23)* (2.89)** (2.84)** (4.84)**
ln (Ki) 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.009 0.008
(1 .06) (0 .11) (0 .10) (0 .13) (3 .33)** (1.02)
Imp_int_lmic
i
Yi
0.041 0.016 0.071 0.116 0.106 0.094
(2 .23)* (0.64) (1 .48) (2 .47)* (3.33)** (1.78)
Imp_int_hic
i
Yi
-0.009 -0.008 0.028 -0.007 0.004 -0.057
(1 .52) (1 .08) (1 .85) (0 .43) (0 .28) (1 .66)
Imp_n_lmic
i
Yi
0.011 0.010 -0.022 0.070 0.183 0.498
(1 .76) (1 .45) (0 .63) (2 .05)* (3.01)** (3.09)**
Imp_n_hic
i
Yi
-0.004 -0.012 0.006 0.083 -0.044 0.049
(0 .43) (1 .01) (0 .38) (3 .32)** (1.81) (1 .05)
R&Dj
Yj
0.377 0.248 0.713 0.626 0.665 -0.021
(7 .53)** (3.63)** (6.67)** (5.70)** (5.61)** (0.12)
Firms 6970 5084 929 479 330 148
Obs: 24791 16876 3880 1994 1418 623
Standard errors in parentheses
* signicant at 5 per cent; ** signicant at 1 per cent
Table 7 presents the results for the subsamples of rms of di¤erent sizes, and a number of new
and interesting insights appear.
For the two subsamples of rms with less than 100 employees, constituting the majority of
rms, no measures of import intensities have signicant e¤ects.
Next, it is seen that intermediate import intensities from low- and middle-income countries
are more signicant and have much larger e¤ects for larger rms compared to the full sample
(although borderline insignicant for the rms with +500 employees).
Finally, nal good import intensities from low- and middle-income countries are also signi-
cant for larger rms, and the magnitude increase rapidly with rm size, suggesting that import
of nal goods is very important in explaining skill-upgrading for larger rms within Danish
manufacturing.
The last fact ties in with the discussion of why the empirical evidence of imports e¤ect on
skill-upgrading may vary according to rm size. The results can be interpreted as supporting
the hypothesis either that larger rms have advantage in utilizing the import of nal goods
production from low- and middle-income countries due to scale (e.g. by setting up own produc-
tion) or that smaller rms to a larger degree utilize third party trading companies, whereby,
their importssimply do not show up in the data.
123
6 Conclusion
The main focus of the current paper has been to study the relation between imports and skill-
upgrading using a high quality employeer-employee sample from Danish manufacturing rms
covering the period from 1999-2003. In the paper it is argued how the micro level evidence
applied presents the following improvements over the traditional use of input-output tables:
 The ability to distinguish imports according to whether it originates from low- or high-
income countries
 The possibility of adding import of nal goods
 The capability to capture within industry di¤erences
 The ability to identify and analyze groups rms across industry classication
The paper proceeds by presenting a theoretical argument why the relative demand for skilled
labor in high-income countries increases with the extent of manufacturing rm imports from low-
income countries. Next an empirical estimation strategy is formulated to test this hypothesis.
It is found that all improvements are of vital importance as the three main conclusions of
the paper are:
1. Pooling imports from all countries and disregarding import of nal products is showed
to render the e¤ect of imports on skill-upgrading close to zero and insignicant (see
model 1 in table 3). Thus, limiting data in this way (similar to the limits imposed when
using gures from input-output tables) will signicantly bias the results and lead to under-
evaluation of imports role for skill-upgrading.
2. When imports are split according to country of origin and level of processing import of
intermediate goods from low- and middle-income countries is found to have a signicant
e¤ect on skill-upgrading for the full sample of manufacturing rms and import of nal
goods from low- and middle-income countries is found to have a signicant e¤ect on
skill-upgrading for several subsamples within manufacturing rms. Hence, distinguishing
imports according to country of origin and level of processing are of vital importance.
3. Although import of nal goods from low- and middle-income countries is found to be
borderline insignicant in the overall sample of manufacturing rms, the analysis showed
(see table 7) that when grouping rms according to their size, import of nal goods from
low- and middle-income countries has a large and signicant impact on skill-upgrading for
rms with more than 100 employees. And interestingly, the explanatory power and mag-
nitude of import of nal goods from low- and middle-income countries for skill-upgrading
increases with rm size.
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These are all empirical facts adding to the understanding of how international trade a¤ects
skill-upgrading. And, as current research seeks to develop theoretical models that to a higher
extent allow us to understand and test the causal relations of trade, this paper suggests, that
one should consider in details how and why larger rms are more a¤ected by international
trade, and especially, why nal good imports seems to be so much more important for this
group of rms.
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